History Forum / General / What If / July 2009

I read the cite and quite frankly it supports my position, not yours.
Look near the bottom of page xii where it speaks of any attempt to
shift the submarine force to attacking American lines of communication
was downplayed and/or ignored.  As to the losses of submarines, quite
frankly again, they are I think less than that of the U-boat arm.

And did not sink her, or otherwise cause her significant damage that
was not quickly repaired by her crew.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_submarine_I-21

FYI had the skipper surfaced her she probably would have torn that
coast guard cutter a new a-hole, as she was well armed for surface
action.

The I-21 continued as an effective IJN unit till she was lost with all
hands sometime after 27 November 1943.

Try again.

Siting duck that does not die, ZOMBIE DUCKS!!!

Jack Linthicum wrote:

       The big problem with IJN submarines was that they had way too many
designs, some excellent, some indifferent, some downright goofy.  

       The POD ISTM here is to suppose that they concentrated instead on a
few of the good ones.  

       Suppose too that they used them a lot closer to home than the US West
Coast, that they hit the logistics of Allied operations in the forward
areas.  The outcome would be a lot better.  

       As I noted on the other ng, on land they used infiltration tactics
superbly, so I can see how they could use them at sea as well.

Dennis

On Jul 5, 12:02 pm, jpesterfi...@centurytel.net wrote:

What would let him get past the Navy Staff and convince Nagumo to
ignore the warships and hit the oil facilities? Remember his
injunction to destroy the American fleet and destroy the American
nation's will to resist. Blowing up an oil storage tank doesn't have
the bit of a first class battleship sunk at its moorings.

On Jul 5, 6:55 am, "Paul J. Adam"  wrote,

True enough but remember that not all of the American fuel storage
tanks held (difficult but not at all impossible to ignite) thick
bunker "C".

There were in fact 4 seperate "tankfarms" on Oahu on the morning of
Dec.7'41 (or 5 if you count the still being built Red Hill complex)
plus dozens of buried 25,000 gallon avgas tanks at various US
airfields.

1.) Of the 9 big tanks on Ford Island, 7 held USN avgas and 2 stored
bunker "C" for Battleship Row. The USN oiler USS Neosho had just 5
minutes before 0755, finished pumping another 500,000 gallons of avgas
into those same storage tanks.

2.) Of the 27 big tanks nestled between  Hospital Point and Hickam
Field (which I call the Pearl Harbor West tankfarm), 7 held USAAF
avgas, 1 held gasoline and 19 seperately held heavier bunker "C",
bunker "B" and diesel fuels.

3.) The 26 big fuel tanks of the PH East tankfarm (built just east &
south of the submarine base), held a similar mix of seperate bunker
"C", bunker "B" and diesel stockpiles with just 1 holding vehicle
gasoline.

It should be understood that in the case of mixed fuel tankfarms, the
easy ignition of lighter fuel in one tank will provide radiant heating
of all nearby fuel tanks to the point where they will soon start to
vent explosive/combustable gases that can easily be touched off by any
nearby flame/spark. Progressive destruction can then move through the
tankfarm, storage tank by storage tank, even if the surrounding berms
are not breached.

Discussions had been held in 1940 wrt installing numerous high
pressure seawater monitors (4" & 6" water cannons) at all three of
these military tankfarms so as to provide cooling against radiant
heating of adjacent fuel tanks in the event of fire but NOTHING was
done in this regard since construction of the Red Hill complex had
already begun. It was thought that there were better uses for the
millions of $ needed than to spend them on protecting above ground
fuel tanks that would soon be abandoned/removed.

4.) The 14 large tanks and dozens of smaller ones scattered about  the
Honolulu Harbor area contained an absolute "witch's brew" of fuels and
flammable chemicals. Bunker "C" for the HECO electric powerplant's
boilers and ships in port, gasoline and diesel for the fishing boats
moored there, gasoline stockpiles for Oahu's civilian vehicles,
industrial alcohols and a host of other civilian industrial chemicals.
Bermed yes but monitors, none.

I would also remind you that each Japanese Val divebomber could carry
and accurately deliver 1 centreline 250 kg HE bomb AND 2 underwing
carried 60 kg incendiary bombs. A Kate torpedo bomber, used instead
for level bombing, could drop 8 x 60 kg incendiaries. It seems to me
that had the Japanese chosen to attack Oahu's fuel stockpiles, they
could easily have "made a right mess" out of those 4 tankfarms (as
well as the largely wooden buildings of the City of Honolulu). Without
a functiong electrical powerplant, there would be no electric water
pumps and therefor no water pressure to use in fighting the spreading
fires.

One could also endlessly debate the possibility of attack damaged
berms allowing flaming, floating oil/gas to spread out over the
surface of Pearl Harbor and further damage the USN warships (and their
crews) trapped there.

Wrt to a hypothetical 3rd wave air attack on Oahu, H.P. Wilmott's 2001
book "Pearl Harbor" devotes an entire chapter, #5 IIRC", to that
possibility. Whatever the intended targets, he details the number and
types of KB warplanes that might have been readied for a soonest
possible 1500 launch but then discounts that possibility by showing
that such a 3rd wave mission would require night flight returns and
thus night landings on the KB's carriers.

Why he did not choose to explore the previous history of IJN carrier
night operations,, I do not know.

Prange's book, "At Dawn We Slept" points out that Genda had orginally
planned an earlier attack time (sunrise was at 0606 on Dec.7'41) on
Pearl Harbor with bomb/torpedo drops schedued at 0630 rather than the
historically chosen 0800. Actually Fuchida was early at 0755. Had
Nagumo chosen this earlier option instead then any 3rd wave would have
had an additional 1.5 hours of daylight available for it's
(hypothetical) mission.

