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History Forum / General / What If / September 2008What IF: Japan Sent Paratroops to Pearl Harbor ?
Gents, I know that this is way, way out there even for me, but I want your targeting suggestions. In 1940 the Japanese National Airline, "Air Nippon" had 12 military aircraft modified into ultra-long ranged 12 passenger airliners. The base airframe was that of the G3M "Nell" twin engined bomber. Several "round the world" promotional tours were historically completed although two of the 12 were lost. One to a retracted landing gear accident on the ground and another to a slide off of a short Pacific Island rain soaked runway. Leaving just 10 to fly high ranking Japanese government and military leaders on international visits. The Japanese watched German parachute troops make spectacular successes in the early European War and wanted some of their own. German instructors were brought in to teach existing combat trained IJN volunteers the basics of parachute jumping but these Japanese Special Naval Landing Force (JSNLF) paras were not historically jump certified until Feb.1942. Since I wish to send not yet fully jump trained paratroops to Oahu for Dec.7'41 I propose that the 10 long ranged former Nells could each carry 8 paratroopers and a combat trained pilot and co-pilot (totaling 10 souls on board) to Oahu from an existing Japanese airbase in the Marshall Islands. They did have the range necessary for a one way flight with a 15% fuel reserve, IF no parachutes and only light infantry weapons were carried, to reduce weight. Since the Japanese airliners were twin engined and had a tail similar (but not identical) to that of the Americn A-20 light attack bomber then operating out of Oahu, each would be painted in American military colours and markings, to resemble a Hawaiian based USAAF A-20. Authentic warplane registration numbers courtesy of Yoshikawa at the Honolulu Consulate. A Japanese radio homing compass, already historically installed would guide the long overwater night flights to Oahu from out of the southwest, for an arrival co-ordinated with the Dec'7'41 air attacks. Since each AH Japanese "A-20" would not have the range to fly elsewhere and didn't carry any parachutes, their attack missions would have to include soft landings somewhere on Oahu. What American target or targets would you choose for these 10 x 10 = 100 men, armed only with light infantry weapons, numerous demolition charges and a "can do" attitude ? And why ? Before you ask, no, this is not intended as a suicide mission. Japanese rescue submarines, with radio homing beacons, were historically present near Johnston Atoll and Niihau Island in case of mechanical troubles during their long night flight. Where possible the 100 JSNLF volunteers would be recruited from Hawaiian issei and nisei troopers who had returned to Japan for educational or military service reasons as per John J. Stephen's 1984 book, "Hawaii Under the Rising Sun". All would be carrying forged American identity documents, US cash and civilian clothes in their packs. It is intended that with local knowledge, all would be able to "fade into" the 40% ethnic Japanese population of Oahu until they could be extracted via pre-arranged minisub or fishing sampan. What are your constructive thoughts gents ? There is no target in Hawaii that a hundred men can take that would be worth the sacrifice of the lives of those men. Even a commando assault in officer country that eliminates Kimmel, Short and other enemy leaders will have no war winning effect. Maybe explosives & incendiaries might assure the elimination of the POL storage units at Pearl Harbor, or, in the alternative, we provide for an additional sortie against that fuel. If some romantic politician insists on a ninja raid against the Americans, let us not do it in Hawaii. Those 100 ninjas can sacrifice their lives to better effect in Washington DC. At platoon strength, that suicide commando assaults the White House if Roosevelt is there, otherwise it is Objective: Warm Springs! The other commandos scatter in one or two man teams to shoot and kill USA leaders --- the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, the President Pro tem of the Senate, the members of the Cabinet. Surrounded without hope of escape, doomed to recognition by their faces and language, the ninjas do their jobs and then seek out a national landmark to eliminate in death. Demolish the base of the Washington Monument; topple Lincoln's statue; immolate the Library of Congress; collapse the dome of the Capitol; grab their Declaration of Independence and Constitution and take a patriotic dump on the enemy's most sacred documents. Drawback --- We better not lose this War, because the additional damage done in Washington DC will provoke the USA into genocidal fury against Japan. ====================== Will President Frances Perkins, the sole survivor of Roosevelt's Cabinet, be a strong war leader, or will she want to retire in '44? Will Churchill ever persuade Frances Perkins' America to persue a "Europe First" policy? Will USA Japanese detention camps be built with gas chambers in them, given the POD of the ATL? > There is no target in Hawaii that a hundred men can take that would be > worth the sacrifice of the lives of those men. Even a commando assault > in officer country that eliminates Kimmel, Short and other enemy leaders > will have no war winning effect. I completely agree that the sacrifices of those 100 could never overcome US strategic production and the American A-bombs to win the Pacific War at a single stroke. I also have to point out that the JSNLF of Dec.7'41 wasn't likely to have known that. Nor to have believed at that stage that their Empire could ever fall. >Maybe explosives & incendiaries might > assure the elimination of the POL storage units at Pearl Harbor, or, in > the alternative, we provide for an additional sortie against that fuel. Two good suggestions but ... I was thinking about 2-3 Nells landing at each USAAF airfield just pre- air raid, to block fighter takeoff runways with their own burning transports, before attacking the US warplanes so nicely parked in wing- tip-to-wingtip rows on those airfield aprons. A bullet thru each wingtank (to drain the residual avgas and vapours) followed by a WP grenade thrown into every other cockpit, should quickly get the barbeque going before reinforcements for the US airfield sentries can arrive from their barracks. Or maybe landings on the far reaches of Ewa and Hickham Fields so that the biggest US Coastal Artillery batteries on Oahu could be destroyed by demolition charge before their gunners (historically billeted off site) could arrive to man them ? A look at the 1st photo to be found at: http://andy_bennett.home.mindspring.com/16-inchbarbette.html shows just how open to ground and air attack those guns were on Dec. 7'41. There wasn't even a fence built around it. > If some romantic politician insists on a ninja raid against the > Americans, let us not do it in Hawaii. Those 100 ninjas can sacrifice > their lives to better effect in Washington DC. But would not this open the Emperor to similar and very personnal reprisal attacks ? > At platoon strength, that suicide commando assaults the White House if > Roosevelt is there, otherwise it is Objective: Warm Springs! The other [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > their Declaration of Independence and Constitution and take a patriotic > dump on the enemy's most sacred documents. What, you're not going to de-capitate the entire page staff too ? [Note to self: Stay on Raymond Speer's "good side". This man appears dangerous and apparently won't "play well with others".] > Drawback --- We better not lose this War, because the additional damage > done in Washington DC will provoke the USA into genocidal fury against > Japan. So, what, they're going to drop two A-bombs on Nagasaki, instead of just one ? > [Note to self: Stay on Raymond Speer's "good side". This man appears > dangerous and apparently won't "play well with others".] He's a pussycat. Just scratch him between the ears and he'll let you live at least long enough to feed him. >> Drawback --- We better not lose this War, because the additional damage >> done in Washington DC will provoke the USA into genocidal fury against >> Japan. > > So, what, they're going to drop two A-bombs on Nagasaki, instead of > just one ? More like burn every population center to the ground and salt the ruins with radiocobalt.  Signatureemail to oshea dot j dot j at gmail dot com. > But would not this open the Emperor to similar and very personnal reprisal attacks ? > So, what, they're going to drop two A-bombs on Nagasaki, instead of just one ? Put together these two lines by yourself and you'll see the answer to your question. Tokyo and the Palace weren't nuked; Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe weren't nuked. And the suggestion somebody made that Japanese should only be heard in hell was not followed. >> But would not this open the Emperor to similar and very personnal > reprisal attacks ? [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Put together these two lines by yourself and you'll see the answer to your > question. Tokyo and the Palace weren't nuked; The main reason Tokyo wasn't nuked was that there wasn't much left after the Great Fire Raids of March and May 1945. During those raids, in our time line, XXI Bomber Command did their best to _avoid_ hitting the Palace. In _this_ timeline, the Palace would be a priority target. Consider that the March 9/10th raid, Mission 40, which was personally led by General Timothy Powers, the gentleman who was the inspiration for Jack 'Vital Bodily Fluids' D. Ripper in _Dr. Strangelove_, resulted in fires that burned for _days_ and were visible from nearly 200 miles, and the casualty count was between 80,000 and 200,000, or from equal to either nuke strike to more than both combined. No-body has an accurate count because there's not much left after the temperatures hit 700 degrees Centigrade. The Great Fire Raid ignited not merely a firestorm, but a firetempest, with winds feeding the flames of up to 200 MPH... (Tim Power's slightly less insane buddy, Curtis LeMay, also featured in _Dr. Strangelove_, as the Air Force chief of staff) In _our_ timeline, the USAAF didn't bother bringing up the hordes of B-17s and B-24s which were available once the fighting in Europe was over and bases nearer Japan (Iwo Jima, Okinawa...) were available. The RAF took its time assembling Tiger Force. In _that_ timeline, every available USAAF aircraft (and USN aircraft...) would be hammering Japan. I can't see Arthur Harris staying out of that kind of fight. Finally, it wasn't the air raids, not even the nuke raids, which broke Japan. It was the submarine attacks which sunk millions of tons of shipping and starved them out. In _our_ timeline, by 1945 Charlie Lockwood's boys were roaming the _Inland Sea_ at will, sinking anything that they could find down to _fishing sampans_. In _that_ timeline, they'd be doing all that, plus shooting at settlements on the shore and anything else they could do, including landing commando on search and destroy raids. > Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe weren't > nuked. And the suggestion somebody made Admiral William F. 