Northern vs. Southern Generals?
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RalphReynolds@eSedona.net - 01 Oct 2006 13:00 GMT I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the South had a string of competent and brilliant generals - except for Bragg and Ewell (after Ewell lost his leg).
What was the cause of this? Chance? Or the fact that President Jackson was a military man, and President Lincoln was not?
Your response please. Thanks, Ralph.
ray o'hara - 01 Oct 2006 20:50 GMT > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > Your response please. > Thanks, Ralph. the south had one competant general. lee. in the western theater the south was losing from the beginning. A.S.Johnson, bragg, pillow, and many others,{a very long list} were hopeless. even jackson and longstreet are over-rated.
that the south had better generals is a myth that does not stand up to close scrutiny.
and i believe you meat president davis , not jackson, and his self imagined genious hurt the south whereas lincoln knew he was nonapoleon and he was willing to listen to council.
jschaller@genlytegroup.com - 02 Oct 2006 14:45 GMT Lincoln and Davis both took very different approaches to military leaders. Lincoln had the problem of politacl appointees who were not fit to command, but due to pressure to keep the Union states satisfied, he had to give in. Some of these men went on to be fine leaders, others did not and were quickly replaced. The problem that Lincoln faced was that there were great leaders, like McClelland who could lead the army, but did not know how to fight with it. They would often let Lee dictate the battle. Instead of taking the initiative, they would often move slowly, feeling Lee out and give him time to move his forces into place. Prime example is at the Seven Day's Battlefield. Lee knew the area and knew where to dig his line to stop the Union's approach on Richmond.
Lee's men, especially those regiments formed in Virginia has an advantage over the Union generals as well. They were fighting on ground that many of them grew up on. They knew what roads could support an army and which couldn't. Prime example is the flanking attack that Jackson used at Chancellorsville.
Lincoln had some very good officers, Handcock, Reynolds, Meade, Sickles, Hooker, Burnside (as a corp commander and not the army commander.) that could command, but they were never given the opportunity because of the "political generals." It was the commanding Generals that hindered the army, Hallick, McClelland, Pope, and Irwin.
As for the competance of Jackson and Longstreet. They were two firebrands that each had a tactical knowledge that surpassed many of the Union generals. It was Lee's ability to use each man to their tactial advantage (Jackson as an offensive war, Longstreet as a defensive war.) The loss of Jackson was very telling on the Confederate army (look at Gettysburg).
> > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > genious hurt the south whereas lincoln knew he was nonapoleon and he was > willing to listen to council. ray o'hara - 02 Oct 2006 23:23 GMT > Lincoln and Davis both took very different approaches to military > leaders. Lincoln had the problem of politacl appointees who were not [quoted text clipped - 27 lines] > defensive war.) The loss of Jackson was very telling on the > Confederate army (look at Gettysburg). the only real chance lee ever had to destroy the AoP was at the 7 days, jackson could be blamed for the failures. longstreet personally ruined j.e.johnston's plans at fair oak{7 pines}.
the south had their share of political generals too. floyd, and.sterling price to name a few.
there is much more to the civil war than just the ANV and the AoP.
lee was overly fond of the frontal assault. the highest single battles losses in the war both belong to lee, 7 days and gettysburg.
Alfred Montestruc - 02 Oct 2006 14:51 GMT > > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > genious hurt the south whereas lincoln knew he was nonapoleon and he was > willing to listen to council. One should consider the ratio of numbers of population and income in money and other factors, also the and superior supply chain in terms of rail transport, and the fact that the union had a large navy when making such statements. If the generals were roughly equal, then the union should have won quickly.
They did not, ergo their generalship was probably deficiant.
Note that the troops to space ratio was not so dense as to make it possible to defend all lines of approch by either side so the war was very much one of manuver and so generalship was more not less important. That is as opposed to conflicts like WWI where the troop to space ratio were such that both side had several men per linear yard of front. In the war between the states the space ratio was much much larger.
ray o'hara - 02 Oct 2006 23:23 GMT > > > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > > > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 26 lines] > making such statements. If the generals were roughly equal, then the > union should have won quickly. one should also consider the fact that the south had great defensive terrain. large well equipped armies and they didn't need masses of troops to defend their supply lines. the unions railroads did them no good in the south, the south had all the weapons they could uses and never suffered on that point. the rule of thumb is that a three to one advantage is needed to guarantee victory. also the confederacy was a huge area. when all that is considered the union actually won fairly quickly.
