Battle of Britain fighter stations
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a.spencer3 - 04 Mar 2004 15:32 GMT Hippo got me wondering re BoB fighter stations in Surrey, and I found the following:
http://www.battle-of-britain.com/
I'd think that NW Surrey was just a bit back from the fun! Certainly, from Wimbledon in those days, we saw all the dogfights, etc., and had plenty of doodlebugs & continual bombing. My father was serving then, mainly from Biggin Hill. Locals in this area tell me that specific targets were bombed - Brooklands, Farnborough, Aldershot. But little of the blanket London problems.
Probably kids' stuff to the WWII ngs, but worth checking for me.
Surreyman
hippo - 05 Mar 2004 14:50 GMT "a.spencer3" wrote in message
> Hippo got me wondering re BoB fighter stations in Surrey, and I found the > following: [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > Probably kids' stuff to the WWII ngs, but worth checking for me. So it looks like attacks from the West were covered from bases around Portsmouth? -the Troll
a.spencer3 - 05 Mar 2004 18:40 GMT > "a.spencer3" wrote in message > [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > So it looks like attacks from the West were covered from bases around > Portsmouth? -the Troll Don't think so. I was on RAF St. Eval (mentioned on this site) in the 1950s, that's down in the West Country. I also knew of Wallop. I also saw a lot of wartime bombing over Cardiff when I was in Caerphilly some of the time - from this site, looks as if Cardiff might have been covered by RAF Filton (which I've visited) near Bristol. Bearing in mind the trouble Cardiff had, I'm a little surprised at the few fighter stations that were round there. My uncle was (later) CO of RAF St. Athan, but that's not mentioned, so presumably was not a fighter station in the war. But I'm an amateur at all this - why not ask the WWII ngs?
Surreyman
Surreyman
hippo - 05 Mar 2004 19:00 GMT "a.spencer3" wrote in message
> hippo wrote in message
> Don't think so. I was on RAF St. Eval (mentioned on this site) in the 1950s, > that's down in the West Country. I also knew of Wallop. I also saw a lot of [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > presumably was not a fighter station in the war. > But I'm an amateur at all this - why not ask the WWII ngs? I'll try to dig out my official history. It is probably in the box marked 'kitchen'. -the Troll
M. J. Powell - 05 Mar 2004 20:28 GMT >> "a.spencer3" wrote in message >> [quoted text clipped - 28 lines] >presumably was not a fighter station in the war. >But I'm an amateur at all this - why not ask the WWII ngs? Stormy Down and Brawdy and Angle had day fighters but nightfighters came from Middle Wallop IIRC.
There was also another station near St. Athan whose name I have forgotten.
Mike
 Signature M.J.Powell
WKensit - 07 Mar 2004 11:03 GMT > Hippo got me wondering re BoB fighter stations in Surrey, and I found the > following: [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > > Surreyman My father was with the first boat load of Canadians to arrive in Britain in WW2. He was in No 1 RCAF. BOB.com lists No1 RCAF in the squadron list but not in the airfield list. One gets a very static idea of the times from just this site. Dad brought home his "ditty bag"..brown canvas, perhaps 10" dia by 16" long. The sides of the bag were covered in the names of obscure airfields all over southern England. It was a case of "Oh, on **** we were bombed out of **** and some of us were sent to fly out of **** but 3 days later we had to move to ***". From conversations I have a sense, perhaps inaccurate, that the RAF came within a hair of losing, not in the air, but on the ground had the Luftwaffe paid more attention to the infrastructure required to support the Hurricanes and Spoitfires.
D. Spencer Hines - 06 Mar 2004 10:30 GMT Hilarious!
Old Proven History ---- No Naive Speculating Required.
The Luftwaffe decision to switch the concentration of their attacks from Fighter Command bases to bombing cities -- particularly London -- is seen as a disaster for the Nazis and a decisive turning point in the Battle Of Britain.
Do some reading before, [better instead of], you post ignorant, naive twaddle.