'Bull' Halsey, on the bridge of USS ENTERPRISE, entering Pearl Harbor, 8 Dec 1941. He meant every word, too. > that Japanese should only be heard > in hell was not followed. Signatureemail to oshea dot j dot j at gmail dot com. > >> But would not this open the Emperor to similar and very personnal > > reprisal attacks ? > >> So, what, they're going to drop two A-bombs on Nagasaki, instead of > > just one ? > > Put together these two lines by yourself and you'll see the answer to your > > question. Tokyo and the Palace weren't nuked; True but the Doolittle Raiders could have specifically targeted the Tokyo Palace in an attempt to kill Emperor Hirohito. This was more the type of reprisal that I had in mind since in 1941/42 the US didn't yet have the A-bomb or know, for sure, that such would actually work > The main reason Tokyo wasn't nuked was that there wasn't much left after the > Great Fire Raids of March and May 1945. During those raids, in our time line, [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > shooting at settlements on the shore and anything else they could do, > including landing commando on search and destroy raids. So, in light of all that, I ask again, just what more could the US have done to the Japanese people, short of setting up Nazi style concentration (death) camps ? Afterall, Gitmo wan't big enough to hold them ALL. On Aug 25, 7:16 am, J.J. O'Shea wrote: > So, in light of all that, I ask again, just what more could the US have done to the Japanese people, You already received more answers than you need. I'll sum them up for you again: - area-bombing incendiary raids on Tokyo targeting the Imperial Palace; - continuing the incendiary raids going down the list of Japanese cities; - using the first three nukes on what remains of Tokyo, and on larger population centers than Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kyoto had not been damaged and would have additional symbolic meaning. All of this can be done _before_ the Japanese accept the Potsdam Declaration terms. Having a third nuke used requires only a short delay. Actually if the premise is that the Japanese attacked the US capital in an effort to single out top institutional targets and to deliberately desecrate important national symbols, it is possible that there are no terms at all; i.e., that the Japanese are offered a German-like no-terms surrender. If that gives them pause for some more thought, then: - continue the blockade; - continue the area bombing; - employ nuke #4, etc. All of this scenario is way worse than what happened to Japan in OTL. Note that at some point down the line the whole food distribution system, water, gas and power utilities, and medical system will collapse. Epidemic diseases will hit along with the famine. The cities will become black holes where human life can't be supported. Survivors will swarm to the countryside, which in turn won't be able to support that flood. The political unity of the country will probably break down. > short of setting up Nazi style concentration (death) camps ? Afterall, Gitmo wan't big enough to hold them ALL. The remarkable fact about the scenario above is that it would require no violation of the laws of war then in force (in contrast with the Nazi death camps, which did violate those laws). Yet it would be worse than OTL. >Admiral William F. 'Bull' Halsey I'm pretty sure Morison says in _The Two-Ocean War_ that he was "Bill" Halsey to anyone who was on a first-name basis with him, and "Bull" was an error of and invention of the press. But I can't find the quotation. Then again, we refer without a qualm to "William the Conqueror", "Henry II Plantagenet", "Edward the Black Prince", and such, despite the fact that they got those names only posthumously, sometimes centuries later. SignatureTim McDaniel; Reply-To: tmcd@panix.com > There is no target in Hawaii that a hundred men can take that would be > worth the sacrifice of the lives of those men. Even a commando assault [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > their lives to better effect in Washington DC. > ... I didn't notice any reference to ninja training, just to capable soldiers who hadn't completed parachute training. Ninja skills aren't picked up with short training. In fact, IIRC, until they became popular in the movies, ninja were scarce and looked down upon, hardly making them suitable for military anything including training troops. Getting back to the original post, fading into the --sei population wouldn't help much considering that post PH all of that population was under suspicion, while a good proportion of it was patriotic and would be suspicious on their own account of newcomers or mysteriously reappearing guys who had been known to have gone to Japan. > Getting back to the original post, fading into the --sei population > wouldn't help much considering that post PH all of that > population was under suspicion, while a good proportion of > it was patriotic and would be suspicious on their own account > of newcomers or mysteriously reappearing guys who had been > known to have gone to Japan. I agree that it would be a difficult situation since the loyalty factor did in fact prove to be so high. All I can say is that the readings that I have done indicate that pre-PH, Japan believed that many of the ethnic Japanese on Oahu were still faithful to their homeland and would help the Empire if given the opportunity. Wrong with hindsight but, at the time, that is what was believed in Japan. Although interestingly, not by their "intel spook" in Honolulu, Yoshikawa. He refused to even attempt to recruit Hawaiian Japanese to aid him as he felt that they had all been corrupted by a softer American lifestyle than Japan could offer. I was not expecting a large percentage of the 100 to survive their post-landing combats but wished to offer a "faint hope" escape option for morale purposes, as was provided historically (but not used) for the 10 IJN minisub crewmen. Just as those 10 vowed to stay with their demolition charged minisubs to ensure that the Americans would gain little intel, I would expect most of the 100 to fight to the death. One of Raymond Speer's less frightening suggestions, that of using these men as "commandoes" to attack the fuel storage tankfarms does raise an interesting possibility if fewer men were assigned to each transport aircraft but parachutes (with rushed training in their use) and incendiary demolition charges were included. The Americans under Short did post several anti-sabotage sentries outside the barbed wire surrounding each tankfarm but it might have been possible for the JSNLF troopers to land safely on the flat tank tops by parachute or in the bermed areas surrounding them. Once down, a timed and tamperproof charge could be quickly planted via magnets on each adjacent tank before the troopers moved to meet at an agreed escape point, to fight their way out of the tankfarm enclosure. An interesting reversal of their less than 100% successful historical attempt to disable previously planted Dutch and British refinery demolition charges in the NEI, a few short months later. [Second note to self: Watch out for J.J.O'Shea too. He has been feeding Raymond Speer instead of arranging to have him put down humanely. They must be up to "no good". Not sure why he mentions burning radiocarbon salt but it can't be healthy.] So on the one hand you want plain-clothed infiltrators and saboteurs; on the other you want fully-equipped, armed to the teeth parachuted demolition engineers. Are you going to choose or are you going not to have enough of any? If you choose the actual paratroopers, with the number of aircraft you'd use you are down to some 50 men. It would be reasonable, from a statistical POV, to assume that 20% of them don't even make it to the archipelago (one aircraft has a mechanical problem, another gets lost), and another 20% don't land on a position suitable for attacking the tank farms. So you are down to 30 men. They might burn down a tank or two - the berms and other safety measures would probably prevent the spreading of the fires. Even if they burn down five tanks, that would be a serious problem if these were US paratroopers reducing the Japanese strategic fuel reserves - but it's the contrary. Given that it took, OTL, quite some time for the USA to go to the offensive, there's time to replace the lost fuel. Of course these men have to be highly trained. They are both paratroopers and assault engineers. If you choose the infiltrators and saboteurs, they won't achieve anything significant save increasing the paranoia, which may be actually helpful in getting the USA on a total war mindset. > So on the one hand you want plain-clothed infiltrators and saboteurs; Technically I believe that my first post specified JSNLF troopers with fake ID, US cash and civilian clothes carried IN THEIR PACKS rather than plain clothes infiltrators and saboteurs. But since I am tossing out scenario variations in a "fast & furious" way here, I can't blame you for getting some all mixed up. > If you choose the actual paratroopers, with the number of aircraft you'd use > you are down to some 50 men. It would be reasonable, from a statistical POV, > to assume that 20% of them don't even make it to the archipelago (one > aircraft has a mechanical problem, another gets lost), and another 20% don't > land on a position suitable for attacking the tank farms. Or end up with broken legs/arms/ribs from attempting to land pre-dawn, on the INSIDE of tankfarms filled with obstacles. > So you are down to 30 men. I'd estimate it as 10 planes with 6 paratroopers and a combat jump trained co-pilot officer (7 jumpers, the pilot won't be able to join them in the jump - perhaps then the first 8 kamikaze ? Almost enough for the 9 big avgas storage tanks on Ford Island). After one plane gets lost in the dark, and one goes down to mechanical failure, that leaves 8x7 = 56 prior to 25% jump injuries, so 56x.75 = 42 functional paratroopers end up inside the wire of the 3 tankfarms. If each carries 3 x 5lb demo