> They did not, ergo their generalship was probably deficiant. > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > front. In the war between the states the space ratio was much much > larger. the primative road net and railroads in the south constricted movement, armies could not just swarm about anywhere. they had to follow routes determined by roads which followed natural features. mountain ranges, trackless forrests and unfordable but also unnavigable rivers made the souths task of defence easier. choke points like chattanooga which was where you had to go through as it was the only place to cross the tennessee and also pass through mts. it is still so today. you view of the strategic and tactical realities is as simple as your view of the constitution.
Alfred Montestruc - 03 Oct 2006 11:32 GMT > > > > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > > > > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 31 lines] > one should also consider the fact that the south had great defensive > terrain. Not especially. It is not like Switzerland or the Balkans. Some good defensive terrain, but many other areas easy to traverse and a wide open flank where the US Navy could land troops almost anywhere with little or no naval opposition.
> large well equipped armies Not set next to the union.
>and they didn't need masses of troops to > defend their supply lines. the unions railroads did them no good in the > south, That is not true. It made it very possible for the Federal Government to shift axis of advances quickly from east coast to the area of the Mississippi valley and back, while the confederates could not do that, and had to keep large armies on both sides of the montains.
> the south had all the weapons they could use, ?????
http://www.civilwarhome.com/confederateordnance.htm -----------------quote At the beginning of the Civil War the Confederate States had very few improved small arms, no powder-mills of any importance, very few modern cannon, and only the small arsenals that had been captured from the Federal Government. These were at Charleston, Augusta, Mount Vernon (Alabama), Baton Rouge, and Apalachicola. The machinery that was taken from Harper's Ferry Armory after its abandonment by the Federals was removed to Richmond, Virginia, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, where it was set up and operated. There were some State armories containing a few small arms and a few old pieces of heavy ordnance. There was scarcely any gunpowder except about sixty thousand pounds of old cannon-powder at Norfolk. There was almost an entire lack of other ordnance stores--no saddles and bridles, no artillery harness, no accouterments, and very few of the minor articles required for the equipment of an army. ----------end quote
In other words, huh? where did you get that idea?
> and never suffered on > that point. > the rule of thumb is that a three to one advantage is needed to guarantee > victory. > also the confederacy was a huge area. when all that is considered the union > actually won fairly quickly. That is absurd.
> > They did not, ergo their generalship was probably deficiant. > > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > the primative road net and railroads in the south constricted movement, The rivers were used much more for commerce than in the north and that is how supplies were moved, and in the end how the Union learned to supply itself in the south.
In any case you are being absurd, the northeast USA has much better defensive terrain than the south. The great plains states have the least defendable terrain.
---snip
ray o'hara - 03 Oct 2006 18:44 GMT .
> > one should also consider the fact that the south had great defensive > > terrain. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > open flank where the US Navy could land troops almost anywhere with > little or no naval opposition. the union landed on many coastal areas.but moving inland was a problem. any really valuable place was defebded by strong forts and a garrison. any troops had to be taken from critical areas and a strongly held supply line would eat into any strength. the union tried and and found it was a no-go
> > large well equipped armies > > Not set next to the union. yes set next to the union. they had plenty of men in their armies and they had exactly the same weapons.
> >and they didn't need masses of troops to > > defend their supply lines. the unions railroads did them no good in the [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Mississippi valley and back, while the confederates could not do that, > and had to keep large armies on both sides of the montains. and then the union troops had to get off the trains and march south. switching troops from penn to ohio was nice in theort but onlt paid off once.
> > the south had all the weapons they could use, > > ????? the south never sufferd from lack of rifles or guns. what they were unable to steal from federal armories they imported from europe
> http://www.civilwarhome.com/confederateordnance.htm > -----------------quote [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > > In other words, huh? where did you get that idea? can you point to any time the confederates ran out of powder? that they didn't have all they could carry? they had plenty of small arms and more than enough guns. the north didn't have masses of ordnance on had neither. after bull run the war enterted a lull while both sides armed. when fighting resumed everybody had what they needed.
> > and never suffered on > > that point. [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > That is absurd. only to lost causers who keep trying to convince us the south actually won.
> > > They did not, ergo their generalship was probably deficiant. > > > [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > is how supplies were moved, and in the end how the Union learned to > supply itself in the south. sherman had no rivers to use. the tenn was passable only to muscle shoals. after vicksburg rivers ceased to be a factor.
