Re: Operation Barbarossa - 68th Anniversary

I've read several of these several times.

You've gone from "No, nothing like this happened" to "No, nothing like this
happened before June 1941 (which nobody but you brought up)" to "They
were ordered to send out peace-feelers, but they may not have meant them".

Perhaps you should read your own quotes.

Mike

They think of there was one it was decoy.  There was no intent to offer
Hitler anything.  Read it again.

Hmmm

So, you agree that they were offering the Ukraine, etc?

Plus, it's odd how you can quote from books that aren't written by
Tooze...

Mike

No proof that Stalin made any such thing.

Russia's War by Overy
page 96:

It was rumoured in Berlin in early October that Stalin had sought an
armistice through Tsar Boris of Bulgaria. It [making peace as Lenin had done
at Brest-Litovsk in 1918] would not have been an irrational choice, any more
than was Lenin's.

The evidence on the peace mission is far from clear. The story that emerged
in the 1980s suggested that on October 7 Stalin ordered Beria to send out
peace feelers to Hitler via the Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow, Ivan
Stamenov. The emissary was instructed to say that Stalin would give Hitler
the Baltic States, Moldavia and parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine.
According to the story the Bulgarian refused, telling either Beria or
Molotov that the Soviet Union would, in the end, win. There is no evidence
from the German side of any contacts in 1941. More recent revelations
suggest a rather different picture. The attempt to make a peace offer may
have been part of a political initiative sponsored by Beria to try to
confuse the Germans long enough to form a more solid defence line outside
Moscow. This version fits more comfortably with the rest of what is known of
Stalin's behaviour in early October - frantic efforts to organize the
defence and to recruit American and British assistance and his subsequent
decision at the moment of acute crisis to stay in the capital .

And in point of fact, the USSR with their T-34s were not winning the war
at that time. In fact, that was when Stalin offered to give up the war.

Mike

But not winning the war.

Fine; that was when Germany was routinely routing Soviet forces.

Mike

Later in the war did not matter - the timepoint is late 1941.  That was when
the T-34 knock hell out if the German tank. You have been given quote so
please stop this ridiculous childish repetition.  Note 4th Panzer Division's
performance.

About the T-34: "We had nothing comparable" - Friedrich von Mellenthin
(1956)

Tooze.page 489.
"To the agile heavily armoured T-34s now pouring off the production line,
the Germans had no answer."

page 492.
"By mid October [1941], 4th Panzer Division had been reduced to only 38
vehicles after a devastating encounter with T-34s"

Guderian sent a team to Russia to assess the T-34 in Nov 1941. They
concluded it was better than what they had: better slanting aromour, better
suspension, big wheels, wide tracks, better gun.

On November 25th of 1941, Adolf Hitler ordered Wa Pruef start work on the
new tank. In December of 1941, Wa Pruef ordered Daimler-Benz and MAN
(Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nuernberg) to design new 30-ton tank armed with
75mm KwK L/70 gun as a response to the Soviet T-34/76 tank.

On Jun 27, 6:56 am, "Bay Man"
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

These are not trivial things.  And later in the war the Germans were
fielding tanks that would eat T-34s for breakfast.

In late 1941 the only advantage the German tanks has was initially more
experienced crews and a radio in each tank.  The Germans would have a
non-combat command tank too.  Nothing else. These deficiencies were more or
less rectified as the war went on.

On Jun 26, 7:22 am, "Bay Man"
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

And the B1bis?  Are you going to claim that it didn't have heavier
armor or large numbers or that the Germans didn't run into them until
later?  The French tanks had heavy armor, and advanced technology AND
high quality crews.  They still lost.

The features you claim made the T-34 a wonder tank are, in the real
world, not that important compared to the other features that the
Germans excelled in..

Actually they didn't.  They knew they could take on T-34s and win with
Mk IIIs.  They did it often enough.  A quotation from *1956* doesn't
change that.

The Germans only really met the Matilda 2 in the desert. The Germans lost.
A few Matlida 2s were in France right at the end.

You did say that and two posts proved you wrong. The timepoint is late 1941.
The Germans in late 1941 thought very different to you.

It also, and more importantly, had inferior technology, and poor
crews.  Weight is nice, but it doesn't decide tank battles.

Yes, the T-34 had heavier armor.  The French Char B1 did too (60mm in
the B1bis) .  Even the D2 had 40mm.  The British Matilda II had *78mm*
armor.  They still lost.

These are not trivial things.  In battle they made a huge difference.
In a battalion on battalion tank fight they would mean that the
Germans would win and the Russians lose.

There were more Pz-IIIs than the G model...

In other words, the hype claiming that the T-34 was a wonder tank that
was light years ahead of the best German tanks was simply false, which
is what I said.

Not that much heavier, not enough to matter anyway, especially not
against the long 75mm gun of the upgraded Mk-IVs.  From 1942 on
Russian tanks were dead meat for German guns.