charges (3x42=126) with a strip of WP attached (it doesn't take much to crack a full fuel tank considering the internal pressure inside it just at ground level) then with enough time, they could in theory rig EACH of the 26 + 27 + 9 = 62 military tanks TWICE. Considering that US sentries would no doubt notice SOMETHING amiss I'd think that twice for each tank would be unrealistic but a significant portion could be cracked and ignited. Leftover demo charges could be placed so as to link the spillage berms. Radiant heat from adjacent burning tanks would quickly heat the unburnt remainder causing their overpresssure vents to open and release explosive vapours towards the already burning tanks.You quickly end up with three (or more) rivers of burning fuels pouring onto the surface of Pearl Harbor and floating towards the USN's already burning Pacific Fleet. Far fewer survivors are rescued. >They might burn down a tank or two - the berms and other safety > measures Sorry but in 1941 there were no other safety measures in place. Not even water spray cannon for tank cooling had been installed as the USN was busy digging it's new Red Hill underground fuel storage tankfarm which was intended to minmize al of these potential problems. >would probably prevent the spreading of the fires. Even if they > burn down five tanks, that would be a serious problem if these were US > paratroopers reducing the Japanese strategic fuel reserves - but it's the > contrary. Given that it took, OTL, quite some time for the USA to go to the > offensive, there's time to replace the lost fuel. And what effect on the US economy and Lend/Lease production/transfer does taking all of those US tankers away fromt their OTL roles have ? Nothing comes for free. > Of course these men have to be highly trained. They are both paratroopers > and assault engineers. Trained to shoot straight and for night drops yes but it doesn't take that much skill to take a demo charge out of a canvas satchel, stick it onto a steel tank via the attached magnets and then push a onetime timer arming button. > If you choose the infiltrators and saboteurs, they won't achieve anything > significant save increasing the paranoia, which may be actually helpful in > getting the USA on a total war mindset. Based on my estimates detailed above, I'd have to disagree with you. [Third note to self: - NEVER, EVER leave Raymond Speer, J.J.O'Shea or Michele alone in a building with a box of matches ! NEVER !] On Aug 25, 5:10 am, Michele wrote: > So on the one hand you want plain-clothed infiltrators and saboteurs; > Technically I believe that my first post specified JSNLF troopers with fake ID, US cash and civilian clothes carried IN THEIR PACKS rather than plain clothes infiltrators and saboteurs. But since I am tossing out scenario variations in a "fast & furious" way here, I can't blame you for getting some all mixed up. I got nothing mixed up. If you want them to operate as infiltrators and saboteurs, using their IDs, and civilian clothes, then the line above by me sums up correctly your intention. If you want them to fight in uniform as commandos, then they don't need IDs etc. > If you choose the actual paratroopers, with the number of aircraft you'd > use [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > don't > land on a position suitable for attacking the tank farms. > Or end up with broken legs/arms/ribs from attempting to land pre-dawn, on the INSIDE of tankfarms filled with obstacles. > So you are down to 30 men. > I'd estimate it as 10 planes with 6 paratroopers and a combat jump trained co-pilot officer (7 jumpers, the pilot won't be able to join them in the jump - perhaps then the first 8 kamikaze ? Almost enough for the 9 big avgas storage tanks on Ford Island). > After one plane gets lost in the dark, and one goes down to mechanical failure, that leaves 8x7 = 56 prior to 25% jump injuries, so 56x.75 = 42 functional paratroopers end up inside the wire of the 3 tankfarms. No. When I said that 20% are not in a position to attack, I didn't mean accidents. I mean that paratroopers do get scattered _miles_ away from the intended DZ. This being the first war drop 20% is probably generous. OTOH 25% accidents is too high, even in darkness. It's probably closer to 10%. The total still is -30%. Remaining men on target are 35. > If each carries 3 x 5lb demo charges (3x42=126) with a strip of WP attached (it doesn't take much to crack a full fuel tank considering the internal pressure inside it just at ground level) then with enough time, they could in theory rig EACH of the 26 + 27 + 9 = 62 military tanks TWICE. Where the operating words are "enough time" and "in theory". > Considering that US sentries would no doubt notice SOMETHING amiss I'd think that twice for each tank would be unrealistic but a significant portion could be cracked and ignited. It depends on what one means by "significant". > Leftover demo charges could be placed so as to link the spillage berms. No. I'd need to check your claim that the tanks can be pierced with 5 lbs of HE, but I'm sure you don't open holes in those berms with such puny amounts, even putting together some 30 lbs of HE that's not enough unless you bore the ground and put the explosive inside. Besides, if the intervention of US sentries prevents the use of all the demolition charges against the tanks, why exactly said intervention does not prevent the use of them against the berms? > Radiant heat from adjacent burning tanks would quickly heat the unburnt remainder causing their overpresssure vents to open and release explosive vapours towards the already burning tanks. Do you mean the vents weren't on top of the tanks? > You quickly end up with three (or more) rivers of burning fuels pouring onto the surface of Pearl Harbor and floating towards the USN's already burning Pacific Fleet. Far fewer survivors are rescued. It seems rather apocalyptic but a bit far-fetched. >They might burn down a tank or two - the berms and other safety > measures > Sorry but in 1941 there were no other safety measures in place. Not even water spray cannon for tank cooling had been installed as the USN was busy digging it's new Red Hill underground fuel storage tankfarm which was intended to minmize al of these potential problems. Of course there were safety measures. The distance between the individual tanks themselves and between the several compounds were safety measures in themselves. This far, we haven't even talked about the possibility that the % of losses mentioned above, plus the losses due to the US reaction, aren't spread evenly. Suppose the Japanese try to hit the three main compounds. It is impossible for a paratrooper having sabotaged one compound and having a demo charge remaining, to reach one of the other two compounds. It is perfectly possible that of the 35 men effectively attacking, 25 are in one compound, 7 in another and 3 in the last one, which makes for rather uneven chances in the last one. >would probably prevent the spreading of the fires. Even if they > burn down five tanks, that would be a serious problem if these were US > paratroopers reducing the Japanese strategic fuel reserves - but it's the > contrary. Given that it took, OTL, quite some time for the USA to go to > the > offensive, there's time to replace the lost fuel. > And what effect on the US economy and Lend/Lease production/transfer does taking all of those US tankers away fromt their OTL roles have ? Nothing comes for free. Of course. If there is a country which can take up such a slack in the war, it's the USA, though. > Of course these men have to be highly trained. They are both paratroopers > and assault engineers. > Trained to shoot straight and for night drops yes but it doesn't take that much skill to take a demo charge out of a canvas satchel, stick it onto a steel tank via the attached magnets and then push a onetime timer arming button. You are wrong. First, they need to be trained as commandos. They won't be "shooting straight" in a firing range. They'll need to know close quarters combat and to show the level of adaptability, initiative and improvisation capability good commandos have. Second, handling demolition charges requires more training than you mentioned. Sending a man to act as an assault engineer with that amount of instruction is likely to result in that man being too close to his first explosion. Finally, you haven't addressed the issue of coordination. Suppose some 10 men do land within a 16-tank compound. They might gather and organize - which gives more time for some sentry to be alerted. Or they might immediately start to do their own thing - which will result in men running towards tanks which have just been rigged for explosion by a comrade. Add more men, and both problems grow bigger. While you are at it, why not calculate the whole weight of that explosive device? You started with 5 lbs of HE - and some WP. Now you have added a satchel, a magnetic device (which requires metal and batteries), and a timer (not the kind of thing one would want to entrust his life with in 1941 after it has come down through a para drop, BTW). What's the final weight? While we are at it, some of the tanks contained avgas, but others bunk fuel. Dropping a match into it won't ignite it. Could you please indicate the temperature at which WP burns, and the temperature at which such fuel burns. > If you choose the infiltrators and saboteurs, they won't achieve anything > significant save increasing the paranoia, which may be actually helpful in > getting the USA on a total war mindset. > Based on my estimates detailed above, I'd have to disagree with you. This is outlandish. _All_ of the estimates you made above have to do with paratroop assault engineers dropping right into the tank farm compounds and using straight military operations. They have nothing to do with cloak-and-katana guys who wander in the streets touting their false IDs. All of this is, of course, purely academic. We know that there was some wind blowing at the time. Enough to entirely ruin a first-ever wartime drop under darkness by sending all of the men miles and tens of miles away from the tank farms, probably many of them straight into salt water. > I got nothing mixed up. If you want them to operate as infiltrators and > saboteurs, using their IDs, and civilian clothes, then the line above by me > sums up correctly your intention. If you want them to fight in uniform as > commandos, then they don't need IDs etc. Michele, the option that I intended was my troops landing and fighting in uniform. So that if captured alive (unlikely I know) they would not be shot as spies. Those few that escaped the combat would later change into their civilian