DSH
| ... From conversations I have a sense, perhaps | inaccurate, that the RAF came within a hair of losing, not in the air, | but on the ground had the Luftwaffe paid more attention to the | infrastructure required to support the Hurricanes and Spoitfires. [sic]
Julian Richards - 06 Mar 2004 23:55 GMT >Hilarious! > [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >seen as a disaster for the Nazis and a decisive turning point in the >Battle Of Britain. The switch was made after the RAF inadvertently bombed Berlin (Hampdens?) and Hitler demanded retribution.
This allowed the airfields and radar stations to be repaired and for aircraft to be worked on at the airfields without interruptions.
The extra advantage to the RAF was that bombing raids to London were further ands at the limit of German fighter range. Many 109's held up over London had to ditch in the Channel on the way home. It also allowed Bader's Big Wing, which was based further north (Duxford?) to play a greater part.
--
Julian Richards julian-richards "at" ntlworld.com
Usenet is how from the comfort of your own living room, you can converse with people that you would never want in your house.
D. Spencer Hines - 06 Mar 2004 14:44 GMT Indeed....
Even the film _Battle Of Britain_ gets most of this reasonably correct.
So, a gaffe on the part of Bomber Command led to a hasty, ill-considered decision by Hitler and Goering to change their strategy, which was WORKING, thereby saving Fighter Command from certain defeat ---- the _Narrow Margin._
The role of the contingent and the unforeseen in warfare ---- often a crap shoot.
Goering had made a claim early in World War II that his Luftwaffe was so superior to Allied forces that not a single British plane would reach Berlin -- "...or you can call me Meyer" ---- so he grossly overreacted when one did and made an egregious error in Grand Luftwaffe Strategy.
My initial objection was to the effect that the poster seemed to think he had discovered something brand-new.
DSH
| >Hilarious! | > [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] | Usenet is how from the comfort of your own living room, you can converse | with people that you would never want in your house. Julian Richards - 07 Mar 2004 01:17 GMT >Indeed.... > [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] >Berlin -- "...or you can call me Meyer" ---- so he grossly overreacted >when one did and made an egregious error in Grand Luftwaffe Strategy. I thought that Goering's claim was that fighters would never reach Berlin and it was USAAF Mustangs that made him look so foolish. If only he had known that some of these fighters were also the "Red Tails" flown by black pilots.
He was also embarrassed when rallies by him and Goebbels became known to allied intelligence and were buzzed by RAF Mosquitoes in daylight.
--
Julian Richards julian-richards "at" ntlworld.com
Usenet is how from the comfort of your own living room, you can converse with people that you would never want in your house.
Bernardz - 07 Mar 2004 02:35 GMT > So, a gaffe on the part of Bomber Command led to a hasty, ill-considered > decision by Hitler and Goering to change their strategy, which was > WORKING, thereby saving Fighter Command from certain defeat ---- the > _Narrow Margin._ The Germans had good reason to change there targets as the found out that London was the only target that the RAF would defend.
Overall the British were building fighters, faster then the Germans were shooting them down. Unless the Germans could invade Britain which is almost impossible because of the British navy, any defeat of the RAF could only he temporary.
 Signature The government runs its intelligence agencies to the same standard as the public transport system.
Observations of Bernard - No 51
Don Phillipson - 07 Mar 2004 13:27 GMT > Overall the British were building fighters, faster then the Germans were > shooting them down. Unless the Germans could invade Britain which is > almost impossible because of the British navy, any defeat of the RAF > could only he temporary. This equation is flawed. By August 1940 Fighter Command's critical shortage was trained pilots, not aircraft. If the Luftwaffe had continued to prompt day fighter combat, its capacity to sustain higher casualties would have worn the RAF down by attrition.
-- Don Phillipson Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
Keith Willshaw - 07 Mar 2004 13:45 GMT > > Overall the British were building fighters, faster then the Germans were > > shooting them down. Unless the Germans could invade Britain which is [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > to prompt day fighter combat, its capacity to sustain higher > casualties would have worn the RAF down by attrition. The RAF had more pilots on strength than fighters available to fly them and was training pilots faster then the Luftwaffe as well as building more aircraft.
During August, 103 Fighter Command pilots were killed and a further 128 were wounded. In the same period the Operational Training Units were able to prepare 260 men as replacements .
