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History Forum / General / What If / July 2008Anglo-French withdraw support for Russia 1914
I was reading this in the wikipedia. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_World_War_I West German historian Andreas Hillgruber argued that in 1914, a "calculated risk" on the part of Berlin had gone awry. Hillgruber argued that what the Imperial German government had attempted to do in 1914 was to break the informal Triple Entente of Russia, France and Britain, by encouraging Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia and thus provoke a crisis in an area that would concern only St. Petersburg. Hillgruber argued that the Germans hoped that both Paris and London would decide the crisis in the Balkans did not concern them and that lack of Anglo-French support would lead the Russians to reach an understanding with Germany. In Hillgruber=3Fs opinion, the German government had pursed a high-risk diplomatic strategy of provoking a war in the Balkans that had inadvertently caused a world war. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Putting aside whether this was Germany's plan, what-if the Anglo-French had withdraw support for Russia, then in 1914. This would cause a major problem in the French-Russian alliance. Now what happens? GREY PACT WITH THE FRENCH (Daily Mirror, 6 July 1914) Is Britain Committed To A Ground War On the Continent? No Comment From Number Ten. A memorandum from the Army Staff to the Foreign Office, dated 16 January 1906, shows that French and British generals, with the knowledge and consent of Sir Edward Grey, agreed that the United Kingdom shall field an Army, 100,000 men strong, in France within two weeks of an outbreak of hostilities between Germany and France. The memorandum does not mention whether or not the British Army would be independent of the French High Command. Other documents at the Foreign Office indicate that Prime Minister Campbell Bannerman learned of the staff memorandum on 26 January and that he approved of it on his own accord. The Cabinet was never consulted. Letter, HH Asquith to Edward Grey. [Written 6 July 1914] We must consult over the memorandum of 16 January 1906. Please see me tomorrow at 12. Press Release, French Foreign Ministry. [Issued 7 July 1914] There is an assurance of long standing from the British that they will stand by France if France is attacked by any Third Power. CABINET DEBATES FRENCH COMMITMENT (Daily Mirror, 8 July 1914) Are We Obligated To Fight For France Under Any Circumstances? Why Was This Undertaking Not Brought Before the Cabinet Earlier? Press Release, Prime Minister's Office. [Issued 10 July 1914.] Sir Edward Grey has retired from the Foreign Ministry, effective midnight on July 9, 1814. His successor in office shall be the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith. CHAOS IN RUSSIA (The Telegraph, 15 July 1914) Is There Still A Russo-French Alliance? French President Raymond Poincare, on a state visit to Saint Petersburg, Russia's capitol, was in an extended conference with Russian officials not including the Czar, Nicholas II. Sources in Russian high society report that the French tell the Russians that France is reconsidering its defense obligations to Russia in light of the British decision to annull a British promise that Britain will send an Army to France to fight any German invasion. Nicholas II is reported to have remarked that "the perfidious English" have betrayed both France and Russia. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (The Telegraph, 28 July 1914) Russia Agrees To Attend Conference In Danzig. Will Austria Insist On Annexing Parts of Serbia? Magazine Article, written by Winston Churchill [Published 21 September 1914] Left in the lurch by the Allies she trusted, Russia was compelled to the conference table at Danzig, where the Central Powers of Germany and Austria have dismembered Serbia, a plucky little power. The partition of Serbia is a shameful example of concession to a bully whose aggression deserved only condemnation. Extremely unpopular in Russia, the backsliding Czarist regime is beset by general strikes of more than two million workers and peasants appalled by their Government's collapse on the issue of Serbian territorial integrity. , , , , In the space of a month, Britain has lost doughty comrades who, together, had the preponderance of power in Europe. Whether there remains more than words to the Anglo- French Understanding, no one can say, but we know that Austria, Germany and Italy recall as their lesson of 1914 that their opposition in general, and Britain in particular, lack the will to confront greedy German demands with a firm and principled negative. > Is Britain Committed To A Ground War On the Continent? Actually Britain was not committed to anything formally especially ground warfare. There was an informal agreement that in the event of war the French fleet would handle the Med and that was it. There was no joint war planning and French plans did not assume British troops. Ken Young Warmongers like Grey and Churchill frequently repeated that the staff talks between military staffs had not obligated Britain to anything. Absolute balderdash! Britain promises to have a minimum of 100,000 men on French soil within two weeks of a German declaration of war against France, and that is not in the nature of a committment! If that was not a committment, merely an option whose implementation was pre-planned, then there should have been other choices on the list, For example, no Army at all in France. A naval expedition to the Baltic. An amphibious assault on Austria Hungary, & etc. etc. But there were no alternatives to that British Army in France. It is correct that nothing had been thought out thoroughly. There were no schemes for basic matters like command integration and supply . That lack of planning precision shows what 21st century lawyers would term "criminal negligence" but it does not mean that Britian had failed to make a commitment on an Army in France. Quoting from AJP Taylor's _War By Time Table_, The cabinet had authorized the mobilization of the expeditionary force on 3 August. They had not decided where it should go, if anywhere, Great Britain had gone to war for the sake of Belgian neutrality. How was she to insure this? Lord Roberts, the senior general