> In any case you are being absurd, the northeast USA has much better > defensive terrain than the south. The great plains states have the > least defendable terrain. > > ---snip the northeast and the great plains had no bearing on the war.the highly constricted terrain of northern va, the mts of north georgia and the heavily forrested and ravine choked area along the mississppi did and those areas are prime defensive terrain.
Alfred Montestruc - 04 Oct 2006 11:45 GMT > . > > > one should also consider the fact that the south had great defensive [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > the union landed on many coastal areas.but moving inland was a problem. any > really valuable place was defebded by strong forts and a garrison. (boggle), like valuable targets would not be defended.
> any troops had to be taken from critical areas and a strongly held supply > line would eat into any strength. the union tried and and found it was a [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > they had plenty of men in their armies and they had exactly the same > weapons. As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it.
> > >and they didn't need masses of troops to > > > defend their supply lines. the unions railroads did them no good in the [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > switching troops from penn to ohio was nice in theort but onlt paid off > once. Once in actual practice, but the threat of it always existed and this had to be accounted for by southern generals in disposition of forces, which prevented them from shifing large forces from for example Virginia to the Mississippi Valley, as any such move could be exploited by the union as they could move troops from theater to theater much faster.
Make no mistake this was an important factor to consider, and that limited confederate stratagey.
> > > the south had all the weapons they could use, > > > > ????? > > the south never sufferd from lack of rifles or guns. what they were unable > to steal from federal armories they imported from europe At enormous expence smuggled through a union navy blockade where much of those weapons were lost to the union and were then shooting at southern troops. If they had more guns and ammo, and were able to spend the money on other things, the war might have gone otherwise.
> > http://www.civilwarhome.com/confederateordnance.htm > > -----------------quote [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > > > can you point to any time the confederates ran out of powder? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_Artillery_in_the_American_Civil_War
-----quote---- Confederate artillery The South was at a relative disadvantage to the North for deployment of artillery. The industrial North had far greater capacity for manufacturing weapons and the Union blockade of Southern ports prevented many foreign arms from reaching the Southern armies. The Confederacy had to rely to a significant extent on captured Union artillery pieces (either on the battlefield or by capturing armories, such as Harpers Ferry); it is estimated that two thirds of all Confederate field artillery was captured from the Union. Confederate cannons built in the South often suffered from the shortage of quality metals and shoddy workmanship. Another disadvantage was the quality of ammunition. The fuses needed for detonating shells and cases were frequently inaccurate, causing premature or delayed explosions. A Southern officer observed, "The combination of Yankee artillery with Rebel infantry would make an army that could be beaten by no one."
Confederate batteries usually consisted of four guns, in contrast to the Union's six. This was a matter of necessity, because guns were always in short supply. And, unlike the Union, batteries frequently consisted of mixed caliber weapons. -------------end quote
If that does not make you understand that the confederate army was not in any reasonable way the equal of the federal army in terms of supply and equipment, then nothing will.
Just imagine going up against an army that outnumbers yours (in manpower) by a wide margin and has more artillery batteries and their artillery batteries have six guns per battery and yours have four, most of them anyway, and your batteries are not even all the same type of gun so you have to get different types of ammo, while Yankee batteries all eat the same type of ammo.
This is like a modern army having to take on an opponent with good air support and you have a much inferior air force.
----snip
> > > > They did not, ergo their generalship was probably deficiant. > > > > [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > sherman had no rivers to use. the tenn was passable only to muscle shoals. > after vicksburg rivers ceased to be a factor. Look at a map of Georgia showing the rivers in Georgia and flowing into the Atlantic and then tell me that.
http://www.n-georgia.com/lakes_&_rivers.htm
He had the Savanna river which is the border between South Carolina and Georgia, then after crossing the Chattahoochee river he has two major rivers that run southeast to the sea besides the Savanna. Yes they were important, yes for most of their distance they are navigable and were used in antibellem times for trade.
--snip
ray o'hara - 04 Oct 2006 17:50 GMT > > . > > > > one should also consider the fact that the south had great defensive [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > (boggle), like valuable targets would not be defended. right. with very strong coastal forts. so landing willy nilly along the coast wasn't much of an advantage.
> > any troops had to be taken from critical areas and a strongly held supply > > line would eat into any strength. the union tried and and found it was a [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns > (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it. they had exactly the same weapons. the confeds lacked for nothing. everyman had the latest in weapons and every southern bttery was fully equipped. they had more guns than horses to pull them. magazine and breech loading rifles were not used in numbers enough to make a difference.
