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John L. Lewis as Herbert Hoover's Secretary of Labor

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David Tenner - 28 Jul 2007 20:22 GMT
In *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency
1920-1933,* pp. 221-2, Hoover wrote as folows concerning his choice of a
Cabinet after his election in 1928:

"When I formed the Cabinet, I came under strong pressure to appoint John L.
Lewis Secretary of Labor. He was the ablest man in the labor world. In view,
however, of a disgraceful incident at Herndon, Illinois, which had been
greatly used against him, it seemed impossible. He, however, maintained a
friendly attitude. As he stated publicly in later years, 'I at times
disagreed with the President but he always told me what he would or would not
do.' Lewis is a complex character. He is a man of superior intelligence with
the equivalent of a higher education, which he had won by reading of the
widest range. He could repeat, literally, long passages from Shakespeare,
Milton, and the Bible. His word was always good. He was blunt and even brutal
in his methods of negotiation, and he assumed and asserted that employers
were cut from the same cloth. His loyalty to his men was beyond question. He
was not a socialist. He believed in 'free enterprise.' One of his favorite
monologues had for its burden:  'I don't want government ownership of the
mines or business; no labor leader can deal with bureaucracy and the
government, and lick them. I want these economic royalists on the job; they
are the only people who have learned the know-how; they work eighteen hours a
day, seven days a week; my only quarrel with them is over our share in the
productive pie.'

"If Lewis's great abilities could have been turned onto the side of the
government, they would have produced a great public servant."
http://www.ecommcode.com/hoover/ebooks/pdf/FULL/B1V2_Full.pdf

(There is no "Herndon, Illinois"; this is obviously a misprint for "Herrin,
Illinois."  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herrin_massacre and  
http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/7847/massacre.htm for the details of the
1922 "Herrin massacre.")

Anyway, Hoover decided to re-appoint the Harding-Coolidge Secretary of Labor,
James J. Davis.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_J._Davis  But in November
1930, a second opportunity arose to appoint Lewis.  Davis was elected to the
US Senate from Pennsylvania and Hoover had to choose a succesor.  According
to Irving Bernstein, *The Lean Years:  A History of the American Worker,
1920-1933*, p. 354

"The American Federation of Labor had traditionally regarded the Department
of Labor as its own and the Secretary of Labor as its voice in the Cabinet.  
Gompers had played the decisive role in the creation of the Department on
March 4, 1913.  No one from outside the AFL had ever been Secretary of
Labor...Shortly after the Davis announcement, [William] Green [Gompers'
successor as head of the AFL] called at the White House to ask the President
to name a man from the Federation.  He suggested five prominent leaders:  
William L. Hutcheson of the Carpenters, John L. Lewis of the Miners, Matthew
Woll of the Photo-Engravers, John P. Frey of the Metal Trades, and John R.
Alpine of the Plumbers.  Green urged Hoover to 'maintain the precedent set by
your predecessors.'

"The President, however, chose to break with tradition.  He appointed William
N. Doak of the independent Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as Secretary of
Labor.  In Hoover's judgment the AFL could be ignored even on an issue of
moment."

The idea of Lewis as Hoover's Secretary of Labor intrigues me in part because  
the two men were philosophically compatible in many ways.  I don't just mean
Lewis' opposition to socialism and communism--that was commonplace among
American trade unionists.  What was more unusual is that Lewis shared the
engineer Hoover's enthusiasm for technological advance and modernization.  
Notoriously, many labor leaders opposed the introduction of new technology
for fear it would put people out of work.  Lewis, however, wanted the coal
industry to become more modern even if that meant employing fewer coal
miners.  Mechanization would help put out of business the smaller, less
efficient mines that were driving down coal prices and wages.  As Lewis put
it, "We decided it is better to have a half million men working in the
industry at good wages...than it is to have a million working in the industry
in poverty."  (Bernstein, p. 225)  Moreover, Lewis endorsed Hoover for the
presidency not only in 1928 but for re-election in 1932 as well (despite
Hoover's having turned him down for Secretary of Labor twice). Lewis'
politics later in the 1930's could hardly have pleased Hoover, but in 1940
they were allies again--Lewis even trying to get the Republicans to nominate
Hoover for president on a stay-out-of-the-war platform.

I do not know to what extent the Herrin massacre was responsible for Hoover's
decision not to appoint Lewis, but let us assume that Hoover was telling the
truth in giving this as his reason.  Our POD can be that the massacre doesn't
occur.  (We'll say W. J. Lester decides not to resort to strikebreakers.)  