present, thought the expeditionary source should go to Antwerp. Sir John French [commander of the force] thought the Army might cross the Channel to Le Havre and then decide where to go --- perhaps to Antwerp, perhaps to Amiens, Sir Douglas Haig thought the regular soldiers should stop at home and train the mass armies of the future. Sir Henry Wilson, director of military operations, cut in impatiently. He explained that there was no choice. The expeditionary force could not help the Belgians. It could only take its alloted place on the French left wing. The marshalling yards were prepared, tracks ready, lines cleared. It was Mauberge or nowhere. On 6 August, the cabinet resolved that the expeditionary force should go to Amiens. No one took any notice. The timetable said Mauberge. To Mauberge [the expeditionary force] went. In this accidental way, Great Britain found herself involved as a continental Power in a continental war. > The cabinet had authorized the mobilization of the expeditionary force > on 3 August. They had not decided where it should go, if anywhere, The day before on the 2nd August the British cabinet mobilized the fleet. It considered but rejected for the time being dispatching an expeditionary force to the Continent. It was only after the Germans invaded Belgium, the British cabinet agreed on sending the troops. > Warmongers like Grey and Churchill frequently repeated that the staff > talks between military staffs had not obligated Britain to anything. Let me see Grey was Foreign Secretary and Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. Neither had anything to do with army planning. Asquith and most of the rest of the Cabinet told them that no commitments were to be made. Grey may have wanted war though that is doubtful but the talks did not include any commitment. Britain did not make any promises. French planning was based on the fact it was doubtful that any British assistance would be available. > Britain promises to have a minimum of 100,000 men on French soil > within two weeks of a German declaration of war against France, If Germany had not invaded Belgium it is doubtful the declaration of war would have got through Cabinet. A declaration of war without that would probably have brought the Government down. Britain did not declare war until after Germany had invaded Luxembourg and Belgium. Still the main problem is not Britain, it is that German plans for war assumed a two front situation and needed France to be attacked and knocked out before Russia had fully mobilised. If Russia declared war the German General staff were committed to an attack on France. There was no way France could stay out. Ken Young Ken Young has to disagree with Ray Speer no matter what, right? So Grey and Churchill cannot be warmongers because their portfolios were for foreign affairs and the Navy, hence they have nothing to do with arrangements since 1906 to implant a British army in the left flank of the French forces. Lets ignore their 1914 behavior in which they forcefully badgered the Cabinet to drop all options other than immediate hostilities with Germany, citing that 1906 memo as a basis for the notion that Britain had no other choice. In propaganda, Britain's sacrifice was "all for Belgium" and Mr. Young believes that poor little Belgium would have be a cause for war even if no prearrangements had placed the British in the French line. Assuming that is true, a Great Britain NOT encumbered by the 1906 agreement will be able to take the Flashman Option. Please read that SHWI thread, Mr. Young, where Britain has a better war because it is not slaughtering its young men like lions led by donkeys. The capital mistake was the idiocy of chaining Britain to fighting in France. The key commitment towards that mistake was the 1906 understanding, which was never approved in Cabinet. Popping up eight years later, someone should have challenged the relevance of a proposal that had never been vetted by the Cabinet. And Grey and Churchill were the advocates arguing that effing 1906 memo eliminated Britain's ability to sit out this new Franco-German War, much as Gladstone and his Cabinet did. Gladstone was smart and practical. Too bad Grey and Churchill did not display those qualities in the intervention debate in Cabinet. But is it possible that England would not declare war on Germany if the latter did'nt invade Belgium...? I think so. I find it hard to believe that Churchill or Grey coúld force Asquith (who could be rather ruthless and forceful if I remember his earlier career correctly) and the rest of the Cabinet to just fall in line without a just cause. On May 26, 3:30 pm, "pierre.zattb...@gmail.com" <pierre.zattb...@gmail.com> wrote: > But is it possible that England would not declare war on Germany if > the latter did'nt invade Belgium...? I think so. I find it hard to > believe that Churchill or Grey coúld force Asquith (who could be > rather ruthless and forceful if I remember his earlier career > correctly) and the rest of the Cabinet to just fall in line without a > just cause. The is a good point. How might the war have been conducted IF the Germans had conducted a defensive war from the beginning on the Western Front with some kind of Maginot Line of there own - remember there is NO airborne assualt at this point in time. Also, what would Britain's response have been if the FRENCH decided to take a short-cut through Belgium? > "The Old Man" wrote: >> "pierre.zattb...@gmail.com" wrote: [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > Britain's response have been if the FRENCH decided to take a short-cut > through Belgium? The French actually did want to invade through Belgium earlier on in their planning, but the political repercussions were too much (loss of British support). If Britain isn't in the war, no economic blockade of Germany. Although they might frown on the High Seas Fleet approaching the Channel. I wonder what Italy's reaction would be? Would they stay neutral too? On May 26, 3:30 pm, "pierre.zattb...@gmail.com" <pierre.zattb...