Re: What if no Manhatten Project

The threat has to be real to get any reaction. If neither side has
gotten far with developing nukes, no one knows how they would work,
B-36, or what size they would be, Davy Crockett or Czar Bomba. No need
for a treaty against something that no one knows what it is.

Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Summary

Multilateral agreement signed and ratified between the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
and U.K. banning:

   * ...placement of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction"
in orbit around the Earth.
   * ...installation of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass
destruction" on the moon, on any other celestial body, or in outer
space
   * ...use of the moon or any celestial body for military purposes,
including weapons testing of any kind.

Ninty five nations have ratified the treaty. The treaty entered into
force on October 10, 1963.
Narrative

The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, was the second of the so-
called "nonarmament" treaties; its concepts and some of its provisions
were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that
Treaty it sought to prevent "a new form of colonial competition" and
the possible damage that self-seeking exploitation might cause.

In early 1957, even before the launching of Sputnik in October,
developments in rocketry led the United States to propose
international verification of the testing of space objects. The
development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a
Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957.
The Soviet Union, however, which was in the midst of testing its first
ICBM and was about to orbit its first Earth satellite, did not accept
these proposals.

Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to
bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive
plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban
the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass
destruction. Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, 1960,
President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic
Treaty be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.

Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and
1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space.
The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other
disarmament issues, nor would it agree to restrict outer space to
peaceful uses unless U.S. foreign bases at which short-range and
medium-range missiles were stationed were eliminated also.

The Western powers declined to accept the Soviet approach; the
linkage, they held, would upset the military balance and weaken the
security of the West.

After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Unions
position changed. It ceased to link an agreement on outer space with
the question of foreign bases. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister
Gromyko told the General Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to
conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of objects carrying nuclear
weapons. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no
intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on
celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space. The General
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963,
welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states
to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer
space.

The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of any
provisions for verification; the capabilities of its space-tracking
systems, it was estimated, were adequate for detecting launchings and
devices in orbit.

Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the
United States in 1965 and 1966 pressed for a Treaty that would give
further substance to the U.N. resolution.

On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union
submitted draft treaties. The U.S. draft dealt only with celestial
bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment.
The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the
Treaty, and by September agreement had been reached in discussions at
Geneva on most Treaty provisions. Differences on the few remaining
issues -- chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies,
reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and
personnel in space exploration -- were satisfactorily resolved in
private consultations during the General Assembly session by December.

On the 19th of that month the General Assembly approved by acclamation
a resolution commending the Treaty. It was opened for signature at
Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25 the
Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the Treaty
entered into force on October 10, 1967.

The substance of the arms control provisions is in Article IV. This
article restricts activities in two ways:

First , it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the
Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise
station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass
destruction.

Second , it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies
exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for
establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing
weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.

After the Treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet
Union collaborated in jointly planned and manned space enterprises.

Source: Department of State

the Cold

That a good point.

I will  try a counter-argument.

In the abstract, nukes don't look like good military weapons.  We
mainly used the
first strike threat to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe.

If we could have somehow stablized the situation with the Soviet Union
in Europe with conventional forces before a nuclear arms race got
started, then maybe nukes would have looked like cumbersome and scary
weapons not worth building.   We don't always do what we can do, we
never based nukes in orbit for instance, we have bans on biological
and chemical weapons.

An intriguing question.

It was touch and go for awhile whether the fission weapons research would
take off into an all-out program during the war. But one needs to look
carefully at how momentum for the project accumulated, and then posit
specific ways and times that it might have gotten shelved or put on a side
track. If you don't take this approach you won't have a clear idea of the
state of research in the field that would have been acheived, which would
then affect strongly what would come later.

For example if no Manhattan Project, would there be an S-1 project? S-1 was
the smaller scale fission research program running from December 1941 to
that set the stage for the industrial phase project that was approved June
1942, and initiated in September . But the research work during the 6 months
or so after actual initiation were continuations of the S-1 effort, and
would have taken place without the Manhattan Project.

A key case in point is Fermi's reactor, CP-1. By 1941 scientists (Fermi
esepcially) in the U.S. knew how to build a graphite nuclear reactor, all
they needed that they didn't have was the money to do it. Fermi began his
project of pile construction before S-1 was even initiated, and as long as
he received sufficient (relatively small) funding and a moderate degree of
priority for materials acquisition he would have completed the pile at the
end of 1942, Manhattan Project or no.

It is hard to see how this milestone would not have occurred, no matter
what.

Reactor research, if not bomb research, was certain to continue throughout
the war and afterward. So we would be dealing with a world hosting nuclear
reactors for scientific, industrial and possiby military power applications.

This could continue for years before someone decided to make a bomb.

I am inclined to think though, that no later than the start of the the Cold
War in 1947, the U.S. would have started to work on an atomic bomb, for fear
the Soviet Union would get one first.

I am reading a bio of Szilard.

I get the impression that a wrong turn or two in the early efforts to
engineer the nuclear chain-reaction might have led to no big US A-bomb
development effort during the war.

The Bomb was not important for the outcome of WWII.   But I guess it
might have slowed down Soviet agression in Europe and W. Asia.

If the project was delayed and there was no big push during WWII,
then when would the Bomb have been first tested, if ever?