clothes before attempting to hide for a few days prior to pick-up, in the Hawaiian-Japanese population More to follow when "the boss" is gone. On Aug 25, 11:53 am, "Michele" wrote: > I got nothing mixed up. If you want them to operate as infiltrators and > saboteurs, using their IDs, and civilian clothes, then the line above by > me > sums up correctly your intention. If you want them to fight in uniform as > commandos, then they don't need IDs etc. > Michele, the option that I intended was my troops landing and fighting in uniform. So that if captured alive (unlikely I know) they would not be shot as spies. Those few that escaped the combat would later change into their civilian clothes before attempting to hide for a few days prior to pick-up, in the Hawaiian-Japanese population So they aren't not long-term infiltrators-saboteurs. My misunderstanding then. FWIW, the Italian torpedo riders had such documents, and directions for evasion and pickup. Never worked. {snip} > All of this is, of course, purely academic. We know that there was some > wind > blowing at the time. Enough to entirely ruin a first-ever wartime drop > under > darkness by sending all of the men miles and tens of miles away from the > tank farms, probably many of them straight into salt water. Michele, I agree with you on all points. Please don't let this distract you from the poor Germans you left stranded! > On Aug 25, 5:10 am, Michele wrote: > [quoted text clipped - 164 lines] > darkness by sending all of the men miles and tens of miles away from the > tank farms, probably many of them straight into salt water. Even more problematical, the Japanese didn't organize the units until September 1941. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_marine_paratroopers_of_World_War_II >Even more problematical, the Japanese didn't organize the units until >September 1941. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_marine_paratroopers_of_World_Wa... Jack, Thanks for the source but didn't my thread starting post already indicate that historically the Japanese paratroopers weren't ready by Dec.7'41 ? Certainly if my AH scenario were to be accepted then my smaller group of 100 would have to be given training prioity over the historical battalions. I'm back again to finish my repy to Michele ... > No. When I said that 20% are not in a position to attack, I didn't mean > accidents. I mean that paratroopers do get scattered _miles_ away from the > intended DZ. This being the first war drop 20% is probably generous. OTOH > 25% accidents is too high, even in darkness. It's probably closer to 10%. > The total still is -30%. Remaining men on target are 35. The source that Jack so thoughtfully provide indicates a very low altitude jump which will minuimize wind drift of the jumpers (as well as likely killing a few of them) as per: "Each paratrooper also carried a 24 feet (7.3 metres) reserve chest- pack, and it should be noted that the basic Japanese naval parachutists training program required jumps between 300-500 feet (90-150 m), which would not give much time to deploy the emergency chute, let alone hesitate in deploying the main canopy." Btw the night of Dec.6-7'41 boasted a nearly full moon to aid both jumpers and pilots. My own island sailing experience tells me that onshore island winds usually begin about 1.5 hours after sun-up. This gives the sun time to heat the mountain rock which in turn heats the air above the mountains, causing it to begin to rise. As it does so, lower air from the coastal areas is draw up to replace it and thus are onshore morning breezes created. If "my" jumpers "hit the silk" just before sunrise there should be little wind to blow them off their tankfarm targets. > No. I'd need to check your claim that the tanks can be pierced with 5 lbs of > HE, but I'm sure you don't open holes in those berms with such puny amounts, > even putting together some 30 lbs of HE that's not enough unless you bore > the ground and put the explosive inside. The earthen berms around the PH oil storage tankfarms were/are much like earth dams holding back water. If even a small notch is blown anywhere in that top edge of a full berm then fuel, flaming or not, will begin to run out at that notch with rapid erosion quickly enlarging/deepening the breach. Progressive berm failure soon follows. 'Tis 1st year hydraulics engineering, at work. > Besides, if the intervention of US > sentries prevents the use of all the demolition charges against the tanks, > why exactly said intervention does not prevent the use of them against the > berms? Because one can shelter behind a berm while placing a demo charge on the top edge of one while one gets no shelter from an oil tank if the US sentry is behind you. > > Radiant heat from adjacent > burning tanks would quickly heat the unburnt remainder causing their > overpresssure vents to open and release explosive vapours towards the > already burning tanks. > Do you mean the vents weren't on top of the tanks? That IS where they are as a side vent would spill fuel directly as the tank was filled. > > You quickly end up with three (or more) rivers > of burning fuels pouring onto the surface of Pearl Harbor and floating > towards the USN's already burning Pacific Fleet. Far fewer survivors > are rescued. > > It seems rather apocalyptic but a bit far-fetched. Not after you've seen it happen as I did in Vladivostock in 1995. > >They might burn down a tank or two - the berms and other safety > > measures [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > tanks themselves and between the several compounds were safety measures in > themselves. Not when one considers deliberate divebomber attacks on individusl tanks. Berm sizes are calculated based on tank volume leakage not on bomb blast radius nor on soil concussion factors. Even a sudden tank rupture can overwhelm a berm as the contents slosh up and over the sides of the berm, eroding it as I have previously described. They are only designed to contain a small, slow leak which slowly fills the bermed volume. > This far, we haven't even talked about the possibility that the > % of losses mentioned above, plus the losses due to the US reaction, aren't > spread evenly. Suppose the Japanese try to hit the three main compounds. JUst two main tankfarm compounds as the 9 Ford Island tanks are in a long single row. >It is impossible for a paratrooper having sabotaged one compound and having a > demo charge remaining, to reach one of the other two compounds. It is > perfectly possible that of the 35 men effectively attacking, 25 are in one > compound, 7 in another and 3 in the last one, which makes for rather uneven > chances in the last one. Just as it is possible that Hirohito could have farted in Tokyo two week before, causing a storm on Oahu that ignites all of the fuel tanks via lightning. Unlikely but not statistically impossible. > > Of course these men have to be highly trained. They are both paratroopers > > and assault engineers. [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > combat and to show the level of adaptability, initiative and improvisation > capability good commandos have. While I recognize that JSNLF troopers were not usually "commando" trained, I could only believe that the 100 volunteers would be selected on the basis of strong scores in the other categories that you mentioned, BEFORE undertaking jump training. Any other choice would be imprudent, considering the mission profile. Single would be better too. >Second, handling demolition charges requires > more training than you mentioned. Sending a man to act as an assault > engineer with that amount of instruction is likely to result in that man > being too close to his first explosion. Well, that just may be but my training consisted of one 2 minute demonstration and I'm still here and still breathing several decades later. > Finally, you haven't addressed the issue of coordination. Suppose some 10 > men do land within a 16-tank compound. They might gather and organize - > which gives more time for some sentry to be alerted. Or they might > immediately start to do their own thing - which will result in men running > towards tanks which have just been rigged for explosion by a comrade. Add > more men, and both problems grow bigger. Hardly. A simple compass allows each man to rig a tank to his, say, north. > While you are at it, why not calculate the whole weight of that explosive > device? You started with 5 lbs of HE - and some WP. Now you have added a > satchel, a magnetic device (which requires metal and batteries), and a timer > (not the kind of thing one would want to entrust his life with in 1941 after > it has come down through a para drop, BTW). What's the final weight? 5lbs, as my post stated. I have never stated that electro-magnets need be used. With 5lbs being the total weight, simple steel magnets are more than sufficient. > While we are at it, some of the tanks contained avgas, but others bunk fuel. > Dropping a match into it won't ignite it. I'd be really careful about trying that in person. It greatly depends on whether you are dropping said match into bunker "A", bunker "B" or bunker "C" fuels. The primary difference being the amount of diesel mixed back into each to improve flow and ignition temperatures. That and the outside (tropical in the case of Oahu) temperature determines the amount of vapour trapped just above the fuel. > Could you please indicate the temperature at which WP burns, and the temperature at which such fuel burns. You don't know how to use google.com yourself ? > This is outlandish. _All_ of the estimates you made above have to do with > paratroop assault engineers dropping right into the tank farm compounds and > using straight military operations. They have nothing to do with > cloak-and-katana guys who wander in the streets touting their false IDs. And the entire cloak-and-katana concept is purely your own outlandish invention, never a part of any of my AH scenarios > All of this is, of course, purely academic. As is the discussion of any AH proposal. All we can examine is the likely probability of the events we suggest, happening. There are no guarantees at all in ANY AH scheme. >We know that there was some wind blowing at the time. We do ? There is photographic evidence of wind after 0750 on the morning of Dec.7'41 but you have so far presented no evidence of wind blowing in any of the tankfarm areas prior to that time. Have you found some wind speeds ? A source, please. > Enough to entirely ruin a first-ever wartime drop under > darkness by sending all of the men miles and tens of miles away from the > tank farms, probably many of them straight into salt water. You've never stepped off of an