There is probably not much Lewis could do for labor as Secretary under Hoover
in the conditions of 1929-33. But his taking the post could have important
consequences anyway.  Even before the Depression, the coal industry and the
UMW were in a bad way in the late 1920's, thanks to the opening of new, low-
wage coal mines in the South and increased competition from other fuels.  The
Great Depression, of course, made things infinitely worse.  "The output of
bituminous fell from 535 million tons in 1929 to 468 in 1930, 382 in 1931,
and 310 million in 1932."  (Bernstein, p. 360.) In OTL the bad condition of
the coal industry helped to spark a series of challenges to Lewis from
districts jealous of their autonomy.  In Illinois, this led to a rival
"reorganized" anti-Lewis UMW which for a time dominated the coal fields of
the state and later to the Progressive Miners of America.  Lewis did
ultimately manage to defeat the dissidents and retain control of a united
though diminished UMW in OTL.  But with him in the Cabinet and unable to take
a direct role in UMW internal affairs, the union might have disintegrated
altogether--there might not have been much for him to return to in 1933.  
Besides, having served as Secretary of Labor for the president most hated by
the American working class would not help his future as a labor leader.  WIth
Lewis in a diminshed role, does the CIO ever get off the ground?  

Signature

David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net

Stan Boleslawski - 30 Jul 2007 22:29 GMT
" Besides, having served as Secretary of Labor for the president most
hated by
the American working class would not help his future as a labor
leader.  WIth
Lewis in a diminshed role, does the CIO ever get off the ground?"

There were Republicans who popped up in the Roosevelt administration,
e.g.
Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, and later Henry Stimson (who actually
served in Hoover's cabinet). Lewis might go formally go into politics,
and
could easily pop up in some capacity under FDR.

Could Dubinsky, Hillman, McMahon, etc. have formed the CIO without
Lewis? Remember the CIO was not intended originally as a rival to
the AFL but was intended as a group devoted to industrial organizing.

Best,
Stan B.

--
David Tenner - 31 Jul 2007 05:55 GMT
> " Besides, having served as Secretary of Labor for the president most
> hated by
[quoted text clipped - 8 lines]
> and
> could easily pop up in some capacity under FDR.

Another possibility is that Lewis might resign in protest after some
disagreement with Hoover, and go back to the UMW and save both it and his
own reputation among workers.  Since my initial post in this thread, I
have been reading Melvyn Dubofksky and Warren Van Tine, *John L. Lewis: A
Biography.* and the authors argue that the idea of Lewis' rock-ribbed
conservative Republicanism from 1920 to 1932 has been exaggerated and that
Lewis' allegiance to the GOP during those years may largely have been due
to opportunism--it was after all the party in power.  (Before 1920, Lewis
had been a Wilsonian--to be sure, so had Hoover!--and for a while had
advocated nationalization of the coal mines.  Indeed, as late as 1921
Lewis looked largely to socialist unions for support in his challenge to
Gompers for the AFL presidency.)  They also point out that by the early
1930's Lewis was getting increasingly "radical" in his economic views,
advocating something like what would become the NIRA, at least for the
coal industry, an idea which Hoover never backed.  So there would be a
good faith basis for such a resignation.  OTOH, Dubofksky and Van Tine
have a hard time explaining away Lewis' 1932 endorsement of Hoover.  That
obviously was not out of gratitude (Lewis had wanted very much to be
appointed Secretary of Labor) and it could not have been out of any
thought that Hoover would actually win--Lewis was far too realistic to
think that.

> Could Dubinsky, Hillman, McMahon, etc. have formed the CIO without
> Lewis? Remember the CIO was not intended originally as a rival to
> the AFL but was intended as a group devoted to industrial organizing.

Dubofsky and Van Tine regard the role of Lewis and the UMW as absolutely
crucial for the founding of the CIO:

"In late 1935 the CIO amounted scarcely more than [John] Brophy [one of
the many former Lewis critics that Lewis made use of] and his two
secretaries, Len DeCaux [a Communist journalist hired by Brophy to edit
the CIO newspaper], a cubbyhole for an office, and Lewis's dreams.  Only
the prospect of generous material and financial support from the UMW,
which meant Lewis, made the CIO a force within the labor movement.

