History Forum / General / British History / August 2008

A concise summary of the story, yes...

Who is the source in the US military who can show any evidence of the
deal?

They've got quotes saying "if there was a deal like that, it would be a
bad thing".

So you believe that when the US Army rescued Jessica Lynch, it really
was a faked incident using pyrotechnics and blank rounds, they actually
knew there was no danger and they exaggerated the whole incident for
publicity?

After all, the odds of the BBC having the story right, versus a
self-serving denial by the US military that is embarrassed by the story,
favours the BBC by a great deal...

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm>
 "We were surprised. Why do this? There was no military, there were no
soldiers in the hospital," said Dr Anmar Uday, who worked at the
hospital.

"It was like a Hollywood film. They cried 'go, go, go', with guns and
blanks without bullets, blanks and the sound of explosions. They made a
show for the American attack on the hospital - action movies like
Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan."

So, were the BBC right then, too? Don't bother with self-serving denials
by the US military...

Which is why you shouldn't be doing it.

In other words, the BBC are infallible?

Try the Chief of the General Staff.

+++++
RHQ/RRF/1363 28th April 2008

   1. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF’S LETTER TO THE ARMY ON THE SITUATION
IN IRAQ

The Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Richard Dannatt,
visited Iraq last week and wants to ensure that All Ranks are aware of
the current situation in theatre.

CGS’ unclassified letter follows below and is self-explanatory,
outlining the conclusions of his visit to Iraq last week but set in the
context of the Campaign as a whole over the last 5 years so that no one
should be in any doubt as to the current situation. Although addressed
to CinC Land Forces it is for general release.

25th Apr 08

CinC Land Forces

IRAQ

1.      I have just come back from one of my regular visits to Iraq and
given the recent developments, I thought that it was important to give
you my views about the situation and I would ask you to pass on this
perspective to the chain of command and our families so that everyone is
clear as to what is going on.

2.      The first point to make is that as far back as 2003, the
Campaign Plan envisaged a progressive handing over of responsibility to
the Iraqis, both in governance and security.  This is what we have
achieved in Dhi Qar, Al Muthanna and Maysan and was what occurred last
year in Basra when we handed over the last remaining base in the city,
and then, in December 2007, the Province itself, to Iraqi control.
Having set the conditions in Basra, the concept of moving into an
overwatch posture at the Contingency Operating Base at Basra Airport was
the next logical step and has allowed the Iraqi Security Forces to
assume responsibility for the security of the Province.  We always
assumed that ‘overwatch’ involved the possibility of having to
re-intervene in security matters if deemed appropriate by both the
Iraqis and the Multinational Force that our troops come under.  The idea
that ‘overwatch’ simply involved our soldiers merely sitting around
waiting to be called was always inaccurate, since the strategy has
always been dependent on capacity building of the Iraqi Security Forces
both in numbers and capabilities – and that has kept us pretty busy.

3.      When I visited Iraq last week, I met soldiers of every rank who
were positive about their role and committed to the task.  I cannot deny
that there are many who said that they would rather be at the forefront
of the operations (as CGS, I think that I would be worried if I headed
an Army that did not express such views) but those same individuals were
all mature enough to understand it is right that the Iraqis that are now
taking the lead. Indeed, these are exactly the nature of operations that
we have been pressing for for some months – an Iraqi solution to an
Iraqi problem.  The Iraqis have called their surge into Basra
‘Operation Charge of the Knights’ and the Iraqi Prime Minister took
the decision to take personal charge of it. To us in the military, that
is a clear sign as to where the Iraq Main Effort has shifted and as a
consequence, where the support of the Multinational Force must follow.
The deployment of additional Multinational Corps headquarters staff
(mostly from the US) to Multinational Division (South East) Basra is
therefore an entirely logical military move which we can understand and
support.