> > > >and they didn't need masses of troops to > > > > defend their supply lines. the unions railroads did them no good in the [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > by the union as they could move troops from theater to theater much > faster. it was not the threat of the union moving forces that prevented the south from doing so it was the jealousy of southern commanders loathe to give up troops. the south shifted longstreets corp to the west when it was so desired nd it came back again when the need passed.
> Make no mistake this was an important factor to consider, and that > limited confederate stratagey. the confederacy had no strategy. but when they felt the need to move troops long distances the managed to do so.
> > > > the south had all the weapons they could use, > > > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > southern troops. If they had more guns and ammo, and were able to > spend the money on other things, the war might have gone otherwise. the south wasn't defeated due to lack of weapons or money. they were defeated in the field due to superior union generalship. grant and sherman were far superior to any the south had. lee was still trapped intelectually in the 18th century and he had no understanding of modern war.
> > > http://www.civilwarhome.com/confederateordnance.htm > > > -----------------quote [quoted text clipped - 36 lines] > Southern officer observed, "The combination of Yankee artillery with > Rebel infantry would make an army that could be beaten by no one." the south's guns were every bit as good as union guns as they were often union guns or guns taken from federal armories. a 12lbs napoleon was the same whether used by north or south.
> Confederate batteries usually consisted of four guns, in contrast to > the Union's six. This was a matter of necessity, because guns were > always in short supply. And, unlike the Union, batteries frequently > consisted of mixed caliber weapons. > -------------end quote the union eventually went with 4 gun batteries as it gave the battery commander better control.
> If that does not make you understand that the confederate army was not > in any reasonable way the equal of the federal army in terms of supply > and equipment, then nothing will. 4 gun batteries proved to be more effective. the south had more guns than hoeses to pull them. weapons was not the souths problem
> Just imagine going up against an army that outnumbers yours (in > manpower) by a wide margin and has more artillery batteries and their > artillery batteries have six guns per battery and yours have four, most > of them anyway, and your batteries are not even all the same type of > gun so you have to get different types of ammo, while Yankee batteries > all eat the same type of ammo. just imagine always going up against an enemy always intrenched fighting on terrain he knows. the union never was more than a 4/3 ratio except on a few occasions and the south even had more on a few. many counties won wars facing longer odds than the confederacy did.
> This is like a modern army having to take on an opponent with good air > support and you have a much inferior air force. sorry al, that is another of your false analogies. the south had more than enough resources to have won. it was jeff davis, r.e.lee , braxton bragg and joe e johnston who failed, not lack of resources.
> ----snip > > [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > Look at a map of Georgia showing the rivers in Georgia and flowing into > the Atlantic and then tell me that. rives that were useless militarily. if navigable they were guarded by strong forts at their mouths and then they were navigable it was for just a short distance inland.
i live neat two rivers that empty in to the sea. the charles and the neponset. neither can be used by ships.
> http://www.n-georgia.com/lakes_&_rivers.htm > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > were important, yes for most of their distance they are navigable and > were used in antibellem times for trade. sherman was coming from the source of those rivers. he had no boats that he could carry. the navagible rivers had strong coastal forts . just looking at a map and declaring things is useless al. until sherman reached the coast he was out of touch with water borne supplies.
scribe7716 - 04 Oct 2006 22:05 GMT > As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns > (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it. During the first years of the rebellion thousands of federal troops were armed with muskets that had been purchased off the scrap heaps of Austrian, Belgian, and other European arsenals. As late as July, 1863, Grant had several regiments of his Army of the Tennessee exchange their outmoded smoothbores for Enfields captured from the rebs at Vicksburg, and some federals at Gettysburg were armed with smoothbore buck and back muskets.
S Witmer - 05 Oct 2006 00:35 GMT > > As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns > > (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > captured from the rebs at Vicksburg, and some federals at Gettysburg > were armed with smoothbore buck and back muskets. Heck, in the early days some Union regiments were armed with smoothbores that were converted from flintlock to percussion. I recall one comment that troops of one regiment wondered whether the safest place to be with the guns they were issued was in front of them when they were fired.
Alfred Montestruc - 05 Oct 2006 19:42 GMT > > As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns > > (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Austrian, Belgian, and other European > arsenals. Some southern troops had no guns at all, and many made do with smoothbores as well.