airplane at 400', into the dark, have you ? Trust me when I tell you that from that height there is barely enough time to be afraid before your boots hit the ground, let alone to drift miles or tens of miles with the (non-existant) breeze. If there WAS indeed a breeze blowing then one or more of the three commercial radio stations in Hawaii would have been broadcasting the details "in the clear" as part of their marine weather forcasts to the Hawaiian salt water fishing fleet. Lives depended on the accuracy of those marine weather forcasts so they were taken quite seriously by the Americans responsible. To which "my" inbound JSNLF paratroopers could easily listen in. On Aug 25, 11:53 am, Michele wrote: > I'm back again to finish my repy to Michele ... > No. When I said that 20% are not in a position to attack, I didn't mean > accidents. I mean that paratroopers do get scattered _miles_ away from the > intended DZ. This being the first war drop 20% is probably generous. OTOH > 25% accidents is too high, even in darkness. It's probably closer to 10%. > The total still is -30%. Remaining men on target are 35. > The source that Jack so thoughtfully provide indicates a very low altitude jump which will minuimize wind drift of the jumpers (as well as likely killing a few of them) as per: > "Each paratrooper also carried a 24 feet (7.3 metres) reserve chest- pack, and it should be noted that the basic Japanese naval parachutists training program required jumps between 300-500 feet (90-150 m), which would not give much time to deploy the emergency chute, let alone hesitate in deploying the main canopy." This alone makes the mission impossible, or if attempted a failure. They would be trying this with two months of training, for the paratroopers; and no previous experience in this kind of mission for either the paratroopers or the pilots. You should study the history of the first operational drops by just about any paratrooper force. Even the Germans dropping in full daylight and ideal conditions with very highly trained men, suffered high dispersion rates. Interestingly, on April 14th, 1940, the 1st Coy, 2nd Btn was launched in Norway from a height of 150 meters. From such a low altitude, you'd expect no strays? Only 2 thirds of the men managed to be gathered, with about half of the equipment, after long hours of wandering around - and these were highly trained men. > Btw the night of Dec.6-7'41 boasted a nearly full moon to aid both jumpers and pilots. Fine, I might ask about rising and setting times and about clouds, but I suspect that even with the moon up and no clouds it wouldn't be of much help, given the above. > My own island sailing experience tells me that onshore island winds usually begin about 1.5 hours after sun-up. This gives the sun time to heat the mountain rock which in turn heats the air above the mountains, causing it to begin to rise. As it does so, lower air from the coastal areas is draw up to replace it and thus are onshore morning breezes created. If "my" jumpers "hit the silk" just before sunrise there should be little wind to blow them off their tankfarm targets. Assuming all the wind is caused by that phenomenon and not by prevailing weather conditions. > No. I'd need to check your claim that the tanks can be pierced with 5 lbs > of > HE, but I'm sure you don't open holes in those berms with such puny > amounts, > even putting together some 30 lbs of HE that's not enough unless you bore > the ground and put the explosive inside. > The earthen berms around the PH oil storage tankfarms were/are much like earth dams holding back water. If even a small notch is blown anywhere in that top edge of a full berm then fuel, flaming or not, will begin to run out at that notch with rapid erosion quickly enlarging/deepening the breach. Progressive berm failure soon follows. 'Tis 1st year hydraulics engineering, at work. Fine. Then this might work. The problem remains that there is a long series of difficult conditions to be achieved for the whole thing to work. > Besides, if the intervention of US > sentries prevents the use of all the demolition charges against the tanks, > why exactly said intervention does not prevent the use of them against the > berms? > Because one can shelter behind a berm while placing a demo charge on the top edge of one while one gets no shelter from an oil tank if the US sentry is behind you. This is strange. Think about the concepts you yourself use. If a US sentry can be behind you with reference to a tank, why can't he be behind you with reference to a berm? Of course you can cross over the berm - thus exposing yourself to a clean burst when you go over, and who knows that the other side of the berm isn't also in the field of fire of another sentry. Remember, if there was one thing the US troops were ready for at Pearl, was sabotage. > > Radiant heat from adjacent > burning tanks would quickly heat the unburnt remainder causing their > overpresssure vents to open and release explosive vapours towards the > already burning tanks. > Do you mean the vents weren't on top of the tanks? > That IS where they are as a side vent would spill fuel directly as the tank was filled. Yes, I suspected that. Then the whole part of "towards the already burning tanks" is not accurate, is it? > > You quickly end up with three (or more) rivers > of burning fuels pouring onto the surface of Pearl Harbor and floating > towards the USN's already burning Pacific Fleet. Far fewer survivors > are rescued. > > It seems rather apocalyptic but a bit far-fetched. > Not after you've seen it happen as I did in Vladivostock in 1995. I'm not saying that this couldn't happen if all the tanks were pierced and set on fire. I'm saying it's far-fetched to assume that that conditions will happen. > >They might burn down a tank or two - the berms and other safety > > measures [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > tanks themselves and between the several compounds were safety measures in > themselves. > Not when one considers deliberate divebomber attacks on individusl tanks. Berm sizes are calculated based on tank volume leakage not on bomb blast radius nor on soil concussion factors. Isn't that irrelevant? The Japanese aren't attacking the tanks with a 250-lb bomb arriving on top of it at terminal velocity. They are attacking it with a puny demo charge... > Even a sudden tank rupture can overwhelm a berm as the contents slosh up and over the sides of the berm, eroding it as I have previously described. They are only designed to contain a small, slow leak which slowly fills the bermed volume. ...which if it does pierce the tank, will create exactly that, a leak. And note I mentioned the distance between tanks _and_ between tank compounds. > This far, we haven't even talked about the possibility that the > % of losses mentioned above, plus the losses due to the US reaction, > aren't > spread evenly. Suppose the Japanese try to hit the three main compounds. > JUst two main tankfarm compounds as the 9 Ford Island tanks are in a long single row. So they aren't attacking those? >It is impossible for a paratrooper having sabotaged one compound and having >a [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > uneven > chances in the last one. > Just as it is possible that Hirohito could have farted in Tokyo two week before, causing a storm on Oahu that ignites all of the fuel tanks via lightning. Unlikely but not statistically impossible. It's not particularly unlikely. To my count, we've lost 4 sticks out of 10 (1 mechanical breakdown, 1 navigational error, 2 out of the drop zone), and you are telling us now that there are two DZs. It's more likely that the missing aircraft are evenly distributed, but the possibility that of the five aircraft intended for DZ 1 three or even four belong to the lost quota rates somewhat higher than Hirohito's storm-making fart. Additionally, landing accidents can easily be concentrated in sticks. An altimeter that's off by no more than 50 meters is enough to kill or maim all of the paratroopers jumping from that aircraft. > > Of course these men have to be highly trained. They are both > > paratroopers [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > combat and to show the level of adaptability, initiative and improvisation > capability good commandos have. > While I recognize that JSNLF troopers were not usually "commando" trained, I could only believe that the 100 volunteers would be selected on the basis of strong scores in the other categories that you mentioned, BEFORE undertaking jump training. Any other choice would be imprudent, considering the mission profile. Single would be better too. OK. >Second, handling demolition charges requires > more training than you mentioned. Sending a man to act as an assault > engineer with that amount of instruction is likely to result in that man > being too close to his first explosion. > Well, that just may be but my training consisted of one 2 minute demonstration and I'm still here and still breathing several decades later. Well, I'm glad for you that you were lucky. Did your experience include placing demo charges in all of a hurry in unfamiliar environments right after a 150-meter paradrop after a long uncomfortable air journey while enemy sentries were shooting at you? If so, you have my respect, seriously. But I'd hypothesize that you were particularly lucky. > Finally, you haven't addressed the issue of coordination. Suppose some 10 > men do land within a 16-tank compound. They might gather and organize - > which gives more time for some sentry to be alerted. Or they might > immediately start to do their own thing - which will result in men running > towards tanks which have just been rigged for explosion by a comrade. Add > more men, and both problems grow bigger. > Hardly. A simple compass allows each man to rig a tank to his, say, north. Not a great idea. That man doesn't know whether a comrade has landed to his, say, North, a minute before him, and has already placed a small demo charge with a timer on the tank he is now running towards, does he? > While you are at it, why not calculate the whole weight of that explosive > device? You started with 5 lbs of HE - and some WP. Now you have added a [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > after > it has come down through a para drop, BTW). What's the final weight? > 5lbs, as my post stated. I have never stated that electro-magnets need be used. With 5lbs being the total weight, simple steel magnets are more than sufficient. So the HE warhead weighs what? 4, 3 lbs? > While we are at it, some of the tanks contained avgas, but others bunk > fuel. > Dropping a match into it won't ignite it. > I'd be