4.      Following the principles of overwatch, we have provided support
to the Iraqis where it is appropriate and within our rules of
engagement.  The capabilities that the Iraqis have requested from us and
which we have provided include intelligence, aerial surveillance (manned
and unmanned), force protection (including CHALLENGER 2 and WARRIOR),
support helicopters, logistic and medical support.  In addition, we have
continued to mentor the Iraqi Security Forces and that is where most of
our effort is now directed, principally with the Iraqi 14th Division.
However, the Iraqis have supported their main effort by moving
additional formations into the Basra area and these have come from areas
in Iraq where they have been mentored by US troops.  Just as it makes
sense for UK advisors to accompany the Iraqi troops that we mentor, it
makes equal sense that US advisors should operate alongside the Iraqi
units they have been working with as they are brought in from other
parts of the country for ‘Operation Charge of the Knights’.

5.      Some commentators have been critical of the way that the Iraqi
operation has been carried out.  Having visited Iraq and talked to many
of those involved, I have concluded that this is unreasonable and
ignores the complexity of dealing with determined adversaries in
challenging counter-insurgency operations.  Just as Multinational Forces
have challenges in operating in a foreign country, the Iraqi Security
Forces face different challenges in operating in their own country.  It
is also worth bearing in mind that a year or so ago, 14 Division did not
exist.  Nor was it at full operating capability when operations in Basra
started.  Therefore to expect it to perform to a standard that has taken
other nations (including our own) decades to reach is patently
unrealistic.  No one would deny that aspects of the Iraqi operation
could have gone better at the outset.  But there is no doubt that each
phase (the Iraqis are now on the fourth phase ) has gone from strength
to strength and is now showing some significant results – the Iraqi
plan is working and is delivering what we sought.  Indeed Basrawis are
now being reported as “optimistic” about the future for the first
time in many years.

6.      My conclusion from my visit is that the campaign remains on its
broad track but as everyone in the Army who has either served in Iraq or
been involved in supporting the operation knows, it has, and will
continue, to take time.  We have quite properly reduced our force
numbers over the last couple of years, but there will still be many more
challenges to overcome and at no stage will it be easy.  When faced with
these situations, we must steel ourselves to see it through; this is
what we have done for the past 5 years and we will continue to do so as
long as a Land Forces contingent is required in Southern Iraq.  I
returned from my visit buoyed by the courage, sense of purpose and
determination of our soldiers.  I would like everyone to know this, lest
anyone think that somehow this is not the case and our families can
continue to take great pride in how their loved ones are carrying out
their duty as professional soldiers serving their country.

CGS
+++++

Now, if you want to call Richard Dannatt a liar, you'd be most unwise:
he's earned a formidable reputation for honesty.

Because they were attached to the Iraqi Army units that Maliki sent
south at short notice, cutting his local commander (and the British) out
of the loop. You've been told that several times, didn't you notice?

There is "a perception"? There is none of that awkward "evidence"?
Funny, that...

More nonsense from more nameless "sources".

Because, you know, *nobody* would notice that they were meant to be
going into Basrah and actually they weren't, and *nobody* would wonder
why. If there was a deal to "leave the militias alone" that has to be
pushed right down the chain of command: otherwise, the militias don't
get left alone.

Try looking beyond the BBC for your information.

<http://www.soldiermagazine.co.uk/mag/update1.htm>
A SENIOR American officer has praised British soldiers for their work in
southern Iraq, claiming that their “decisive” efforts had helped
smash rogue militias.

Gen Jack Keane, who serves on the US Policy Review Board, told reporters
there had been a “stunning turnaround” in fortunes and said the
troops deserved recognition. He had earlier been quoted in the media as
saying there was a “general disengagement” by British forces in the
region and that security on the ground was gradually deteriorating.

But speaking in Basra, he pointed out that British support for the
Iraqi-led Operation Charge of the Knights had played a pivotal role in
defeating the insurgents who had been in control in some areas of the
city.

“It has been a stunning victory in such a short period of time,” he
said. “I was here in the third week of March of this year and the
militia were pretty much in control of the city. Now the Iraqi security
forces are in control. You can go any place in Basra, have complete
freedom of movement and can do it safely.”

Gen Keane praised soldiers of 7th Armoured Brigade – the Desert Rats –
for their work with the Iraqis in Military Transition Teams. They had
passed on invaluable knowledge and experience to the Iraqi soldiers they
were mentoring, who were becoming a credible force in their own right.

“Working with the Iraqis side-by-side, providing advice and counsel
and helping educate them about techniques and procedures we know work is
a proven combination,” he said.