@gmail.com> wrote: > But is it possible that England would not declare war on Germany if > the latter did'nt invade Belgium...? I think so. I find it hard to > believe that Churchill or Grey coúld force Asquith (who could be > rather ruthless and forceful if I remember his earlier career > correctly) and the rest of the Cabinet to just fall in line without a > just cause. The is a good point. How might the war have been conducted IF the Germans had conducted a defensive war from the beginning on the Western Front with some kind of Maginot Line of there own - remember there is NO airborne assualt at this point in time. - The problem with this is that at the time, no general had understood that the available technology would give a large advantage to defense. If you look at everybody's 1914 plans, it's all maneuvered warfare. This is understandable; you don't defeat an enemy only by defending; but the underlying assumption is that wide-ranging offensives, mobile fronts, and cavalry operations are all possible. > On May 26, 3:30 pm, "pierre.zattb...@gmail.com" > [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > underlying assumption is that wide-ranging offensives, mobile fronts, and > cavalry operations are all possible. In 1914, it was clear how to put France out of war. How to achieve the same goal against by purely military means Russia was, at this time, anybody's guess. Staying on defense against France meant a prolonged war almost by definition and it would also give France a total freedom of action. German choice of the priorities was logical for 1914: with France being forced to capitulate, Russia would be doomed to sue for peace: it did not have either rmoney or technology/industrial capacities to fight Germany and A-H on its own. So, a basic idea behind the German plan was (or seemed to be at this time) quite reasonable. An idea of 'Maginot Line' would be, AFAIK, a total novelty in 1914, not to mention that it would take a lot of time to build such a line (and, IIRC, defences of this type proved to be of a marginal; usefulness during WWII). Stalemate on the Western Front was, to a great degree, due to a huge concentration of forces on both sides. So, if Germany left only a weak force to guard these defences, where is a guarantee that this force would be capable to defend a very long line against attack of the French army? As for the maneuvered warfare, 1st, the generals always prone to refighting the last war and 2nd, operations of this type had been conducted by both sides on the Eastern Front so this was not a total insanity. (snip stuff I agree upon) As for the maneuvered warfare, 1st, the generals always prone to refighting the last war - OK... and 2nd, operations of this type had been conducted by both sides on the Eastern Front so this was not a total insanity. - When had this fighting taken place? My remark refers to 1914 planning, even before the war had begun, as you'll remember. > <a...@hotmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggionews:a425668e-5858-48aa-a5af-d78bd28a67e4@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > - When had this fighting taken place? My remark refers to 1914 planning, > even before the war had begun, as you'll remember. In 1914: Russian advance into Eastern Prussia (which ended with their defeat at Tannenberg), German advance into Russian part of Poland, Russian advance into Galicia were examples of a trench war. At least advance into the Eastern Prussia had been planned by the Russians before war started. And, as far as the big-scale cavalry deployments are involved, battle at Jaroslawice was fought in August 1914 and involved at least 1 cavalry division on each side. On May 27, 11:08 am, "Michele" <nospammiar...@tin.it> wrote: > <a...@hotmail.com> ha scritto nel > messaggionews:a425668e-5858-48aa-a5af-d78bd28a67e4@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com... [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > - When had this fighting taken place? My remark refers to 1914 planning, > even before the war had begun, as you'll remember. In 1914: Russian advance into Eastern Prussia (which ended with their defeat at Tannenberg), German advance into Russian part of Poland, Russian advance into Galicia were examples of a trench war. At least advance into the Eastern Prussia had been planned by the Russians before war started. - So, before the outbreak of the war, nobody had any actual evidence that maneuvered warfare could be conducted, yet everybody planned for that and not for the defense. That's what I said. With hindsight, we can say that it worked in places, it didn't work elsewhere. But that is irrelevant to the point above, which is exactly the point I made: It is highly unlikely that the Germans would plan for a passive defense along the French border in 1914, for the simple reason that everybody (including not only the Germans but also the French) believed that offensives would carry the day. This is all I was saying. > It is highly unlikely that the Germans would plan for a passive defense > along the French border in 1914, for the simple reason that everybody > (including not only the Germans but also the French) believed that > offensives would carry the day. This is all I was saying. But historically the Germans DIDN'T think they could break through the French frontier in a timely manner. Hence the attack through Belgium, bringing both Belgium and Britain into the war. So they weren't totally enamored of the overwhelming strength of attack and elan (unlike the French). It seems to me that there is a legitimate what if suggested by the claim that they thought offensives would carry the day and that they didn't believe the entire boarder could be defended against a superior force, and that's the "what if they come up with the plan of simply going straight into France accross a broad front and avoid Belgium?" This obviously requires a break point several years prior to the actual war. Heck, advance on the entire boarder and you force the French back out of contact with Belgium and conceivably open a route for the northern advance (logistics are impossible on the likely opened route IIRC, but this is the early 20th century German high command we're talking about, logistic impossibilities won't neccessarily stop them from going with a plan). With the narrower frontage and without the plan for the attack through Belgium to win the war in a single "surprise" knock-out punch the timing becomes somewhat less critical and there might well be a "hold" point prior to the actual attack allowing the Germans to mobilize without attacking France immediately. DougL > <a...@hotmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggionews:e32a0b4c-c624-406a-b8aa-3394cde7d226@e53g2000hsa.googlegroups.com... > On May 27, 11:08 am, "Michele" <nospammiar...@tin.it> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 28 lines] >yet everybody planned for that and > not for the defense. Most of the previous experience demonstrated that maneuvered warfare could be conducted. What will or will not happen during the next war is always a speculation so what 'actual evidence' are you talking about? >That's what I said. With hindsight, we can say that it > worked in places, it didn't work elsewhere. But that is irrelevant to the [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > (including not only the Germans but also the French) believed that > offensives would carry the day. This is all I was saying To be precise, you said: "This is understandable; you don't defeat an enemy only by defending; but the underlying assumption is that wide-ranging offensives, mobile fronts, and cavalry operations are all possible." And my comment was that they WERE possible, especially in 1914. This is all I was saying. >An idea of 'Maginot Line' would be, AFAIK, a total novelty in 1914... ???? Fortifications were considered very important in 1914. Recent history confirmed this - the very long siege and immense attacker casualties at Port Arthur, the Turkish stand at the Chatalja lines in 1913. German war plans in 1914 assumed that any assault on the French defenses in Alsace and Lorraine would fail - therefore it was necessary to march around the flank through Belgium. >So, if Germany left only a weak force to guard these defences, where is a >guarantee that this force would be capable to defend a very long line >against attack of the French army? Not a 'very long line', compared to the extended front of 1915-1918, and fortifications are a multiplier. Also, in fact, the Germans had good reason to expect an all-out French attack in Lorraine. The French were convinced they could break through, and cut off the German right wing in Belgium. The Germans expected to stop them - else their own plan would collapse. >As for the maneuvered warfare, 1st, the generals always prone to >refighting the last war and 2nd, operations of this type had been >conducted by both sides on the Eastern Front so this was not a total >insanity. All true. | People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a | | million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong | | with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman | > "Rich Rostrom": > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > it was necessary to march around the > flank through Belgium. The French in Alsace and Lorraine in 1914? I didn't know the Germans allowed the French to build fortresses on German territory. Very interesting. What is your source on this? Just kidding. I know what you mean (i.e. Verdun). :) -Bisquik :o)-~ On May 27, 12:14 pm, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> wrote: > a...@hotmail.com wrote: > >An idea of 'Maginot Line' would be, AFAIK, a total novelty in 1914... [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Fortifications were considered very > important in 1914. Fortifications, yes, but Magino Line-type of fortifications was (AFAIK) not. > Recent history > confirmed this - the very long siege > and immense attacker casualties at > Port Arthur, >the Turkish stand at the > Chatalja lines in 1913. Port Arthur was nothing like Magino line: it was a fortress, not a line protecting a big part of a border. There were powerful fortresses like Peremishl and the Ottomans created powerful system of the fort- based defences of Constantinople as early as during the Russian- Ottoman War of 1877-78 (it was at least a 'foundation' of Chatalja lines) and their fortifications and defense of Plevna were a godd illustration of the point you are making. In all these cases the fortifications had been, shall we say, 'local' or 'regional' However, post-WWI idea of the fortifications totally blocking the whole border (or at least a big part of it) were, AFAIK, a new development which absorbed WWI experience. > German war plans in 1914 assumed that > any assault on the French defenses in > Alsace and Lorraine would fail - therefore > it was necessary to march around the > flank through Belgium. > >So, if Germany left only a weak force to guard these defences, where is a > >guarantee that this force would be capable to defend a very long line [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > extended front of 1915-1918, and > fortifications are a multiplier. Well, you are talking with a benefit of a hind sight. :-) Conversation about a purely defensive German strategy on the Western Front makes sense (IMO) if it is accompanied by an attempt to inflict a fast crushing defeat on the Eastern front. Which means that only 'limited' force should be left to defend the West. Now, for this limited force facing the whole French army, pre-WWI French-German border would be a very long line of defense. I agree that definitions like this are rather abstract (what is 'very long' vs 'just long' or 'not long comparing to <whatever>' shoudl be defined in the terms of firepower, troops per mile, etc.). > Also, in fact, the Germans had good reason > to expect an all-out French attack in Lorraine. > The French were convinced they could break > through, and cut off the German right wing in > Belgium. The Germans expected to stop them - > else their own plan would collapse. Indeed. But, within a 'totally passive Western Front' scenario, what would it take for the Germans to make sure that the French breakthrough will not happen while they are happily marching deeper and deeper into the Russian Empire? > >As for the maneuvered warfare, 1st, the generals always prone to > >refighting the last war and 2nd, operations of this type had been > >conducted by both sides on the Eastern Front so this was not a total > >insanity. > > All true. On May 27, 9:53 am, a...