really careful about trying that in person. Well, me too! The match of the example isn't to be intended in practice. In particular... > It greatly depends on whether you are dropping said match into bunker "A", bunker "B" or bunker "C" fuels. The primary difference being the amount of diesel mixed back into each to improve flow and ignition temperatures. That and the outside (tropical in the case of Oahu) temperature determines the amount of vapour trapped just above the fuel. ...you are now relying on vapors, that are, as you say, trapped in the _upper_ part of the tank, to ignite the match. That is the case if one dropped the match from above into the tank. Now, that's not the way it will work with a breach at ground level and a tiny amount of WP at that height. The vapors should play no part. > Could you please indicate the temperature at which WP burns, and the > temperature at which such fuel burns. > You don't know how to use google.com yourself ? Well, it's your scenario. I'd use it myself if the scenario was mine and if somebody raised a doubt. But if you are happy with not knowing whether the respective temperatures are OK, that's fine with me. I can live with my doubt. > This is outlandish. _All_ of the estimates you made above have to do with > paratroop assault engineers dropping right into the tank farm compounds > and > using straight military operations. They have nothing to do with > cloak-and-katana guys who wander in the streets touting their false IDs. > And the entire cloak-and-katana concept is purely your own outlandish invention, never a part of any of my AH scenarios Fine. My misunderstanding. If it offended you, please accept my apologies. > All of this is, of course, purely academic. > As is the discussion of any AH proposal. All we can examine is the likely probability of the events we suggest, happening. There are no guarantees at all in ANY AH scheme. That's not what I meant. I'm sure you know. >We know that there was some wind blowing at the time. > We do ? There is photographic evidence of wind after 0750 on the morning of Dec.7'41 but you have so far presented no evidence of wind blowing in any of the tankfarm areas prior to that time. Have you found some wind speeds ? A source, please. No, in fact I have none. I'm assuming the wind was already blowing. I might be wrong. Or not. As I see it, again, it's the scenario creator who has to check the facts. That's what I did with my own timeline. I won't do it for yours. If you are happy with not knowing, I am, too. > Enough to entirely ruin a first-ever wartime drop under > darkness by sending all of the men miles and tens of miles away from the > tank farms, probably many of them straight into salt water. > You've never stepped off of an airplane at 400', into the dark, have you ? Trust me when I tell you that from that height there is barely enough time to be afraid before your boots hit the ground, let alone to drift miles or tens of miles with the (non-existant) breeze. No, I haven't. If you did, my compliments. In any case, when I mentioned such drifts, I did not have in mind such a risky launch height. Even taking that altitude as a given - and keeping in mind that the men will be sorely untrained for that - the example I mentioned above featured 1/3 of missing men with a 150-meter drop. Now, one would like to know the speed of impact with the ground from such a drop. Keeping in mind that what is barely safe today with modern parachutes, in this scenario should be attempted with the rudimentary Japanese parachutes of the time. And, a point you did not answer to, carrying those fragile timers. Interestingly enough, the height of a tank, alone, might well make the difference between a somewhat bruised but combat-worthy paratrooper, and one with two sprained ankles or worse. > If there WAS indeed a breeze blowing then one or more of the three commercial radio stations in Hawaii would have been broadcasting the details "in the clear" as part of their marine weather forcasts to the Hawaiian salt water fishing fleet. Lives depended on the accuracy of those marine weather forcasts so they were taken quite seriously by the Americans responsible. To which "my" inbound JSNLF paratroopers could easily listen in. Haven't you argued that wind is irrelevant when jumping from 150 meters? > This alone makes the mission impossible, or if attempted a failure. > They would be trying this with two months of training, for the paratroopers; [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > of the equipment, after long hours of wandering around - and these were > highly trained men. I don't follow your logic. With the proper degree of support a man can make several training jumps every day. In my own peacetime case I did 8 a day without missing coffee breaks. We're not looking for parachute acrobatics training here. Just how to step out of an airplane, into the darkness when the little light turns green and wait a second or two for the static line to rip your chute open. Gather your wits and use what little control your chute lines give you to aim for the softest landing spot that you can see in the moonlight. Pray. Hit & roll. Check to make sure that no limbs are broken. Take safety off weapon and check wrist compass before moving to north and attaching first charge to closest tank. Then, shoot at anyone out in the moonlight wearing a uniform different from yours as you make your way to the designated rendezvous point. Wrt 1st Coy, 2nd Btn. I am not familiar with the details of their mission but suspect a drop into a wooded area made their co-ordination more difficult. My JSNLF troopers aren't looking to fight a set-piece battle here. Just to plant their charges and then run faster than the blast waves ... >Fine, I might ask about rising and setting times and about clouds, but I > suspect that even with the moon up and no clouds it wouldn't be of much > help, given the above. Suspect all you want but my jump logbook has two night jumps recorded and I can tell you that full moonlight REALLY helps. > Assuming all the wind is caused by that phenomenon and not by prevailing > weather conditions. That is where the part about listening to the marine weather forecasts during the flight in, comes into play. > > The earthen berms around the PH oil storage tankfarms were/are much > like earth dams holding back water. If even a small notch is blown [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > Fine. Then this might work. The problem remains that there is a long series > of difficult conditions to be achieved for the whole thing to work. Was not the historical attack on Pearl Harbor also done in the face of a long series of difficult conditions ? The Japanes solved all of those problems, one-by-one and I see no reason why they would not have done the same in this case. I do still prefer a 3rd wave air strike to take out the US tankfarms though. > This is strange. Think about the concepts you yourself use. If a US sentry > can be behind you with reference to a tank, why can't he be behind you with [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Remember, if there was one thing the US troops were ready for at Pearl, was > sabotage. No doubt this kind of night combat would be very confused, short, sharp and nasty. As I've previously typed, I don't expect that many of "my" paratroopers would survive but as they were JSNLF I would expect many of them to die while detonating their demo charge against a storage tank, if such was necessary on behalf of their Emperor. I can't imagine peacetime US sentries being quite so "gung ho" to die for FDR, can you ? > > Do you mean the vents weren't on top of the tanks? > > That IS where they are as a side vent would spill fuel directly as the > tank was filled. > Yes, I suspected that. Then the whole part of "towards the already burning > tanks" is not accurate, is it? You are being ridiculus. If you have ever worked with petroleum fuels you know that the vapor cloud either blows with the breeze or flows along the ground, spreading out radially if there isn't wind. With several flaming tanks scattered thru the tankfarm, those vapors will reach an ignition source at some point. Sooner rather than later. . > I'm not saying that this couldn't happen if all the tanks were pierced and > set on fire. I'm saying it's far-fetched to assume that that conditions will > happen. Just as on Dec.6'41 most any US serviceman on Oahu would have most likely expressed the opinion that a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor was far-fetched. And we know how that turned out, don't we ? >The Japanese aren't attacking the tanks with a 250-lb > bomb arriving on top of it at terminal velocity. They are attacking it with > a puny demo charge... ... placed at the bottom of the tank wall where the hoop stress is greatest. A hole blown there usually creates a tearing effect that results in a crack that runs up the tank's wall to the roof. In the case of a full tank, the very wieght of the contents rips that crack wide open and dumps the tank's entire contents, nearly instantly, all in one direction. That tidalwave of fuel tends to overtop the berm and erodes it but that is rarely seen by human eyes since the whole of it is usually in flames by that point. > > Just two main tankfarm compounds as the 9 Ford Island tanks are in a > long single row. > So they aren't attacking those? They will be attacked by JSNLF troopers landing, still in their transports, on the runway beside them, rather than by troopers jumping. > Additionally, landing accidents can easily be concentrated in sticks. An > altimeter that's off by no more than 50 meters is enough to kill or maim all > of the paratroopers jumping from that aircraft. As I've already typed, I don't expect many JSNLF survivors. > Well, I'm glad for you that you were lucky. Did your experience include > placing demo charges in all of a hurry in unfamiliar environments right > after a 150-meter paradrop after a long uncomfortable air journey while > enemy sentries were shooting at you? If so, you have my respect, seriously. > But I'd hypothesize that you were particularly lucky. Neither does my personal experience include feeling it the GREATEST honor possible to die in the service of my Emperor. > Not a great idea. That man doesn't know whether a comrade has landed to his, > say, North, a minute before him, and has already placed a small demo charge > with a timer on the tank he is now running towards, does he? We're not talking long sticks of parachutists stretching out into the darkness here. There would be just 7 chutes strung out in the moonlight, from each disguised transport plane. Any one JSNLF trooper is going to be able