"Indeed, in a real sense the CIO, at birth, was Lewis.  Brophy, who
administered the early CIO, was an extension of the UMW president, a man
who served at Lewis's pleasure and was paid by the mine workers' union.  
Lewis's fellow committee members David Dubinsky and Max Zaritsky lacked
national influence and seemed as eager to maintain the respectability that
the A. F. of L. conferred on them as to please Lewis.  [Harvey] Fremming
[oil workers], [Thomas] Brown [mine, mill, and smelter workers], and
[Thomas] McMahon [textile workers] represented weak unions, negligible
political influence, and no power in the A. F. of L.  [Charles] Howard
[printers], perhaps the most principled and unselfish of all the CIO
founders, spoke only for himself, not his union, which never affiliated
with CIO.  Only Sidney Hillman approached Lewis in stature and influence.  
Much admired by labor journalists, academic labor specialists, and social
reformers, Hillman, however, led a union--the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers--that operated in a peripheral industry and represented a narrow
strata of the American working class:  largely Jewish and Italian
immigrants.  Among the CIO's founders, then, only Lewis had in the past
bargained as an equal with the men who ran the A. F. of L., and only Lewis
led a union situated at the heart of the American industrial economy."  p.
223

"There can be no doubt that Lewis created the CIO.  From June 1936, when
it began its real existence, to September 1937, the month preceding its
first national conference, the CIO was *not* a self-sustaining
organization. In the fifteen months from June 1936 to September 1937 the
CIO spent $1,745,968 and earned only $308,388 (despite a membership in
excess of 3 million by the end of the period ), leaving a deficit of
$1,437,580.  Of the total funds the CIO received to support its
operations, the UMW alone provided $1,245,000 (SWOC [Steel Workers
Organizing Committee] received $960,000 from the mine workers); without
Lewis's generosity, then, there would have been no CIO." (p. 279)    

Signature

David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net

Sydney Webb - 31 Jul 2007 03:34 GMT
[snip good stuff]

> The idea of Lewis as Hoover's Secretary of Labor intrigues me in part because
> the two men were philosophically compatible in many ways.  I don't just mean
[quoted text clipped - 9 lines]
> industry at good wages...than it is to have a million working in the industry
> in poverty."  

[snip]

> I do not know to what extent the Herrin massacre was responsible for Hoover's
> decision not to appoint Lewis, but let us assume that Hoover was telling the
[quoted text clipped - 3 lines]
> There is probably not much Lewis could do for labor as Secretary under Hoover
> in the conditions of 1929-33.

Now he tells us?

> But his taking the post could have important
> consequences anyway.  

[snip]

> But with him in the Cabinet and unable to take
> a direct role in UMW internal affairs, the union might have disintegrated
> altogether--there might not have been much for him to return to in 1933.
> Besides, having served as Secretary of Labor for the president most hated by
> the American working class would not help his future as a labor leader.  WIth
> Lewis in a diminshed role, does the CIO ever get off the ground?

Now this I like.  I know next to nothing about American unionism but
there's still the AFL, right?  Without the CIO is this more like one of
the labour confederations in the other countries of the First World?  Do
we see a linkage between the AFL and the Democratic party under FDR that
makes the Dems more like a labour party or a social democratic party
that the Western Europeans and Antipodeans used to enjoy?

Or is it even more interesting?  Inquiring minds want to know.

- Syd

Signature

"All we need to do now is push Jimmy Thomas under a bus and we'll have a
British Soviet Republic by 1927. That or a British Fascist state - but
hey, it's a chance you take."
   - Phil Edwards, for whom the PoD is as important as the consequences

David Tenner - 31 Jul 2007 18:35 GMT
>> But with him in the Cabinet and unable to take
>> a direct role in UMW internal affairs, the union might have
[quoted text clipped - 12 lines]
>
> Or is it even more interesting?  Inquiring minds want to know.

The AFL traditionally had adhered to Gompers' "non-partisan" approach,
that labor should not affiliate with any political party, but simply
"reward its friends and punish its enemies" in both parties.  In practice,
there seemed to be more friends in the Democratic Party than inthe
Republicans, but the AFL always had a strong Republican component,
especially in the more conservative craft unions.  Each presidential
election year, the Democrats would have a "labor committee" headed by a
prominent AFL unionist like Dan Tobin of the Teamsters and the Republicans
would have a similar committee headed by someone like Bill Hutcheson of
the Carpenters; while the CIO after 1936 developed an increasingly close
relationship with the Roosevelt administration (complicated by both John
L. Lewis and the Communists opposing the administration on the war, though
the Communists unlike Lewis reverted to alliance with FDR after June 22,
1941).  It was only in 1948 that the leadership of organized labor, in the
AFL as well as the CIO became really overwhelmingly Democratic (except for
the pro-Communist left wing of the CIO which made the disastrous decision
to back Wallace) as a result of the Taft-Hartley Act.