@hotmail.com wrote: > An idea of 'Maginot Line' would be, AFAIK, a total novelty in 1914, > not to mention that it would take a lot of time to build such a line > (and, IIRC, defences of this type proved to be of a marginal; > usefulness during WWII). As I said, this is WORLD WAR ONE; no paratroopers, tanks nor aerial bombardment as yet. And for it taking a while to build, wasn't there a crisis in 1905? (The First Moroccan Crisis, also called the Tangier Crisis was brought about by the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Tangier in Morocco on March 31, 1905 and his subsequent speech in which he favoured Moroccan independence. This was a challenge to France's mandate of the country, and was designed to split the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France (signed in 1904).) Let's say that in 1904, with the signing of the Entente, some strategic-thinking member of the General Staff decides to reinforce the French-German border to force any prospective attack into narrow and defensible corridors by building a series of forts along the border with the area between smoothed (grassland) to deny cover for an assualting force while defending forces have a network of trenches connecting fortified areas with pillboxes armed with artillary and machine guns. The trenches themselves could also be used at defensible positions. Thus by the time of the Second Crisis, (The Second Moroccan Crisis, also called the Agadir Crisis, was sparked by the German demand for large areas of French Equatorial Africa to compensate for Germany's loss during the First Moroccan Crisis. The deployment of the German warship Panther heightened the tension when it was sent to the Moroccan port of Agadir on July 1, 1911.) it was decided to reinforce this system of trenches and hardpoints with a secondary system, while the primary was upgraded with telegraph and telephone communications and improved weaponry. It's also possible that airstrips could be built for aerial reconnaissnace and (later) bombardment aircraft to give added strength. Thus by 1914, while the German Army goes off to kick Russian a.s, reserves and militias could hold the Western Front until the Eastern Front has been pacified. > On May 27, 9:53 am, a...@hotmail.com wrote: > [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] > machine guns. The trenches themselves could also be used at defensible > positions. With the German General Staff planning an offensive war, why and how would such a person make his way high enough in the General Staff to be able to change a prevailing way of thinking? Probably, a set of the preconditions would include a very early death of Schliffen (and probably few more high-placed personalities). Schliffen was obsessed with 'Cannae' so advocay of a defensive war should be a difficult task for a person of a lower rank. Anyway, the Germans in 1904 considered themselves quite capable to defeat (again) French in an offensive war so why would they plan to spend huge amounts of money and material on a defensive plan? [] > Thus by 1914, while the German Army goes off to kick Russian a.s, > reserves and militias could hold the Western Front until the Eastern > Front has been pacified. The problem with this logic is that, while the original 'Schliffen Plan' was planning for a total French defeat within less than 2 months, nobody could clearly predict what would it take in the terms of time and effort to 'pacify' Russia. At best, it looked as a, potentially, very long story and the existing historical examples were not very encouraging. Leaving 'reserves and militias' to defend even fortified border against the whole French Army would be extremely risky. In article <a425668e-5858-48aa-a5af-d78bd28a67e4@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com>, > An idea of 'Maginot Line' would be, AFAIK, a total novelty in 1914, > not to mention that it would take a lot of time to build such a line The 1870 war had proved the danger of allowing your forces to be trapped in fortifications. Thus the French concentration on "Elan" in 1914. Of course in 1939 the French were using the lessons from 14-18. The last war is all planners have to go on. Ken Young On May 28, 7:48 am, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote: > In article > <a425668e-5858-48aa-a5af-d78bd28a6...@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com>, [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > The 1870 war had proved the danger of allowing your forces to be > trapped in fortifications. Yes. However, the same war demonstrated that it is rather difficult to take a big city surrounded by a line of the forts. Siege of Plevna during the Russian-Ottoman War was an example of the usefulness of the fortifications (mostly ad hoc) and closer to the end of this war the Ottomans built an impressive line of the forts defending access to Istambul. Port Arthur was one more positive example in this area. So, one may say that experience of the French-Prussian War demonstrated how NOT to use fortresses. :-) Magino Line represented a totally new (well, not REALLY new because there were numerous analogs back in history) way of thinking by practically denying a war of maneuver. >Thus the French concentration on "Elan" in > 1914. Of course in 1939 the French were using the lessons from 14-18. > The last war is all planners have to go on. Exactly. In article <38091569-4246-459a-8d0a-7f4a638abf49@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, > Also, what would > Britain's response have been if the FRENCH decided to take a short-cut > through Belgium? The French were aware of the British attitude and had no plans for a march through Belgium. At least not without Belgium consent. Ken Young > In article > <38091569-4246-459a-8d0a-7f4a638abf49@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > Ken Young At one point Lichnowsky telegraphs home that Britain will guarantee French neutrality if Germany doesn't march in the West. Wilhelm ordered Moltke "the lesser" to march East. Lichnowsky corrected himself later in the day. (As did a telegram from the British king.) If Lichnowsky's later telegram isn't sent and France attacks in Alsace/Elsass would 1) Italy be obligated and willing to respond as a 'causus foederis" for the triple alliance? 