“The British participation is not only helpful, it is decisive.”
Gen Keane said he believed that the Iraqis had a strong senior commander
in Gen Aziz, who was committed to ensuring enemy forces had no place to
hide. His crackdown had hit the insurgents hard.

“The British military, the Iraqi forces and some of the US forces that
are also participating in the operation deserve a tremendous amount of
credit,” Gen Keane concluded.
+++++

<http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqi-security-force-operat
ions-basra>

"Frustrated American officials claimed that the Iraqi government
overestimated the ISF’s abilities, “underestimated the scale of
resistance,” and failed to establish detailed and coordinated
plans.[xvi]  Despite prior coordination with American leaders in
Baghdad, Maliki’s impulsive thrust into Basra left Iraqi and Coalition
forces without time to prepare and mass forces before mounting the
attack.[xvii]  Given the historical lack of U.S. and British presence in
Basra as well as the limits of Iraqi logistics and command and control,
Operation Charge of the Knights would have been difficult under far
better circumstances.[xviii]  The GOI’s faulty planning and
coordination complicated the mission even further and contributed to
perceptions that Mahdi militiamen completely defeated the Iraqi Security
Forces.[xix]"

+++++
<http://crapo.senate.gov/issues/preserving_freedom/documents/twii_080630.
pdf>
BASRA — Operation Charge of the Knights, a joint operation involving
UK Soldiers and the Iraqi Army, which aims to restore order and improve
security in Basra, is making further progress. The Iraqi Army continues
to demonstrate its commitment to improving the security situation in the
city, carrying out a number of vehicle check points in recent days.
Inspections were carried out on a number of vehicles which were going in
and out of
the city.

Operation Charge of the Knights, which began in March, is now into its
14th phase. The operation has been one of the key drivers in bringing
peace and stability to the streets of Basra in recent months. Elements
of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service, with their US and UK
Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), can now be seen working in the city.

<http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17853&
Itemid=128>
NT:  Question from Al-Watan Newspaper. A few days ago we’ve heard that
there is a desire by the United States to coordinate with the British
government to bring back the British forces to Basra. If this is true,
will—have you addressed the British government regarding this?

MAJ GEN BERGNER:  Well, first of all, let me say that the British forces
that remain in Basra are there specifically to help enable and partner
with Iraqi Security Forces, and they are still there operating in the
province of Basra. I think that the decisions, the deployment of Iraqi
Security Forces, and the leadership and direction of the Government of
Iraq in the last few days demonstrates that the Government of Iraq takes
very seriously their responsibility and their capability to project
force into provinces that have achieved provincial Iraqi control and to
assert the necessary security forces to enforce the rule of law.

And so, this is less about the coalition forces in the province of Basra
than it is about Iraqi Security Forces and the leadership of the
Government of Iraq in implementing plans necessary to deal with criminal
activity. Shukran. Yes, sir.

....

REP5:  James Hider from the London Times. You said that there had been
discussions with low-level members of the Jaish al-Mahdi in the Sadrist
office. Are those discussions going on? And what exactly did you agree
before this operation started? Have they in any way signed off on this
was the first question?

And secondly, what is the plan if the Iraqi forces can’t take Basra?
The British were there for five years, thousands of troops and we got
into this mess anyway. Is there any plan for reinforcements, for
coalition troops to go in if the Army can’t take Basra? And I hear
that they’ve been repulsed from one area, Al-Hanaya, already by the
Mahdi Army?

MAJ GEN BERGNER:  What was the first part of your question?

REP5:  It was the talks with the Jaish al-Mahdi.

MAJ GEN BERGNER:Oh, yeah. Okay. Well, first let me start with that. At
the local level, coalition commanders have talked to members of the
Jaish al-Mahdi on an unexceptional basis in an effort to try to improve
security in neighborhoods in different districts. And so, lieutenant
colonels and brigade commanders have engaged and will continue to engage
in dialog with all those who seek to improve security in the districts
and neighborhoods that they are responsible for.

And that has included members who are associated with Jaish al-Mahdi in
the past and it is not specifically tied to anything today. So I
think…I don’t want to mislead you that there is some recent
discussion or interaction underway. That’s not what I intended.