The chief question is the extent to which the AFL would have organized the
unorganized had there been no CIO.  The stereotype is that the AFL was
hopelessly biased in favor of craft and against industrial unionism, that
it was led by people who thought that the unskilled couldn't be organized
(or even if they could, perhaps *shoudn't* be, since that would threaten
the old-time leaders' power), and that it wasted an enormous amount of
energy on jurisdictional disputes between its unions (the Wobblies used to
call the AFL the "American Separation of Labor").  These stereotypes did
have some validity, yet some AFL unions, even after the CIO departures,
did show a considerable ability to organize the unorganized, notably the
Teamsters.  Also, the AFL of OTL was more politically conservative in the
late 1930s and early 1940's than it would have been without the CIO split.
This is so not only because the more "progressive" unions left for the
CIO, but also because many AFL leaders in those days seemed to want to
oppose any candidate who had CIO support.

Signature

David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net

Sydney Webb - 01 Aug 2007 09:34 GMT
[snip]

> The AFL traditionally had adhered to Gompers' "non-partisan" approach,
> that labor should not affiliate with any political party, but simply
[quoted text clipped - 29 lines]
> CIO, but also because many AFL leaders in those days seemed to want to
> oppose any candidate who had CIO support.

Thank you for that cogent history lesson, David.  So summarising
recklessly the AFL was a conservative organisation, representing the
'aristocracy of labour' - the craft workers - and would become even more
conservative with the CIO departures.

If there is no Lewis and no CIO it would be possible for American labour
unions to develop in a different direction.  So without the United Mine
Workers of America organising the United Steel Workers of America - an
industry union - we might see see a variety of craft unions each
representing the different skill sets present in a steel mill.  Some of
these will be 'craft' unions in name only if they represent the
unskilled.

[A union representing all the unskilled is potentially massive.  A
right-wing ('moderate' in US terms) IWW, anyone?]

The flaw in this theory is that the steel industry defeated union
organising drives in 1892 and 1919[1].  There is a window of opportunity
offered between the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) of 1935 and the Taft Hartley amendments of 1947.[2]   Outside of
this window and without the support of the UMW it seems hard to imagine
how steel or any other major industry will be piecemeal unionised by an
alphabet soup of craft unions.

[1] Source: A rather dodgy looking Wikipedia entry -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_unions_in_the_United_States#John_L._Lewis_and_CIO

[2] Another dodgy Wiki site suggests that the Wagner Act wasn't even
useful until 1937 when its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme
Court in _National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation_ -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Labor_Relations_Act
Interestingly this was a case of the NRLB rather than a union taking on
Big Steel and winning.  In theory this precedent could be used by craft
unions to bit-by-bit unionise the steel industry.  Yet ISTM that it was
the combination of the law on one hand and the strength of a big steel
union backed by a big mining union that saw the success of OTL.  In the
ATL the unions might get a toe in the door but it will soon be slammed
on them.

- Syd

Signature

"All we need to do now is push Jimmy Thomas under a bus and we'll have a
British Soviet Republic by 1927. That or a British Fascist state - but
hey, it's a chance you take."
   - Phil Edwards, for whom the PoD is as important as the consequences

David Tenner - 02 Aug 2007 05:56 GMT
[On the possibility of the AFL organizing the steel workers through craft
unionism in the absence of the CIO:]

> The flaw in this theory is that the steel industry defeated union
> organising drives in 1892 and 1919[1].  There is a window of opportunity
[quoted text clipped - 3 lines]
> how steel or any other major industry will be piecemeal unionised by an
> alphabet soup of craft unions.

[snip]

> Yet ISTM that it was
> the combination of the law on one hand and the strength of a big steel
> union backed by a big mining union that saw the success of OTL.  In the
> ATL the unions might get a toe in the door but it will soon be slammed
> on them.

Another thing to remember is that the CIO's organizing drive in the steel
industry of 1937 was by no means a complete success. Yes, without a
strike, they got Myron C. Taylor of US Steel to reach a historic agreement
to recognize the SWOC.  But "Little Steel" (which of course was little
only by the standards of US Steel) still held out for years. Only the
threat of losing governemnt war contracts in 1941 finally made them cave.  