2) Would Belgium in the face of French agression against Germany allow a German counter attack through Belgium? (The compromise between the kaiser and Moltke was to let the mobilization plan go into effect but not cross any frontier) 3) If 1 or 2 or both , what is Britain's attitude now? > 1) Italy be obligated and willing to respond as a 'causus foederis" > for the triple alliance? No, they could still point to the defensive clause in the alliance. AS for willing it depends on where the advantage seemed to be. OTL Italy declared war in the hope of gaining some Italian speaking territory from A-H. > 2) Would Belgium in the face of French agression against Germany > allow a German counter attack through Belgium? I doubt it Belgium was determined to stay neutral not declare war on France which is what this would amount to. > 3) If 1 or 2 or both , what is Britain's attitude now? Well this depends on a lot of factors. Gray and Asquith would probably want to support France but they have to get this through Cabinet and Parliament. That is far from a given if Belgium is not invaded. Ken Young In article <215e178e-1a74-4c15-9b0e-720d689cd1f1@26g2000hsk.googlegroups.com>, > I think so. I find it hard to > believe that Churchill or Grey coúld force Asquith As it was three cabinet members resigned over the issue. Without Belgium it is highly possible that a declaration of war would have brought down the government. Britain going to war in 1914 was far from a done thing. On the other hand German war plans made it impossible for France to stay out. Ken Young > The capital mistake was the idiocy of chaining Britain to fighting in > France. Where else are they going to fight in 1914? The BEF consisted of about 10 divisions. They needed a port to disembark, no landing craft in 1914. Stick them into Belgium and they are going to go the way of the Belgian Army. You are working from hindsight here. No military planner forecast Trench Warfare or for that matter a long war hence the resulting shortages. Ken Young > kenney@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote: > >> The capital mistake was the idiocy of chaining Britain to fighting in >> France. > > Where else are they going to fight in 1914? I always found Jackie Fisher's idea intriguing... Land the BEF on Germany's northern coast. :-) -Bisquik :o)-~ > So Grey and Churchill cannot be warmongers because their portfolios > were > for foreign affairs and the Navy, hence they have nothing to do with > arrangements since 1906 to implant a British army in the left flank of > the French forces. Sorry about the delay I meant to respond but forgot. That is not what I said. They had nothing to do with Army planning. The Admiralty advocated landing troops in Belgium and Churchill proposed Copenhaging the German fleet. The Admiralty had not bothered to ask the Army about what was planned. Two members of the Cabinet resigned on the declaration of war and without the German invasion of Belgium it is likely that Asquith would have faced a vote of confidence. > The capital mistake was the idiocy of chaining Britain to fighting in > France. What was the alternative the RN was not able to land troops anywhere in Germany in 1914 and no plans for that had been discussed with the Army anyway. > And Grey and Churchill were the advocates arguing that effing 1906 > memo eliminated Britain's ability to sit out this new Franco-German War, > much as Gladstone and his Cabinet did. Refusing to honour the Guarantee to Belgium would probably have brought the government down and the Tories were much more belligerent. Off course if Germany had not invaded Luxembourg and Belgium the situation would have been different Ken Young > Off course if Germany had not invaded Luxembourg and Belgium the > situation would have been different Which brings up the question of just how well the Germans would be doing against France if they *didn't* slide through those two countries. I mean, everyone always suggests that way would be good as it'd avoid bringing in Britain to the conflict - but if it means Germany'd get it's a.s handed to it by France if it didn't violate their neutrality... Basically, what I'm asking if it *militarily* (if not politically) made sense for Germany to head that way, or if they could have done just as well (or better, thanks to not adding Britain to their list of foes) by heading straight into France. David  Signature_______________________________________________________________________ David Johnson home.earthlink.net/~trolleyfan "So many of you come time and time again to watch this final end of everything which I think is really wonderful and then to return home to your own eras and raise families and strive for new and better societies and fight terrible wars for what you know is right, it gives one real hope for the whole future of lifekind... ...Except of course we know it hasn't got one." > > Off course if Germany had not invaded Luxembourg and Belgium the > > situation would have been different [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > (or better, thanks to not adding Britain to their list of foes) by heading > straight into France. Why do they need to "head" anywhere in particular? Germany's border with France was eminently defensible, as the Frogs found out when they attacked it in August 1914, and suffered humungous casualties. About the only conquest worth bothering about was the Briey iron field, which was right on the border, and could have been seized by a _very_ limited operation. -- Mike Stone - Peterborough, England Q) In the Roman Civil Wars, why did all the bachelors fight for Sulla? A) Because they weren't the Marian kind. >Basically, what I'm asking if it *militarily* (if not politically) made >sense for Germany to head that way, or if they could have done just as well >(or better, thanks to not adding Britain to their list of foes) by heading >straight into France. If the Germans attack straight into France, they attack straight into the mass of the French army defending in strong fortifications. They don't get crushed, but they don't win, either. And there is a "Russian steamroller" in the East. Also, remember that Germany did not plan on an extended war. I suspect that they believed they had to win quickly. The sheer weight of Russian mass might overwhelm them if they were fighting France at the same time. And also - did they consider this - I would think they did - Germany would be cut off from nitrates in the event of war, meaning that within a few months Germany would be out of explosives, including smokeless gunpowder, and out of fertilizer too. OTL Germany captured an immense stockpile of nitrates in Belgium, and Haber invented his process for nitrates from air just when that ran out. They couldn't have counted on either circumstance. ATL no invasion of Belgium: they don't capture that