History Forum / General / British History / June 2006

Hard to say what his politics are. How would you describe the impact of
personal politics on the decision to engage in espionage on the likes of
James W. McCord, Jr., Aldrich Ames, Jeffrey Carney, Clyde Conrad, Robert
Hanssen, Ronald Pelton and many many others? Answer: None. They were all
in for the money. As is the case in 75% of all cases of espionage. But,
Hines would have to get back in his time machine and travel forward to at
least the early 1990s to know that.

Homework assignment for Hines: http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/spies.pdf

This pogue, Ronald N. Montaperto, is clearly a Left-Wing Democrat operative
and spy for China.

The Democrats LOVE him.

<http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=450004&subid=900021&contentid=1293>

The dumb Democrats even tell us to click under the RED header in order to
get Montaperto's piece of Communist Propaganda.

Hilarious!

Deeeeelightful!

Not surprisingly -- this Left-Wing Democrat and Communist sympathizer,
appeaser and actual SPY for Red China -- Ronald N. Montaperto -- told us
that Red China really isn't a THREAT after all -- and the Left-Wing
Democrats lapped it up.

They even called it a "Reality Check".

Virginia, it just doesn't get any better than this.

Enjoy!

DSH

Lux et Veritas et Libertas
----------------------------------------

"Assessing the Chinese Military Threat"

By Ronald N. Montaperto

The full text of this report is available in Adobe PDF format. Click
"Full_Report.pdf" under the red File Attachments header on the right.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

PPI | Policy Report | April 1, 1998
Reality Check

"Assessing the Chinese Military Threat"

By Ronald N. Montaperto

"The full text of this report is available in Adobe PDF format. Click
"Full_Report.pdf" under the red File Attachments header on the right."

Hilarious!

RED, Aye!

Yep, it's a RED File Attachment all right.

DSH
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

"China is laying the foundations for an aggressive claim to
preeminence in the Pacific. It ought to be very clear that this is a
catastrophe for all of us, and could foreshadow a Cold War as bad as the
last." Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (1981-1987)

Bingo!  -- DSH

"Beijing has come to see the United States not as a strategic partner,
but as the chief obstacle to its own strategic ambitions.... Moreover, the
Chinese-American rivalry of the future...will increasingly challenge
Western, and especially American, global supremacy. Richard Bernstein and
Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict With China"

"There is no fundamental contradiction of interests between the United
States and China." Chas Freeman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
(1993-95)

"There are no unmanageable U.S.-China conflicts. In both economic and
security relations, conflicting interests are amenable to negotiation and
mutually satisfactory outcomes." Robert S. Ross, Harvard University, (The
National Interest, Fall 1997)

     Defense and economic analysts are clearly engaged in a sharply
polarized debate over the future strategic posture and intentions of the
People's Republic of China. The pause engendered by the recent visit of U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen is almost certainly temporary. The debate
is likely to resume and even intensify in the months ahead.

     The first school, reflected in a drumbeat of books and articles in
recent months, assumes the essential incompatibility of U.S. and Chinese
national interests. Its proponents believe that China is determined to
create a new security order, one in which Beijing will exert uncontested
hegemonic power in Asia and be a power with true global reach as well.
According to this view, the modernization program of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army (PLA) foretells Beijing's plan to use its rapidly growing
economic strength to build a world-class military force to drive the United
States--which it sees as an adversary-- from the region and establish its
control over every dimension of Asian political and economic affairs.

     The logic of this thesis leads to the conclusion that the two nations
are on a collision course and conflict is probably inevitable, since vital
U.S. interests require opposition to any such rising power. Thus we arrive
at a familiar template and policy prescription: China replaces the Soviet
Union with a similar anti-American mission; and Washington should use every
means available to constrain and even prevent the development of China's
comprehensive national strength. In a word, U.S. interests require
"containment."

     The second school acknowledges a number of serious tension points,
such as Taiwan, human rights, and arms proliferation in U.S.-China
relations. But it also assumes that these can be resolved because American
and Chinese national interests are essentially compatible. Proponents
believe that although Beijing certainly could "spoil" regional stability and
challenge U.S. global interests, it will not do so. Good relations with
Washington and continued regional stability are vitally important to China's
top priority: economic modernization. Common, or at least overlapping,
interests establish a "strategic framework" for bilateral relations, making
the many irritants manageable. Again, the policy prescription is clear:
China's emergence as a major power can be managed by developing a broad
network of friendly relations and cementing this web for future benefit as
China becomes integrated into the world system. In a word, the United States
should "engage" China.