REP5:  [Unintelligible] talks on at the moment. There’ve been talks
[unintelligible].

MAJ GEN BERGNER:I can’t tell you if there are battalion commanders out
there today talking to members of Jaish al-Mahdi, but they have in the
past, and where there is a basis to help improve the security situation
we continue to…we will always be willing to talk to folks on that level.

....

REP11:  Sam Dagher] with the Christian Science Monitor. Thank you for
the opportunity. Just a couple of questions. We were told by an Iraqi
security official in Basra who is actually taking part in the operation
itself that there are U.S. and British soldiers close to the Iranian
border at the moment to intercept any sort of militia or weapons
movement.

So if you can comment on that. Second question is, we were just in Sadr
City and the whole…pretty much the whole district is ringed by U.S.
troops and U.S. military vehicles. A lot of the inner roads are now
closed by the militiamen themselves. They are out on the streets. They
are not letting anyone go in or out. We were told…we even saw evidence
perhaps that they’ve even booby-trapped a lot of the main roads into
Sadr City and laid IEDs. Is this mission impossible?

I mean, they are now among civilians. How could you get them? And also
the third question is relating to…[laughs] border, Sadr City, and, oh,
yesterday government checkpoints, Army and police—I mean, I saw this
with my own eyes. The militiamen were right next to these checkpoints
intimidating people, telling them to actually go back home, to close
their shops.

There was so much anti-American banners and graffiti at all these
checkpoints. So…I mean doesn’t this maybe lead us to question a
little bit maybe the loyalty of some of these forces and whether they
would be willing to fight, you know, these militiamen and criminals when
push comes to shove? Thank you.

MAJ GEN BERGNER:  First, the forces that we have in Basra are the forces
that we have embedded in any…with any other Iraqi Security Forces. We
have transition teams with Iraqi Army units.

We have liaison officers with the Baghdad Operations Command, and they
represent both the Multi-National Force and MND…Multi-National
Division – Southeast. And we have the normal relationship we have with
border enforcement teams, which we generally have a border enforcement
transition team that helps coordinate efforts and develop capacity
within the border enforcement elements as well.

Those are the forces that we have in Basra. And we do not have any
conventional forces there. We do not have the…there have been other
reports that there were coalition forces deployed there. What we have
there is what I just described. Your comment about Sadr City and the
circumstance there, as you know, much of the indirect fire that has been
directed towards neighborhoods here in Baghdad has emanated from the
vicinity of East Baghdad and Sadr City in several cases in particular.

....

INT:  Question from Kurdistan TV. You have mentioned that there are some
foreign sides that stand behind the military operations in Basra.  And
you’ve mentioned also Quds Forces. Is this a direct accusation by you
against Iran regarding the operations and what’s going on in Basra?

The second question: is there any intention…if there is any withdrawal
of the British forces, will you take over responsibility there instead
of the British forces in case the British forces withdrew from Basra?

MAJ GEN BERGNER:  Well, first of all, the Government of Iraq has asked
its neighbors to exert helpful influence in improving the security and
stability in Iraq. The Government of Iraq has asked its neighbors to
exert positive and helpful influences to improve the stability and
security here in their country. And we have certainly joined them in
that interest as well.

And in terms of Basra, there is no question but the Government of Iran
has significant influence in Basra and in the province and in
southeastern Iraq in general. And so, we would love to see the
Government of Iran fulfill its commitment to help improve the security
and stability and the situation there, and to reduce the activities of
those operating outside the law.

And our understanding is that the Government of Iraq is working closely
with their neighbors, specifically to ask their improved support in
improving the situation there. In terms of—what was your second
question again? It was about the Brit-…I remember. It’s…I got it.
Your second question was about MN-…Multi-National Division –
Southeast, and British forces there.

The government of the UK and the leadership of the Multi-National
Division there have made it very clear that they are working…they are
going to continue to perform their mission. They are continuing to work
with the Iraqi Security Forces, and so there really isn’t a basis for
me to project beyond that. There is no sense that they will do otherwise
than continue their mission there. Shukran. Who have I not asked
on…yes, sir.

....