ObWI:  What if Myron Taylor were as stubbornly anti-union as, say, Tom
Girdler of Republic Steel (as one can see from
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,850363,00.html Girdler never was
in the least apologetic about his all-out resistance to unionization in
1937) and willing to risk a strike in the belief that he would ultimately
prevail?  Although one contemporary journalist claimed that it would make
no difference because Taylor was supposedly just a stooge for Tom Lamont
and the House of Morgan:

"The most enlightened man in the House of Morgan, almost professionally
so, is Thomas W. Lamont. By that I do not mean that Mr. Lamont could hold
down, on his own intellectual merits, an ordinary instructorship in
economics at one of our leading universities. I mean to say that Mr.
Lamont is enlightened in the sense that he is shrewd, a clever strategist,
and a man of wide worldly contacts. Above all, he knows what is good for
the House of Morgan. He appreciated that the American steel trusts could
not very well take on any British armament business and at the same time
refuse to bid for our own naval construction because they objected to the
labor provisions of the Walsh-Healy Act. He also knew that the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee had a majority of the workers in United
States Steel, especially in the Pittsburgh district; he also probably knew
that the union had few members and would have much trouble in Little
Steel. He wanted continuous production, and he was impressed with the fact
that General Motors lost a whole season's business through the strike. He
knew that the La Follette hearings were not doing big industry any good;
and that if the hearings should ever get around to an exposé of Big Steel,
the revelation of the number of gangsters and spies and personnel fakers
employed by Big Steel would give him the shock of his life. He knew that
the industry, in fighting the union, was messing up its entire productive
process. Carnegie Steel, for instance, had 11,000 ratings for 100,000
workers. He knew that the intransigeant reaction of the Liberty League in
the last campaign had enormously strengthened the Deal. And finally he
knew that John Lewis had not changed overnight from a conservative labor
leader to flaming revolutionary and that Lewis's record in the United Mine
Workers--and Morgan dominates a lot of coal--has been highly responsible,
indeed the most rationalizing influence in this most irrational of
industries; Lewis is radical only in the sense that conservatism cannot
organize the masses. And Mr. Lamont probably also suspected that the large
independent steel companies, over which the House of Morgan has no
immediate control, would keep the union worrying. All these factors
decided Mr. Lamont and the House of Morgan to become far-visioned
industrial statesmen. This attitude was shared by Edward R. Stettinius,
Jr., the Morgan chairman of the finance committee of United States Steel.
Their main problem was to make Myron Taylor believe that he had given
birth to the big idea. The thing to do was to play on Mr. Taylor's
vanity..."  http://www.youngstownsteel.com/littlesteel01.html

In any event, while Taylor's desire to be seen as a great industrial
statesman may have something to do with his recognition of SWOC, obviously
his fear that the SWOC might stage the same sort of successful strike that
the UAW had earlier done in Flint must have played a part.  So if the
Flint sit-down strike had been a failure
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_Sit-Down_Strike maybe the unionization
of Big Steel would have been, too--at least temporarily.  And I can
imagine the Flint strike failing if Frank Murphy had not been governor of
Michigan.  (Incidentally, one should note that Taylor only agreed to
recognize the SWOC as bargaining agent *for its members*, so the agreement
was not as favorable for the CIO as the GM-UAW agreement of the previous
month.  That Lewis was willing to accept this is an indication that he was
aware labor's position in steel may have been weaker than in the
automobile industry, where apart from Governor Murphy's dislike of using
force, the union also had the advantage that shutting down one plant could
paralyze GM. [1]  Anyway, as Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine point
out, "Lewis...realized the importance of symbols and images.  When Myron
Taylor, representing US Steel, accorded recognition to organized labor in
March 1937, newspaper columnists, public officials,  scholars, and many
labor leaders did not examine the terms of the settlement microscopically.  
They were awestruck by news that the fortress of the open shop, the
company that for four decades had used every weapon in its arsenal to
combat trade unionism, had surrendered without a struggle to the CIO..."  
*John L. Lewis:  A Biography*, p. 277.)

Of course, saying that unionization of the mass production industries
might have failed in 1937 does not mean that it would *never* succeed.  
The NLRA would give the unions hope that unlike in 1919, immediate failure
would not necessarily be fatal for them, especially since it would now be
harder for the companies to fire union activists.  And of course in a few
years the war boom and the eagerness of companies to get government
contracts might spur successful unionization of the mass production
industries by the AFL.  (The same thing happened to some extent during
World War I, but the unions then had no Wagner Act to protect their gains
once the war ended.)