I did not say the Union had all the guns it wanted from the git go, I said they had more and better. That is all I said.
> As late as July, 1863, Grant had several regiments of his > Army of the Tennessee exchange their outmoded smoothbores for Enfields > captured from the rebs at Vicksburg, and some federals at Gettysburg > were armed with smoothbore buck and back muskets. scribe7716 - 06 Oct 2006 00:30 GMT > > During the first years of the rebellion thousands of federal troops > > were armed with muskets that had been purchased off the scrap heaps of > > Austrian, Belgian, and other European > > arsenals. > > Some southern troops had no guns at all... In July 1863?
>... and many made do with > smoothbores as well. In July 1863?
> I did not say the Union had all the guns it wanted from the git go... July 1863 ain't exactly the "git go," and not only were federals exchanging their arms for superior Confederate weapons at Vicksburg there were still units of the AotP, surely the best cared for and best supplied of the Union armies, armed with smoothbores at Gettysburg.
One should not be so devoted to the Lost Cause mythos as to denigrate the remarkable work done by Confederate chief of ordnance Josiah Gorgas, work that has led many historians to say the the Confederates never lost a battle due to lack of arms or ammunition.
ray o'hara - 06 Oct 2006 02:53 GMT > > > As a rule the Union had a more men and more and better guns > > > (smallarms), and a hell of a lot more artillery and ammo for it. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > Some southern troops had no guns at all, and many made do with > smoothbores as well. no southern troops ever had "no guns at all"
> I did not say the Union had all the guns it wanted from the git go, I > said they had more and better. That is all I said. they all had the same, sprifields, enfields and austrian weapons. both sides had enough guns for everybody.
Rich Rostrom - 06 Oct 2006 15:24 GMT >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" Acccording to Bruce Catton, at the battle of Wilson's Creek
Price had between 9,000 and 10,000 men, probably, of which only about 7,000 could [fight]; the rest had no weapons at all.
...
>they all had the same, sprifields, enfields and austrian weapons. >both sides had enough guns for everybody. Not in 1861, on either side; especially the CSA.
Jeff Davis, late in the war, noted that the CSA had overcome its early shortage of arms, when volunteers were turned away for want of weapons for them; now (1864) they had plenty of arms, but wanted men to bear them. (He called for a revival of the volunteer spirit.)
| He had a shorter, more scraggly, and even less | | flattering beard than Yassir Arafat, and Escalante | | never conceived that such a thing was possible. | | -- William Goldman, _Heat_ | ray o'hara - 06 Oct 2006 23:24 GMT > >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" > [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > but wanted men to bear them. (He called for a > revival of the volunteer spirit.) the union didn't arms for everybody at first either. both sides were short at the beginning, nobody on either side ever went into combat unarmed.
Alfred Montestruc - 07 Oct 2006 21:23 GMT > > >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" > > [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > the union didn't arms for everybody at first either. both sides were short > at the beginning, nobody on either side ever went into combat unarmed. Hard to prove a negative.
;-)
Marcaurelius - 08 Oct 2006 17:35 GMT > Hard to prove a negative. Like the "right to secede?"
Alfred Montestruc - 09 Oct 2006 12:01 GMT > > Hard to prove a negative. > > Like the "right to secede?" That would not be a negative.
That right would follow from having a right of self-government, or a right of consent of the governed. If you have a right of self-government/ right to consent to what government you have, you obviously have the right to withdraw consent from an existing government, and set up a new one.
So if you agree that people have a right of self-government, then a right to seceed follows automatically.
ray o'hara - 09 Oct 2006 13:55 GMT > > > Hard to prove a negative. > > [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > So if you agree that people have a right of self-government, then a > right to seceed follows automatically. they did have self government. it was called theunited states. self government does not mean quitting the goverment everytime you lose an election. what you are advocating is chaos.
Alfred Montestruc - 09 Oct 2006 18:12 GMT > > > > Hard to prove a negative. > > > [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > government does not mean quitting the goverment everytime you lose an > election. No, but it does mean the right to change the government if you do not like it, and FYI the revolutionary war was a war of secession from the British Empire. The vast majority of British subjects did not want to change the government, only some of the American colonists did, and they only had a practical majority in 13 of the north american colonies, of which the British had many more than 13, like the various Canadian colonies, which pointedly did not join the 13.