nitrate stock, but perhaps could buy it. Neutral Britain will not blockade them, but France can make it very hard for them to ship anything in. (WW I with the British neutral could get very weird. The Germans can't force Dover Strait, so they would break out to blue water via the Faroes. The French would go out to meet them. One could see the French and German navies fighting battles west of Scotland, while the British watch.) | People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a | | million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong | | with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman | In message <rrostrom.21stcentury-A0FD82.23011404072008@news.isp.giganews.com>, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcentury@rcn.com> writes >(WW I with the British neutral could get very weird. The Germans can't >force Dover Strait, so they would break out to blue water via the >Faroes. The French would go out to meet them. One could see the French >and German navies fighting battles west of Scotland, while the British >watch.) I'm not convinced that Britain would let either get close to Scotland without consequences. One of the more plausible WW1 alternatives to British involvement in a land war (suggested by George MacDonald Fraser) is a British naval blockade of Germany and German-occupied lands. Belgium is conquered without much of a fight, France either surrenders or is beaten pretty quickly, hopefully without too many casualties. The British blockade makes a continued war unprofitable, and so the Germans hopefully settle a negotiated peace with reparations (from France and Belgium) as in the Franco-Prussian war and eventually withdraw. It's not entirely convincing and the long term consequences aren't wonderful - Germany still believes that it's possible to win a war without catastrophic losses - but it would make a very different 20th century. SignatureMarcus L. Rowland http://www.forgottenfutures.com/ LJ:ffutures http://homepage.ntlworld.com/forgottenfutures/ Forgotten Futures - The Scientific Romance Role Playing Game Diana: Warrior Princess & Elvis: The Legendary Tours The Original Flatland Role Playing Game > I'm not convinced that Britain would let either get close to Scotland > without consequences. Why not? They let the Russian fleet sink half the British fishing fleet when transiting the North Sea without so much as a murmur in 1905. SignatureWilliam Black I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach Time for tea. >> I'm not convinced that Britain would let either get close to Scotland >> without consequences. [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] >They let the Russian fleet sink half the British fishing fleet when >transiting the North Sea without so much as a murmur in 1905. "The Dogger Bank incident (also known as Incident of Hull or The Russian Outrage) occurred when the Russian Baltic Fleet mistook some British trawlers at Dogger Bank for a Japanese Imperial Navy force. The Russians attacked on the night of October 21, 1904. Three British sailors died and a number were wounded. A priest aboard a Russian cruiser caught in the crossfire was also killed. The incident almost led to war between Britain and Russia, until it was diplomatically defused." (source Wikipedia) does not equal "sink half the British fishing fleet..." "The incident led to a serious diplomatic conflict between Russia and Great Britain, which was particularly dangerous due to the alliance that existed between Britain and Japan. In the aftermath some British newspapers called the Russian fleet 'pirates' and the Russian admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski was heavily criticised for not leaving the British sailors lifeboats. Royal Navy battleships of the Home Fleet were prepared for war action whilst British cruiser squadrons shadowed the Russian fleet as it made its way through the Bay of Biscay. Under diplomatic pressure, the Russian government agreed to investigate the incident, and Rozhestvensky was ordered to dock in Vigo, Spain, where he left behind those officers considered responsible (as well as at least one officer who had been critical of him).[2] The fishermen eventually received £66,000 from Russia as compensation." does not equal "...without so much as a murmur" I don't think the Russian fleet was perceived as a serious threat to the Royal Navy before this incident, and it would have been considered politically unwise to shadow them before this incident occurred. Russia was at war, but their ships were several thousand miles from the enemy, and there shouldn't have been any problems. Comparing that to a battle between two rival navies off the Scottish coast is just silly. SignatureMarcus L. Rowland http://www.forgottenfutures.com/ LJ:ffutures http://homepage.ntlworld.com/forgottenfutures/ Forgotten Futures - The Scientific Romance Role Playing Game Diana: Warrior Princess & Elvis: The Legendary Tours The Original Flatland Role Playing Game >>> I'm not convinced that Britain would let either get close to Scotland >>> without consequences. [quoted text clipped - 30 lines] > > does not equal "...without so much as a murmur" They did nothing but protest. After a time some money was given but while the Royal Navy was ready to attack the murderous Russina fleet the politicians didn't allow them to attack. > I don't think the Russian fleet was perceived as a serious threat to the > Royal Navy before this incident, and it would have been considered [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Comparing that to a battle between two rival navies off the Scottish coast > is just silly. In what way wasn't the Russian fleet 'off the Scottish coast'? They even started shooting and nothing was done. What makes you think that the then British government would behave in a different manner for anyone else? SignatureWilliam Black I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach Time for tea. >>>> I'm not convinced that Britain would let either get close to Scotland >>>> without consequences. [quoted text clipped - 47 lines] > >In what way wasn't the Russian fleet 'off the Scottish coast'? In the sense that at its closest Dogger Bank is about 60 miles from any part of the British coast, and at that time territorial waters were (I think) 3 miles. >They even started shooting and nothing was done. I very