     This is a fruitless debate mired in a Cold War "black hat, white hat"
mind set. Major powers, particularly with 1.3 billion people, nuclear
weapons, a U.N. Security Council veto, and one of the world's largest
economies, cannot be ignored or merely isolated. Indeed, the United States
engaged the Soviet Union even as we contained it. In any case, the notion of
Beijing as global adversary, like the view of it as a strategic partner, is
based on assumptions for which there is conflicting empirical evidence. For
every bit of evidence pointing in favor of Beijing's "guilt," and therefore
the need to contain, (e.g., the 1996 military exercises in the Taiwan
Strait, arms sales in the Middle East, and the jailing of dissidents), it is
possible to adduce countervailing evidence of Chinese good intentions (e.g.,
the cross-strait visits by mid-level officials, Beijing's adherence to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the spread
of village elections, and laws allowing citizens to sue the government).

     A critical factor shaping China's behavior will be its military
capabilities. This paper assesses the current strength of China's military,
its modernization plans, and suggests policy responses for the United
States. If, as has been noted above, Beijing's strategic objectives are
shrouded in ambiguity, its military capabilities remain less so, even
allowing for the PLA's extreme emphasis on secrecy. An understanding of
military capabilities can help analyze and assess, if not the intentions of
the Chinese leadership, at least the most important material factors that
will influence and constrain its international behavior.

     The analysis in this paper concludes:

     a.. The PLA is not engaged in a crash program designed to produce
modern military capabilities within a short period of time. On the contrary,
since the late 1970s, PLA leaders have clearly accepted that military
modernization should be tied to overall economic development. The most
optimistic Chinese expectation is that the program will produce incremental
results over as many as five decades.

     a.. At present, the PLA would be hard pressed to fulfill successfully
its basic missions with respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Nor is
the PLA a match for the military forces of its regional neighbors such as
Japan and the Republic of Korea.

     a.. The PLA is capable of harming the interests of the United States
as well as those of its friends and allies. However, the PLA can only act as
a spoiler. It cannot effect a qualitative change in the overall environment,
or establish a military momentum that would enable it to gain and sustain
important political advantage. Eventually, countervailing political and
military pressure would come to bear and cause the Chinese to pay a heavy
price for the economic development goals it prizes so highly.

     a.. In general, Beijing considers itself to be more secure today than
at any time since the end of World War II. China's strategic concerns stem
from a desire to complete national reunification and defend Chinese
territory. The PLA focus is defensive and directed toward its borders and
adjacent areas. It is an expression of Chinese irredentismi.e. the desire
to recover culturally or historically related lands now under foreign
controlbut not necessarily wider expansionism. If all of its plans
materialize without difficulty, in 20 to 30 years, China will still be a
regional power.

     a.. It is grossly misleading to conceive China as the next Soviet
Union, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. China's military
modernization program is still relatively modest in scale and limited in
means. It is unlikely that China's economy will continue to grow at the 9 to
10 percent annual rate of recent years. Beijing is not rushing pell-mell to
become a military superpower.

     a.. China's nuclear modernization is a key factor determining the
future of nuclear weapons in the world. The United States and Russia
continue a build down, which, if and when START III is implemented, will
reduce each side to 2000-2500 warheads, some 85 percent less than at the
height of the Cold War. China has roughly 350-400 warheads. Avoiding a
buildup is in the Chinese interest. The United States and China should form
a strategic consultative group to explore the possibility of post-START III
cuts in exchange for a ceiling on numbers of Chinese warheads as part of a
multilateral negotiation on nuclear arms and missile defense among the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

     A high degree of ambiguity surrounds the question of China's future
development and the direction of its internal and external policies. This
ambiguity is likely to remain a factor complicating the U.S. policy calculus
for at least a generation to come. But there are some certainties: China
already plays a defining role in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region. It
is irredentist, with a large sense of historical grievance. In the future,
Chinese power and influence will almost certainly continue to grow. As
China's economic and military capabilities develop, the test will be whether
China is expansionist as well. In either case, some disruption of the
political, economic, and military status quo will be likely. In this sense,
China already poses a challenge to East Asian security, and could also play
a "spoiler" role throughout Asia.

     If Beijing were willing to pay the inevitable price, the PLA today
could seriously damage potential adversaries in limited campaigns. But this
does not mean that China will inevitably choose to use the military
instrument in pursuing its interests. Whether it chooses to do so or not
depends upon many things, not the least important of which is the nature and
quality of the military instruments available to the Chinese leadership."
-------------------------------------

DSH

Lux et Veritas et Libertas

Vires et Honor