The Germans had taken higher losses and they were NOT able to field sufficient replacements. At the end of August Milch made the rounds of Luftwaffe bases in Northern France and found all luftwaffe units to be under strength, the best were at 90% of establishment and the worst 50%.
Keith
D. Spencer Hines - 07 Mar 2004 10:08 GMT Amusing...
The Brits here can't even agree whether Britain had a shortage of pilots or fighter aircraft in August 1940 ---- or a shortage of neither.
Deeeelightful!
DSH
Iain Rae - 07 Mar 2004 10:49 GMT > Indeed.... > > Even the film _Battle Of Britain_ gets most of this reasonably correct. No it get it correct.
> So, a gaffe on the part of Bomber Command No, no gaffe, 10 german bombers lost over England at night jettistoned their bombs and turned for home, they were over London at the time and this was assumed to be a deliberate attack. Churchill ordered the RAF to bomb Berlin in retaliation.
In the film you see the commander of the Luftwaffe bombers arriving in Berlin to get his dressing down at the same time as the RAF appear.
>led to a hasty, ill-considered > decision by Hitler and Goering to change their strategy, which was [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > My initial objection was to the effect that the poster seemed to think > he had discovered something brand-new. And you felt so smug about it you decided to broadcast the fact to sci.military.naval.
Followups set somewhere more appropriate for Mr Hines.
Keith Willshaw - 07 Mar 2004 10:37 GMT > >Hilarious! > > [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > allowed Bader's Big Wing, which was based further north (Duxford?) to > play a greater part. This is a simplistic view at best. The reality is that the decision to switch targets was made at a Luftwaffe Staff Meeting at the Hague on Sept 3 1940. While Hitler may well have wanted to have London bombed in reprisal the simple fact is that the recommendation to switch targets came from the Kesselring.
The Luftwaffe commanders were believing their own propaganda at this stage believeing the RAF had been seriously depeleted with between 100 and 300 aircraft left. Kesselring's reason for the switch of target was to draw the remaining strenght of the RAF into battle where it could be destroyed.
In reality RAF front line strength had INCREASED slightly during August 1940 but the Luftwaffe had suffered very serious attrition losing 229 Me-109's , 123 Me-110's, 75 Do-17's, 98 He-111's, 104 Ju-88's and 62 Ju-87's
They had not been able to replace these losses and when Milch made a tour of front line units he found they varied from 50-80% of nominal strength. At the same period RAF records show that every squadron had a full complement of aircraft + spares and 1150 pilots were available for 675 aircraft allowing pilots to be rested and even sent on leave during the BOB
Although neither side knew it at the time it was the Luftwaffe that was losing the war of attrition.
Keith
Olivers - 07 Mar 2004 15:19 GMT Keith Willshaw muttered....
> They had not been able to replace these losses and when Milch > made a tour of front line units he found they varied from 50-80% > of nominal strength. At the same period RAF records show > that every squadron had a full complement of aircraft + spares > and 1150 pilots were available for 675 aircraft allowing pilots > to be rested and even sent on leave during the BOB Adding to the RAF's statistical edge was the location of most of the engagements, over or near British soil. Any Luftwaffe aircrew shot down or aboard a/c with substantial mechanical problems were essentially lost (especially after the RAF decided that the Air Sea Rescue He115s ought to be harassed), while a substantial percentage of RAF pilots parachuting (even in coatsal waters) or making forced landings could be flying again within hours
> Although neither side knew it at the time it was the Luftwaffe > that was losing the war of attrition. He who readeth his own press releases is soon reduced to riding upon the hot air contained within them.
TMO
WKensit - 07 Mar 2004 11:52 GMT Couldn't you just say "you're correct?'"
> Hilarious! > [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > | infrastructure required to support the Hurricanes and Spoitfires. > [sic] a.spencer3 - 07 Mar 2004 09:43 GMT > Couldn't you just say "you're correct?'" Just ignore Hines. He's a self-important blowhard whom nobody knows outside of his isolated little island in the Pacific 2,500 miles from anywhere else and even further from any commonsense. Just ignore him, as the rest of this ng do.
Surreyman
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