much doubt that anyone concerned was psychic enough to guess that the Russians (who were not at war with Britain) were about to start shooting at shadows. All of the British ships involved were fishing vessels, none AFAIK with radio. So it must have taken several hours for the Royal Navy to learn that an incident had occurred, let alone respond to it. And we're talking the middle of the night with no warning. >What makes you think that the then British government would behave in a >different manner for anyone else? By the time the British government knew about Dogger Bank the "battle" was over and the Russians had moved on. The RN caught up with the Russians at the Bay of Biscay, several hundred miles away. By then the extent of the damage was clear, presumably the Russian ambassador was doing his best to lower tempers, and the diplomats had taken over. The British fleet "shadowed" the Russians, which is something you don't do to a friendly navy - given the possibility of collisions and accidents, it's something you only do if you are seriously considering much more drastic action. The British knew it, and the Russians knew it. Basically, you're asking Britain to go to war because a couple of fishing boats have been sunk, something that happens several times a year (admittedly usually through collisions rather than gunfire), and complaining because Britain did the equivalent of going to Defcon 2 but didn't actually open fire. In the event the Russians paid Britain massive damages (several million pounds in today's money), put the responsible officers ashore, and otherwise did their best to calm things down. This undoubtedly saved many Russian lives, and possibly some British (though given the gunnery exhibited by the Russian fleet at Dogger Bank this is debatable). Going back to the original discussion, you're talking about the French and Germans (the two largest European naval powers) already being at war and converging to fight a battle within striking range of British ports. Britain would have ample warning, and the Navy would undoubtedly be ready to deal with anything that looked like an attack on Britain. I agree that if a battle was well off the coast Britain probably wouldn't intervene - after all, both sides are bally foreigners - except to protect British shipping, but in this context I suspect that any such protecting would be fairly aggressive. SignatureMarcus L. Rowland http://www.forgottenfutures.com/ LJ:ffutures http://homepage.ntlworld.com/forgottenfutures/ Forgotten Futures - The Scientific Romance Role Playing Game Diana: Warrior Princess & Elvis: The Legendary Tours The Original Flatland Role Playing Game >Going back to the original discussion, you're talking about the French >and Germans (the two largest European naval powers) already being at war >and converging to fight a battle within striking range of British ports. Not necessarily "within striking range". As the OP of this sub-thread, I wrote "west of Scotland", which could mean in sight of the Butt of Lewis, or around Rockall, 500 km W. The point is that France will control the Channel, insuring German ships (war or merchant) cannot pass. German ships however can go north of Britain, and France can't interfere there. But at some point further S and W, France's naval power becomes equal to Germany's (they're both well out from their bases). There is of course the issue of whether Britain would continue unlimited trade with Germany, in which case there is no possible blockade. Now that I think about it, this seems probable. Britain is not going to tolerate any French-imposed limits on her commerce. Anything Germany wants to import will be shipped to Britain, and then transshipped to Germany via the North Sea, which the French Navy will stay out of. | People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a | | million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong | | with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman | > > So Grey and Churchill cannot be warmongers because their portfolios > > were [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > landing troops in Belgium and Churchill proposed Copenhaging the German > fleet. I think that was Fisher actually. He suggested in to Edward VII in 1905 or 1906. The King's response was "My G-d, Fisher, you must be mad!" -- Mike Stone - Peterborough, England Q) In the Roman Civil Wars, why did all the bachelors fight for Sulla? A) Because they weren't the Marian kind. > Putting aside whether this was Germany's plan, what-if the Anglo-French > had withdraw support for Russia, then in 1914. This would cause a major > problem in the French-Russian alliance. This is exactly why it wouldn't happen. France had a long history of seeking an eastern ally against threats to their eastern border, but this tendency was magnified greatly after Germany took Alsace-Lorraine. Scoring an alliance with Russia was a major coup, and one that France couldn't afford to throw away. If it had to choose between Britain and Russia, France was going with Russia. For its part, Germany feared Russia's rapid industrial development, believing that it was only a matter of time before the combined might of France and Russia was more than a match for Germany. When that happened, Germany figured France (visibly itching for "revanche" over Alsace-Lorraine) and Russia (frustrated by German interference in its Balkan ambitions) would pick a fight to take down Germany. They were probably right. So whether they were trying to start the war early, before Russia and France were ready, or trying to break the alliance by making the alternative a war they weren't ready for, the basic principle is the same: lance an emerging threat by challenging it when you can still win. And the French response has to be the same: go to war now, because you won't be able to start a war at the time of your choosing if the alliance is broken. Old Toby Least Known Dog on the Net > If it had to choose between Britain and > Russia, France was going with Russia. Almost certainly. In OTL the UK declared war on Germany, not in support of Russia or France, but in support of Belgium. So you can argue that British obligations going back to 1830 were actually more important to the UK than the recent entente. > Old Toby > Least Known Dog on the Net Alan |
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