> what you are advocating is chaos. Funny that is almost exactly what the British said.
ray o'hara - 10 Oct 2006 12:51 GMT > > > > > Hard to prove a negative. > > > > [quoted text clipped - 22 lines] > colonies, of which the British had many more than 13, like the various > Canadian colonies, which pointedly did not join the 13. the FFs did not pretend they had the law on their side. they understood they were committing treason and never tried to claim otherwise
> > what you are advocating is chaos. > > Funny that is almost exactly what the British said. no it isn't. the british were sympathetic to the colonists. and it was george the III and parliment who were opposed to letting the colonies have representation in parliment.
Marcaurelius - 10 Oct 2006 12:51 GMT > If you have a right of > self-government/ right to consent to what government you have, If you really believed that--- then you should free your slaves immediately.
In other words: stop enslaving others. If you believe in self-government and consent of the governed.
Then the slaves can only consent to their enslavement.
Alfred Montestruc - 10 Oct 2006 15:54 GMT > > If you have a right of > > self-government/ right to consent to what government you have, > > If you really believed that--- then you should free your slaves > immediately. I've never owned any thanks.
8-)
> In other words: stop enslaving others. 8-P
I've never done it.
> If you believe in > self-government > and consent of the governed. > > Then the slaves can only consent to their enslavement. And would have the right to withdraw consent at the drop of a hat, so slavery is not a moral proposition. On the other hand the Union was not trying to end slavery till long after the war started, so all that is moot.
Marcaurelius - 10 Oct 2006 12:51 GMT > That right would follow from having a right of self-government Nat Turner had the right to self government.
He did not consent to his enslavement.
Wouldn't you want to kill those who enslave you?? I would.
Appealing to Natural Law.
Alfred Montestruc - 10 Oct 2006 15:54 GMT > > That right would follow from having a right of self-government > > Nat Turner had the right to self government. > > He did not consent to his enslavement. Exactly.
> Wouldn't you want to kill those who enslave you?? I would. IIRC Nat was born a slave, and so was never "enslaved" however he would have the same right of self-government as anyone else.
Also he has the standing to do this for himself. A bunch of Yankees who profited from slave trading and then profited from trading in slave made products are not in a position of moral high ground with respect to southern slave owners than Nat was.
Further Nat was not trying to assert a right to govern the plantation masters to prevent them from starting a new nation, he was only seeking his own liberty and that of his fellow slaves, and killing them to prevent them from killing him or otherwise violating his rights.
So this would be apples and oranges. On the other hand it was militaraly stupid, he had no reasonable prospect of victory, and he was no Sparticus. In the end all he accomplished was to get some slave owners killed and himself and a some other slaves.
ray o'hara - 10 Oct 2006 16:12 GMT > > > That right would follow from having a right of self-government > > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > IIRC Nat was born a slave, and so was never "enslaved" however he would > have the same right of self-government as anyone else. he was enslaved at birth. born a slave of captured, it is still being enslaved.
> Also he has the standing to do this for himself. A bunch of Yankees > who profited from slave trading and then profited from trading in slave > made products are not in a position of moral high ground with respect > to southern slave owners than Nat was. those yankees weren't the ones calling for abolition and they were long out of business.
> Further Nat was not trying to assert a right to govern the plantation > masters to prevent them from starting a new nation, he was only seeking [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > no Sparticus. In the end all he accomplished was to get some slave > owners killed and himself and a some other slaves. the south had no real prospect of victory either, so nat and jeff davis had something in common. and dvis was all for enslaving and keeping enslaved others. all while crying about how he was being unfairly oppressed.
Alfred Montestruc - 10 Oct 2006 23:51 GMT > > > > That right would follow from having a right of self-government > > > [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > he was enslaved at birth. born a slave of captured, it is still being > enslaved. No that does not fit the dictionary definition. You can play your PC game with somone else.
> > Also he has the standing to do this for himself. A bunch of Yankees > > who profited from slave trading and then profited from trading in slave > > made products are not in a position of moral high ground with respect > > to southern slave owners than Nat was. > > > those yankees weren't the ones calling for abolition Yes they were. Many of the people bankrolling the Republican party were rich off the textile mill industry and off the shipping industry that both were doing a lot of business with slave made products, further many of those same folks got their money from granddad or greatgranddad that made it in the slave trade.
>and they were long out > of business. Not trading in products of slave labor. They were very much still in business.
> > Further Nat was not trying to assert a right to govern the plantation > > masters to prevent them from starting a new nation, he was only seeking [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > the south had no real prospect of victory either, Very competent general officers trained at west point and other military acadimies who have led troops in battle and won many battle and have been on the winning side of wars disagree with you.