to see the man ahead of him touch down, unless a tank is directly between them. I'm sure that the placement details could be worked out to minimize duplication, before takeoff. The point here is that not every tank has to be blown by a demo charge. Once several fires are started within a tankfarm then extinguishing them with 1940s technology will be impossible and an overheating chain reaction effect will begin that leads to the destruction of that entire farm. The advantage to cracking as many as possible at the same time is that doing so increases the odds of a flow of burning fuels spreading out over the surface of Pearl Harbor while the US Pacific Fleet is still thee to be roasted. >And, a point you did not answer to, carrying those fragile timers. Sorry, since you don't seem to trim your responses at all I must have missed the question in all of the repeated text. What was it that you wanted to know about "those fragile timers" ? And what is it that makes you think them fragile ? > Interestingly enough, the height of a tank, alone, might well make the > difference between a somewhat bruised but combat-worthy paratrooper, and one > with two sprained ankles or worse. As long as the man can use one good arm to place a demo charge against a tank and then use a finger to press the timer button, how will any of that stop him from dying in the service of the Empire ? > Haven't you argued that wind is irrelevant when jumping from 150 meters? I don't believe that I previously typed the word "irrelevent". I did take issue with your statement that "my" paratroopers could drift 'miles or tens of miles' off target. Since the tankfarms had been recently surrounded by wire fences at General Short's order, it would be important for the IJN transport pilots to know wind speed/direction so that the troopers could be dropped inside of those fences, rather than having to waste time cutting their way in ... but such would not be essential to the mission in the darkness. In article <52751be5-2c55-452a-b231-3416117646f9@m45g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, > Or end up with broken legs/arms/ribs from attempting to land pre-dawn, > on the INSIDE of tankfarms filled with obstacles. Everybody seems to be making the assumption that WW2 assault parachutes were as steerable as modern sports parachutes. They weren't and German designs were worse for steering than Allied ones. The D-Day drops were carried out with complete air superiority and still scattered the troops with some of them landing miles from their targets. The Germans used gliders at Eben Emmel. Off course there is also the problem that if German doctrine is followed all the paratroops would have is a hand weapon probably a Nambu, Japan was slow in issuing SMG. Other weapons and equipment were dropped separately in canisters. Ken Young > In article > <52751be5-2c55-452a-b231-3416117646f9@m45g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > Everybody seems to be making the assumption that WW2 assault parachutes > were as steerable as modern sports parachutes. Well, no, I am not. In fact, I repeatedly pointed out that the drift would be severe. Yet the original poster now expects these men at their first combat drop after two months of parachute training to drop from 150 meters. From that height, there's not much time to steer. However, now that I think of it, I suspect that with the residual speed one would be coming down with, even slapping into the vertical side of one of the tanks would be an experience best avoided. On Aug 26, 5:37 am, Ken Young wrote: > Everybody seems to be making the assumption that WW2 assault parachutes > were as steerable as modern sports parachutes. They weren't and German > designs were worse for steering than Allied ones. The D-Day drops were > carried out with complete air superiority and still scattered the troops > with some of them landing miles from their targets. The Germans used > gliders at Eben Emmel. The Japanese did develop gliders too but years too late for Dec. 1941. > Off course there is also the problem that if German doctrine is > followed all the paratroops would have is a hand weapon probably a > Nambu, Japan was slow in issuing SMG. Other weapons and equipment were > dropped separately in canisters. The Osprey publiction (Elite #127) entitled, "Japanese Paratroop Forces of World War II" indicates on page 6 that the first IJN parachute training jumps were in fact made at Tokyo Bay on Jan.15, 1941. Lots of training time from then until Dec.7'41. Some eleven months in fact. Also specified on page 60 are a pistol and at least two handgrenades to be carried by each paratrooper, HE, WP or smoke being available. A 2lb, 11 oz magnetic anti-armor charge is also specified there but it's 10 second delay fuse would need to be replaced by one of longer duration for this mission. Additional weaponry including carbines, LMGs and "knee mortars" were dropped with the paratroops by seperate cargo container. In article <a6f116f3-f45f-4005-8eff-f313d92d7096@w39g2000prb.googlegroups.com>, > Additional weaponry including carbines, LMGs and "knee mortars" were > dropped with the paratroops by seperate cargo container. So before they can assault anything they have to recover the weapons cannisters. Think about it, especially as Japanese pistols were notoriously bad. Ken Young On Aug 27, 6:19 pm, Ken Young wrote: > So before they can assault anything they have to recover the weapons > cannisters. Think about it, especially as Japanese pistols were > notoriously bad. If that is the history then that is what I must deal with. Such are the trials of writing AH scenarios. > Gents, > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > flight with a 15% fuel reserve, IF no parachutes and only light > infantry weapons were carried, to reduce weight. Okay, that's 100 (maximum) Japanese, and they aren't going to be able to get together into decent concentrations. They will, be saboteurs, unable to defeat any significant US force. Remember that there were tens of thousands of soldiers there, and Short was nuts about preventing sabotage. He disregarded the possibility of Japanese air raids, and ran an exercise using the pilots as scratch infantry, but he was prepared to stop sabotage. The most significant goal they're likely to accomplish is dying for their Emperor. It seems futile to discuss other targets. > What are your constructive thoughts gents ? Observe the actual defenses of Oahu. Do not propose alternatives on the basis that they were greatly different from what they were. SignatureDavid H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask. david@thornley.net | If you don't, flee. http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O- > Okay, that's 100 (maximum) Japanese, and they aren't going to be > able to get together into decent concentrations. They will, > be saboteurs, unable to defeat any significant US force. Agreed but there are still some interestring possibilities ... apparently Kimmel and Short played golf together, on Ford Island in the centre of Pearl Harbor, early in the morning on each and every Sunday. Had Yoshikawa learned of this via an informant, Tokyo might have planned JSNLF aircraft landings on the airfield there. Would Short have been likely to have posted many anti-sabotage sentrys on a US airbase island set out in the middle of the US Pearl Harbor Naval Base ? > Remember that there were tens of thousands of soldiers there, Many of whom were sleeping off hangovers from their just passed Saturday night libertys. None of whom carried cell phones in their pockets. And most of "my" JSNLF ex-Hawaiian troopers would speak English and know the latest baseball scores > and Short was nuts about preventing sabotage. He disregarded > the possibility of Japanese air raids Exactly my point in proposing this AH scenario.The Americans on Oahu didn't think that Japanese carrier planes could reach Oahu so they would never even have considered the possibility of Japanese land based bomber types arriving, even if they actually took the time to look thru the USAAF style paint jobs. > The most significant goal they're likely to accomplish is > dying for their Emperor. It seems futile to discuss > other targets. I do agree that sending them only makes sense if a larger scale operation against Oahu is planned. Like for instance my previously mentioned sending of the Combined Fleet over to follow-up on the historical KB attacks. Only then do "my" JSNLF troopers have roles worth risking death for, taking out 16" US coastal defense artillery etc.. I must confess to attempting to use 'mucho hindsight' in this case. Other than a non-historical IJN submarine sighting of the USS Enterprise, I can only come up with this "way out there" JSNLF operation as a way for Nagumo's KB to receive a sighting report on that missing American carrier. Their overnight course between Kwajalein and Oahu would take them nearly directly over the Enterprise's historical position at about 0530 that morning. Just light enough for the Japanese to clearly see Enterprise below but still dusky enough that the fake American paint jobs might still be accepted as a flight of American A-20 bombers inbound to Oahu. Maybe. > Observe the actual defenses of Oahu. Do not propose > alternatives on the basis that they were greatly different > from what they were. I wasn't aware that I had ? To what US defenses do you refer ? > Remember that there were tens of thousands of soldiers there, > and Short was nuts about preventing sabotage. He disregarded > the possibility of Japanese air raids, and ran an exercise > using the pilots as scratch infantry, but he was prepared > to stop sabotage. Even before Harbor was bombed, Short had put into effect an alert against sabotage and internal disorder. ** Posted from http://www.teranews.com ** > Gents, > [quoted text clipped - 60 lines] > > What are your constructive thoughts gents? Better off by sending 1,000 or more Japanese (or Japanese-American) ninjas over the course of a year or two disguised as students, tourists, businessmen, etc. via cruise ships, airliners, etc. and giving them deep cover until The Day. To ensure secrecy, they will be told to listen to a Japanese-language radio program daily and encoded instructions will be given to them. Added to this, how about bubonic (or other) plague shipped to the Japanese embassy in Washington DC, and injected into rats to be released in various major American cities on a specific day. The ensuing plague will weaken America's will to fight if they are in the throes of something terrible at home. > Better off by sending 1,000 or more Japanese (or Japanese-American) ninjas over the course of a year or two This implies