[1] "Steel also differed from the auto industry in structure. Not
dependent on assembly line methods of manufacture, though continuous flow
characterized some aspects of steelmaking, the steel industry was not as
vulnerable to economic damage inflicted by worker ocupation of a single
strategic plant." Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, *John L. Lewis:  A
Biography*, pp. 276-7  

Signature

David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net

David Tenner - 11 Aug 2007 17:40 GMT
> The flaw in this theory is that the steel industry defeated union
> organising drives in 1892 and 1919[1].  There is a window of opportunity
[quoted text clipped - 3 lines]
> how steel or any other major industry will be piecemeal unionised by an
> alphabet soup of craft unions.

Remember that the Little Steel strike of 1937 was no more successful (at
least in the short run) than the 1919 strike, and that US Steel also might
have defeated the SWOC if Myron C. Taylor had taken the hard line Judge
Gary took in 1919--or for that matter that Tom Girdler took in 1937.  

Indeed, the experience of 1919 shows that a coalition of unions can mount
a pretty impressive strike in the steel industry. On October 9, 1919, when
the strike was at its height, 367,000 workers were out, according to union
sources (the companies questioned the figures). See Philip Taft's analysis
in *Organized Labor in American History*, pp. 358-9:

"Inevitably, the failure of the strike was attributed, at least by some
commentators, to the lack of unity, inadequate financial support, and the
form of orgnization--a joint campaign by the twenty-four unions comprising
the National Committee rather than a campaign by one industrial
organization. But there never was before or since a more successful
organizing campaign. The Report and Accounting of the National Committee
for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers showed that organizers working under
the direction of the committee recruited 156,702 members, who were dis
tributed among the cooperating unions. The number allocated ranged from
two for the Steam Shovel Men's Union to 70,026 for the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. 'This detailed report includes
only those signed up by the National Committee for Organizing Iron and
Steel Workers and from whom initiation fees of $1.00 each was deducted and
forwarded to the general office of the National Committee. It represents
approximately 50 per cent to 60 per cent of the total number of steel
workers organized during the campaign.'

"The accounting did not include thousands of workers who joined but upon
whose initiation fees no deduction was levied by the National Committee.
In addition, 'thousands more were signed up directly by the multitude of
local unions in the steel industry that were not reported to the National
Committee.'  'It was reported that the financial cost of the year's work
to one or two of the twenty-four unions of the Committee, in maintaining
organizers, contributions, meetings, etc. approximated $200,000 a piece.'

"Funds cannot be regarded as a limiting factor. The total receipts for
strike relief reached $418,141.13, and at the end of the strike an unused
$69,631.42 was turned over to the National Committee.

"Did the workers in 1919 lack the will to stay organized? The evidence
does not justify such a conclusion. Nor was the fact that they were
organized in twenty-four separate unions a necessary weakness. It may be
that the division of workers among so many organizations would have
impeded the smooth functioning of collective bargaining and imposed severe
strain upon the system. However, the steel workers were never able to
reach that stage; they were overwhelmed by superior power. Workers in 1919
had no Labor Board to protect their right to organize and they could not,
as did the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in the Little Steel Strike,
retrieve a lost strike in the courts. Gary could freely say in 1919: it
'has been my policy, the policy of our corporation, not to deal with labor
leaders.'

"In the Little Steel strike in 1937, the companies were no more squeamish
about their tactics than Gary had been eighteen years earlier. Moreover,
they were able to defeat the union and compel it to go back to the plants
without a contract. The difference was that the union now turned to the
National Labor Relations Board, which compelled the companies to recognize
formally the Steel Workers Organizing Committee by signing a written
agreement."

Another factor in the failure of the 1919 strike was that this was the
height of the Red Scare, and employers publicized the past radicalism of
the strike's leader, William Z. Foster, who had been with the IWW and then
formed the Syndicalist League of North America (which advocated working
within the AFL to advance revolutionary syndicalism). (Of course they
could not bring up his membership in the Communist Party because that was
a few years in the future.)  Testifying before Congress, Foster tried to
give the impression that his radicalism was all in the past,that he was
now in full accord with Gompers, and that he had even helped to sell war
bonds in 1918. (Foster's far-left critics would forever be bringing this
up. One Trotskyist was later to observe that Foster had supported *two*
imperialist world wars--though, to be sure, he only supported the second
one after June 22, 1941.)  However, even if Foster had been a Gompersian
pure-and-simple trade unionist all his life, the strike would still have
failed, simply because the steel companies were determined to crush it and
had the power to do so, especially with support from state and local
government in many steel towns.

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David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net

 
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