AFAIK you have no qualification to state that. Have you even taken military science classes in ROTC? Have you attended a military acadamy? Have you led troops in battle? What rank in a real military organization have you achieved? Unless that rank is that of at least Major with lots of combat experiance, and having been to war college, then even those would be a far cry from the qualifications of numerous gerneral officers who would disagree with you.
Yes the Union side had some advantages in material and numbers, that is no garentee of victory. Witness the enormous advantage of numbers of tanks and men and planes and ammo the Arabs in the various Arab Isreali wars had, and they were huge, and they still lost.
The disadvantage that Turner had was many orders of magnitude larger than that of Isreal, and he and his people did not have a large advantage in training and wartime experiance to offset the numbers advantage, while the south, and Israel did.
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Marcaurelius - 10 Oct 2006 12:51 GMT , then a
> right to seceed follows automatically. So the Secessionists called for a Constitutional Convention to discuss breaking up the Union???
Don't think they did. They invoked the "right of revolution." And they lost.
ray o'hara - 08 Oct 2006 21:53 GMT > > > >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" > > > [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] > > ;-) what negative. neither side sent unarmed men into battle.
Alfred Montestruc - 09 Oct 2006 13:55 GMT > > > > >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" > > > > [quoted text clipped - 27 lines] > > what negative. That unarmed men were "never" (this being the negative) sent into battle during the war between the states.
>neither side sent unarmed men into battle. ray o'hara - 09 Oct 2006 18:12 GMT > > > > "Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.21stcentury@rcn.com> wrote in message news:rrostrom.21stcentury-834565.21545905102006@news.isp.giganews.com...
> > > > > >no southern troops ever had "no guns at all" > > > > > [quoted text clipped - 30 lines] > That unarmed men were "never" (this being the negative) sent into > battle during the war between the states. such an event would have been recorded al. its not like asking to prove ghosts don't exist. no unarmed troops ever went into battle.
Rich Rostrom - 02 Oct 2006 14:34 GMT >I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until >Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >What was the cause of this? >Chance? To the extent it existed, chance.
The CSA had more than few rampant incompetents in high command in the early stages of the war. Floyd and Pillow at Fort Donelson. Floyd and Wise in West Virginia. Bragg, as mentioned. Holmes. Huger. Bishop Polk is widely condemned as a bad general (I'm not quite sure why.)
A. S. Johnston had a huge pre-war reputation, but nothing he did in the War confirms it. Was Beauregard competent? He was the one who had the Army of Tennessee attack in column of divisions at Shiloh, which was a truly bizarre formation. (A. S. Johnston signed off on it, which damns _him_.)
On the Union side, Grant had command of an army in 1862. Buell was a mediocrity, but he never actually lost a battle, and he did get his men into action. Rosencrans had some successes: in West Virginia, at Corinth, and at Stones River, before failing at Chickamauga.
The biggest command failing for the Union was McClellan, and the biggest success for the CSA was Lee. I would say that luck is sufficient to account for two individuals.
>Or the fact that President Jackson was a military man, and President ^^^^^^^ ITYM _Davis_.
>Lincoln was not? While Davis had been a junior officer in the Army, and seen combat in Mexico, he was not a career soldier. It's arguable that his military background impelled Davis to interfere in strategy and even operations more than Lincoln did.
| He had a shorter, more scraggly, and even less | | flattering beard than Yassir Arafat, and Escalante | | never conceived that such a thing was possible. | | -- William Goldman, _Heat_ | Marcaurelius - 02 Oct 2006 23:06 GMT > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. You observe, or are you participating in mythmaking? Because that is what I grew up with- the assumption of the superiority of Southern militarism.
And I observe that the
> South had a string of competent and brilliant generals - except for > Bragg and Ewell (after Ewell lost his leg). John Bell Hood? Pemberton? Pink Floyd?
> What was the cause of this? Home field advantage. The advantage of the defensive-- at that point in military history.
> Chance? > Or the fact that President Jackson was a military man, and President > Lincoln was not? Lincoln had the advantage of having no pretense at military knowledge. He cracked the books, got OJT. Looked for officers who would do the job, because he wasn't going to do it for them.