knowing that there will be war against the USA in a year or two, back in December 1940 or 1939. The likelihood that out of 1,000 agents, at least one is caught over a 1 or 2-year period, giving the game away, is near 100%. > Added to this, how about bubonic (or other) plague shipped to the Japanese embassy in Washington DC, and injected into rats to be released in various major American cities on a specific day. The ensuing plague will weaken America's will to fight if they are in the throes of something terrible at home. So maybe the Japanese do achieve a de facto ceasefire during which they consolidate their hold over South-East Asia. What do you think will happen next? Who's going to produce more bio agents, more gases, and more nuclear weapons than the enemy? Who has a smaller, more densely populated territory, less self-sufficient as to food than the enemy? Who has a less developed health system? >> Better off by sending 1,000 or more Japanese (or Japanese-American) >> ninjas over the course of a year or two > This implies knowing that there will be war against the USA in a year or > two, back in December 1940 or 1939. The Soviets had deep sleepers in the US (or were reputed to) in case of a war. Why not Japan "just in case"? > The likelihood that out of 1,000 agents, at least one is caught over a 1 or > 2-year period, giving the game away, is near 100%. In a culture were suicide was an honorable escape, if an agent is cornered or captured, they bite the hollow tooth. >> Added to this, how about bubonic (or other) plague shipped to the >> Japanese embassy in Washington DC, and injected into rats to be >> released in various major American cities on a specific day. The >> ensuing plague will weaken America's will to fight if they are in the >> throes of something terrible at home. > So maybe the Japanese do achieve a de facto ceasefire during which they > consolidate their hold over South-East Asia. What do you think will happen > next? Who's going to produce more bio agents, more gases, and more nuclear > weapons than the enemy? Who has a smaller, more densely populated territory, > less self-sufficient as to food than the enemy? Who has a less developed > health system? Why would the Japanese admit to the bio-attack? Could have been the Nazis, or (in 1941) the Soviets. There were a lot of potential enemies out there. Just do it and then launch an attack on the SE Asian oil- producing regions as if they're taking advantage of a potential enemy's sudden distraction. On Aug 26, 5:16 am, "Michele" <nospammiar...@tin.it> wrote: > "The Old Man" <Braung...@verizon.net> ha scritto nel > messaggionews:10c3f908-81de-44a3-afb1-cf6d40976280@i76g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... >> Better off by sending 1,000 or more Japanese (or Japanese-American) >> ninjas over the course of a year or two > This implies knowing that there will be war against the USA in a year or > two, back in December 1940 or 1939. > The Soviets had deep sleepers in the US (or were reputed to) in case of a war. Why not Japan "just in case"? Well, not impossible I suppose. Japan knew the USA had a long-term dislike for their policies in China. Still it doesn't sound terribly likely. Note the supposed sleepers of the USSR are normally portrayed as exceptional individuals trained since their youth and exceedingly loyal; they seldom are portrayed as being countable in the thousands. The ideal recruit for this kind of program would also be a guy who has experienced why life in the USA is better and who might well have mixed loyalties. Approaching 10,000 of them (a reasonable recruitment pool to end up with 1,000 or 2,000 trainees) means near certainty that one of them will inform the authorities of what he now sees as his true country. There is even a fair chance that one of them will actually be a double agent working for the USA. > The likelihood that out of 1,000 agents, at least one is caught over a 1 > or > 2-year period, giving the game away, is near 100%. > In a culture were suicide was an honorable escape, if an agent is cornered or captured, they bite the hollow tooth. Yeah. And a dead Japanese, a suicide with a sophisticated poisonous device carried out while said man was under suspicion, having come back from Japan recently - which direction does this clue point towards? It is enough to go over all men in a similar situation. Interrogating them. Just a couple more identical suicides will be enough to distrust all and every Japanese in the USA, let alone those in the Hawaii or those who have recently come over from Japan. >> Added to this, how about bubonic (or other) plague shipped to the >> Japanese embassy in Washington DC, and injected into rats to be >> released in various major American cities on a specific day. The >> ensuing plague will weaken America's will to fight if they are in the >> throes of something terrible at home. > So maybe the Japanese do achieve a de facto ceasefire during which they > consolidate their hold over South-East Asia. What do you think will happen [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > less self-sufficient as to food than the enemy? Who has a less developed > health system? > Why would the Japanese admit to the bio-attack? Could have been the Nazis, or (in 1941) the Soviets. There were a lot of potential enemies out there. Just do it and then launch an attack on the SE Asian oil- producing regions as if they're taking advantage of a potential enemy's sudden distraction. They wouldn't admit it, of course. Ruling out the Soviets (they have other fish to fry in 1941) , the US public opinion would probably expect the Germans and Japanese to have been accomplices - after all, plenty of people tended to believe that German pilots had actually carried out the Pearl Harbor stunt. This does not exculpate the Japanese, rather it puts the Germans in the same net. _If_ such an attack was done out of the blue, then maybe the USA would go after the Germans. If, as it seems reasonable, it is carried out roughly at the time when Pearl harbor was done, then the Japanese have no hope of playing the who, me? part. US decision makers fully expected hostility by Japan at the time. And I don't think the US public opinion would accept either a natural epidemic explanation, or, much worse, a "somebody did it but we don't know who, so nobody will be punished". Somebody _will_ have to be punished. I finally note that "added to this" seems in contradiction with the deniability. If you want to _add_ a Sleeper Regiment attack in Pearl and a bio attack, then there is no deniability for the latter. Maybe you could explore the second option individually; a bio attack in the USA followed by a conventional attack - only against the British and Dutch, bypassing the Philippines and ignoring Pearl Harbor. If this happens, my opinion is that the outcome above would come through: "It was Japan, never mind evidence". > On Aug 26, 5:16 am, "Michele" <nospammiar...@tin.it> wrote: >> "The Old Man" <Braung...@verizon.net> ha scritto nel [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] > fair chance that one of them will actually be a double agent working for > the USA. Or that one or more will "turn", either voluntarily, or when caught for something else. How are they supposed to get in? Not as permanent immigrants, the quota for immigration from Japan being so low. Tourists? Won't it attract notice of a number of Japanese "tourists" all overstay their visas? Students? Students are supposed to study something, have been accepted by an educational institution. >> The likelihood that out of 1,000 agents, at least one is caught over a 1 >> or [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > and every Japanese in the USA, let alone those in the Hawaii or those who > have recently come over from Japan. Soviet officer Vladimir Vetrev was caught drunk after assaulting his girlfriend. He rather quickly confessed to being a spy for the French -- something he was never suspected of. Not every agent is going to be this super-energized ultimate superspy. If you are looking for people with a knowledge of English and some familiarity with American culture, you're going to have to get some who are subpar in other ways. And if an agent dies in custody, what happens when a search of his rooms turns up suspicious material? (Maps of military areas, explosives, large numbers of firearms, etc.) Who's running the show, anyhow? Presumably this is the navy. The Kempeitai would have spy equipment and the like. (Japanese HUMINT was never very good but that's another matter.) The Army and the Navy hated each other; they certainly didn't deign to inform each other of their plans. Joseph T Major >> The Soviets had deep sleepers in the US (or were reputed to) in case > of a war. Why not Japan "just in case"? You know, I remember hearing when I was a kid about some super secret Soviet center for training deep-cover illegals. It was a perfectly reproduced small American town. The agents were supposed to live there and live exactly like Americans, speaking English, living a "capitalist" life-style, and so on, so they wouldn't give themselves away once they came to the Main Enemy. I suppose this was the sort of hysterical misperception that, for example, had Frenchmen with open shutters shot for being Fifth Columnists, Englishmen who had pigeons fly away from them in the park being locked up as spies, and Japanese-Americans who owned short-wave radios being dispatched to resettlement camps as saboteurs. There was a enthusiastic literature on the Vast Nazi Espionage Establishment whose perpetrators were not embarrassed by its total non-confirmation. Note that none of these alleged "sleeper" agents has come out of hiding, now that the purpose of their mission is dead and gone. What I wonder is, what if there had actually been such a State-Security run reservation? Would it be a theme park today? Would Soviet "sleeper" agents have been well-trained and loyal? Or would they have been predisposed to drop everything and silently defect? Joseph T Major >>> The Soviets had deep sleepers in the US (or were reputed to) in case >> of a war. Why not Japan "just in case"? [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > life-style, and so on, so they wouldn't give themselves away once they > came to the Main Enemy. It's in a movie. SignatureWilliam Black I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach Time for tea. On Aug 26, 5:56 pm, "William Black" <william.bl...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote: > >>> The Soviets had deep sleepers in the US (or were reputed to) in case > >> of a war. Why not Japan "j |
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