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm
presents a detailed description of the factory installed radio
direction compass carried by all of the IJN's early war aircraft. This
was the system that was historically used by Fuchida to navigate from
the KB's airstrike launch point, to Oahu.

That system could also have been used to guide earlier 1st and 2nd
wave airstrikes to Oahu thru the darkness, as Genda had originally
intended, so as to give more daylight hours later in the day for a
(hypothetical) 3rd wave strike and return to the KB's carriers.

As for the KB's pilots, please see http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-10.html
for:

Q. Had your pilots been trained to land on the carriers at night?
A. Yes, about 2/3 of all pilots were thoroughly trained at night.

Q. When did you first start night carrier operations?
A. About 1933.

Q. Was one carrier used for night operation or did you have pilots on
each carrier?
A. Each carrier had a few night pilots at first, then increased. About
2/3 of all pilots on each carrier were thoroughly trained in night
carrier operation. About 1/3 were familiar but not so well trained.

Q. How did you land at night?
A. We used a green and red light which were lined up for a flight path
to come aboard. We also used a signalman.

Q. Did he control the speed during the landing?
A. No, after a night battle, only signal used was O.K. and should
land, or that he was not O.K. and should be waved off; in which case
he made another approach. During the training more signals were used
to indicate speed and altitude. These signals were given by blinker
guns at night.

Q. What accidents incurred in training?
A. Thorough basic training was given at night on land; therefore, we
had very few accidents in night landings aboard ship.

The specialized night landing system of red and green lights mentioned
(note: these were NOT the main decklighting floodlights) is further
described at http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf
and was fitted to ALL of Japan's carriers from 1934.

It seems to me that had Nagumo actually WANTED to make a 3rd strike on
the Americans at Oahu, as indicated by the SPIRIT of Yamamoto's
orders, he COULD have reasonably done so. In the spirit of fairness
though, it must be said that stiffening wind/weather conditions DID
cause several landing accidents and damages during the return of the
2nd wave's warplanes from 1115 on. I do not know at this time if
flying weather conditions after 1330 on Dec.7'41 improved, stayed the
same or further worstened at the Kido Butai's still hidden position
some 200 miles north of Oahu ?  Certainly US land based and carrier
aircraft operated without weather problems to the west, south and east
of Oahu thru the afternoon and evening of Dec.7'41 but I have found no
detailed reports of wind/weather conditions to the north of that
surprised island.

Finally, I would point out that Wilmott does NOT mention weather
conditions as an obstacle to a 3rd strike.

It seems to me, a MAJOR missed Japanese opportunity and as per page #
547 of "ADWS", one that Nagumo had ALREADY decided to avoid even
BEFORE his Kido Butai strikeforce had left Japanese home waters some
two weeks before.

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that
jpesterfield@centurytel.net wrote on Sun, 5 Jul 2009 09:02:09 -0700
(PDT) in soc.history.what-if :

    I recall reading that Japan in 1940 had barely enough shipyard
capacity to keep up with normal needs and routine maintenance.  Once
the shooting started, the ship yards were overwhelmed with the need to
replace shipping, replace warships, and repair what salvageable.

    Good luck on convincing Real Warriors that the Glory is in
attacking the Merchants.  Every One Knows, that the Real Glory is in
Attacking the Enemy.   Armies attack Armies, Air Forces attack
Airplanes, Navies Attack Ships.

    The Genius of Yamoto's plan was attacking the American FLEET so
far from the Japanese home waters.  Most war scenarios expected some
kind of Fleet surface action in the Western Pacific.

    Secondly, I suspect that Yamoto understood a USN Fleet in being to
be more of a threat, even if it had logistical supplies.  He could
"burn their crops" and run wild for six months or so, but then ... and
there would always be this "threat" of the USN finally getting enough
oil to come west.

tschus
pyotr

-
pyotr Filipivich
"Bother," said Pooh, "Eeyore, ready two photon torpedoes and
lock phasers on the Heffalump. Piglet, meet me in transporter
room three. Christopher Robin, you have the bridge."

On Jul 5, 5:55 am, "Paul J. Adam"
<paulNOT.jTHESE.adamB...@googlemail.com> wrote:

That would be incorrect.

http://mythbustersresults.com/episode38

"It has already been proven that when shot by a normal bullet a
gasoline tank will not explode. However, if a gasoline tank is shot by
a tracer round from a great enough distance so that the round can
ignite with air friction, it will cause the gasoline to catch fire."

I specified incendiary ammo, which Japanese fighters normally used,
and shooting from a strafing aircraft which means several hundred
meters range at least.

A short burst including at least one tracer round into each oil tank
would be all that was required to ignite more than half of the tanks
then the already burning tanks would set off adjacent tanks that were
leaking from 20mm cannon fire.

of 20 mm auto cannon fire?

Ok say for the sake of argument that you need more than tracers to
light them up.

You have a couple of fighters strafe each row of tanks with 20 mm
cannon fire, which will cause holes and leakage into the berms, then
about 20 minute later you have a bomber drop an incendiary bomb over
each tank.  It need not be large or sophisticated.  50 lb is plenty
big enough if thermite and it explodes into say 1 lb sticks all
burning.

I do not know exactly how many tanks were their but for the sake of
argument say it is 100, then we need 5000 lb bomb capacity multiplied
by a safety factor call that three or 15000 lbs of bomb load capasity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nakajima_B5N

a kate can carry 6 x 60 kg bombs, then we figure on one kate for every
two tanks and we have our 3/1 safety margin.  So we need 50 kates to
be confident of taking out nearly all of 100 above ground tanks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor

Given that the Japanese had six carriers and over 400 aircraft
participating in the attack sparing 50 bombers in one wave to do this
is definitely possible.