Dave Welsh - 02 Oct 2006 23:23 GMT > I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until > Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the > South had a string of competent and brilliant generals - except for > Bragg and Ewell (after Ewell lost his leg). > > What was the cause of this? To begin with, the North had by far the harder task. When amateur armies are being organized, the side that takes the offensive has much more difficult problems to solve.
The very first of Lincoln's generals, McDowell, was by no means incompetent (although he was not a great general). It is unlikely that, with the officers and the army he had, any Union general could have done much better at Bull Run (First Manassas).
Neither was McClellan incompetent, certainly not in the opinion of Robert E. Lee, who stated that he was the best Union general that he had faced. McClellan had major defects in lack of aggressiveness and overestimating his enemy's resources, but he fought Lee to a standstill at Malvern Hill and Antietam. McClellan never gave Lee an opportunity for the sort of deadly strategic surprise that smashed up Pope and Hooker.
As for Hooker, he was not an equal opponent for Lee and did not possess all of the qualities to be a successful Army commander, but in action and on campaign he was one of the best Union corps commanders. Ceaseless intriguing for advancement eventually ended his career.
Finally there was Meade, who inflicted one severe defeat and a number of lesser reverses on Lee before Grant arrived on the scene. He took over the Army of the Potomac in difficult circumstances, and managed the campaign well, winning the greatest battle of the war. Grant had great confidence in Meade's military abilities, although he recognized the difficulties of dealing with the savage temper this "damned goggle-eyed old snapping turtle" often displayed.
So far as Southern generals are concerned, Bragg was very far from being the worst. He had genuine strategic insight and moments of real brilliance. His great problem was a lack of personal leadership qualities and inability to get along well with subordinates and peers.
"Bishop" Polk, despite his impressive personality and character, seems to have been a genuine incompetent who made many serious errors on campaign and on the battlefield.
Pemberton lost the war for the South at Vicksburg. His lack of understanding of the strategic situatuion, and general ineptitude on campaign, enabled Grant to run rings around him.
Dave Welsh dwelsh46@cox.net
> Chance? > Or the fact that President Jackson was a military man, and President > Lincoln was not? > > Your response please. > Thanks, Ralph. Rich Rostrom - 03 Oct 2006 11:32 GMT >> I observe that the North had a string of incompetent generals until >> Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan took command. And I observe that the [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] >Neither was McClellan incompetent, certainly not in the opinion of Robert E. >Lee, who stated that he was the best Union general that he had faced. That quote is almost certainly apocryphal.
If Lee thought McClellan had any real ability, would he have stayed on the field after the first day of Antietam?
>McClellan had major defects in lack of aggressiveness and overestimating his >enemy's resources, but he fought Lee to a standstill at Malvern Hill and >Antietam. McClellan never gave Lee an opportunity for the sort of deadly >strategic surprise that smashed up Pope and Hooker. Uh, yes, he did, but Jackson blew it. Had Jackson attacked on time at Beaver Dam Creek, Porter's entire reinforced corps would have been destroyed, a disaster exceeding Second Manassas or Chancellorsville.
Jackson muffed another chance at Gaines Mill, and yet another at Savage Station.
>As for Hooker, he was not an equal opponent for Lee and did not possess all >of the qualities to be a successful Army commander... When in independent command he flinched. In this he was matched by McClellan, who attacked only when he had overwhelming number and possibly the enemy's plans in his pocket.
>Finally there was Meade, who inflicted one severe defeat and a number of >lesser reverses on Lee before Grant arrived on the scene. He took over the [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] >So far as Southern generals are concerned, Bragg was very far from being the >worst. Well, no... he wasn't a drunkard, like Cheatham, a coward, like Pillow, or a nitwit like Floyd. He was able enough to be made one of the CSA's main army commanders, and to lead a large army in extensive movements and fierce battles, in most of which they held their own.
>"Bishop" Polk, despite his impressive personality and character, seems to >have been a genuine incompetent who made many serious errors on campaign and >on the battlefield. That may be, though I don't recall any particularly egregious blunders by him. And he was well-liked - Joe Johnston literally wept over Polk's body.
>Pemberton lost the war for the South at Vicksburg. His lack of understanding >of the strategic situatuion, and general ineptitude on campaign, enabled >Grant to run rings around him. Grant was at the peak of his form, and Pemberton was deprived of his cavalry by higher command, which left him in the dark as Grant moved.
| He had a shorter, more scraggly, and even less | | flattering beard than Yassir Arafat, and Escalante | | never conceived that such a thing was possible. | | -- William Goldman, _Heat_ |
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