Which was still inferior to the German 75s...

At Kursk (specifically, Prokhorovka) German Mk-IIIs and Mk-IVs
inflicted something like 5-1 losses against 5th Guards Tank Army in an
open field meeting engagement.

Where they would be destroyed by a better supplied German army.

The 32nd Siberian Rifle Division at Borodino,

With better rail lines the head is not as vulnerable...

I'll respectfully beg to disagree.

Sure they were unusually difficult to engage for Mk

The T-34a (aka model 1940) weighed some 30% more than the best Pz III. It
was more than twice as fast (which is a remarkable feat for a heavier
tank!), had a much better power/weight ratio (which made it much livelier in
acceleration), and its ground pressure was some 30% lower (which made it
maneuverable in mud and snow, in conditions where the Pz III would have
bogged down). As to mobility, the Pz III was marvelous when compared to
British and French infantry tanks, and it was crap when compared to the
T-34a.

As to armor, the T-34 was evidently superior, with front armor in the order
of 45mm, exceedingly sloped (it was, in 1941, _the_ sloped-armor tank). The
Pz III had a 30% thinner front armor, and sloped between 10° and 30° degrees
(always in the front aspect).

As to the main gun, the Pz III carried a 50mm-42 calibers long, the T-34a a
76.2mm-35 calibers long. At 500 meters, the Pz III's gun was more accurate,
but the 76.2mm was reasonably accurate and still more powerful than the
50mm. Additionally, the 76.2mm was able to engage infantry under cover,
whereas the 50mm was too small a caliber for that.

The Pz III was superior in two things: all of them had a radio, whereas only
a part of the T-34s had one; and the Pz III had a 3-man turret, while the
T-34 had two men there. Which made the commander overworked, and reduced the
rate of fire in comparison with the opponent.

Nor were the T-34s all that few. The Western Special Military District
alone, in 1941, had 228 of them, while the grand total for all German Pz
IIIGs was 707 - all along the Barbarossa front.

Generally speaking, the Pz IIIGs could and did defeat T-34s, but not because
the T-34s were "hype" per se. They did because they had better trained and
more experienced crewmen inside them, with better orders, and those radios.
HVAP special rounds did help, and the T-34as normally did not carry any of
them (in the earlier stages, they were short on standard AP as well).

By reading this, it seems the Germans upgrade their tanks, while the T-34
remains always the same. There were bad news for the German tanker, in
actual history: the T-34/40 was upgraded to the /41, with a longer gun (39
calibers), which meant more muzzle velocity, which meant more accuracy at
range and more piercing power. Then the /42, which had the same gun but a
thicker armor, and which began to be issued with HVAP rounds. Then the /43,
with yet thicker armor.
And if you want to take the ultimate Pz IV now, the Ausf. J, then let's not
forget that at this point then we have to look at the 85mm-53 calibers gun.
Pz IVJs facing these at even odds had slightly above even chances of winning
if both sides were maneuvering to attack, let alone facing "long odds". But,
right, by this time the Germans were withdrawing and retreating and
disengaging and redeploying West, so they fought defensive battles, which do
tend to require long odds for the attacker.

No. The backbone were slow T-26s. The T-70 BTW was introduced in 1942. In
the Western Special Military District, there were 593 between BT-5s and
BT-7s, but 1321 T-26s. The problem with these was age and maintenance
status, much more than armor, which was on par with the Pz III's.
Additionally they had the same woes as the T-34 (inferior experience,
training, doctrine and orders, too small a crew, no radios), without the
superior gun.

Mk-IIIs went

Albeit there were 1321 T-26s in the WSMD, it is important to remember what I
said about maintenance, above. The actually serviceable ones were some 1000.

KV-1s were a serious problem (heavy armor), but too slow and

Yes. This we can agree upon.

Preposterous. Even with a perfectly efficient rail network, that would all
be gauged to the Soviet standard, which means the Germans still have to
regauge it. Additionally, can I take an improved Transsiberian rail line
with that? If so, I'll have more experienced, battle-hardened,
full-strength, full-cadre, fully equipped, heavily reinforced Siberian Rifle
Divisions earlier in the West. The 32nd Siberian Rifle Division at Borodino,
in October (no excuses about General Winter yet), single-handedly stopped
the coupled 10. Panzerdivision and the SS-Division Das Reich. They were
stalemated for a week and lost together 10,000 men and over 100 tanks. With
a better Transsiberian line, more of those divisions can show up earlier and
chop off the German advance's head even more nicely than in history.

On Jun 24, 7:35 am, "Bay Man"
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

The T-34 is more hype than practical value (well, it was a *lot*
better than the other Russian tanks, but not that much better than the
German tanks).  Sure they were unusually difficult to engage for Mk
IIIs (compared to other Russian tanks), but there weren't that many
and the Germans expected the war to be over before there would be.
Later in the war somewhat upgraded Mk-IIIs (better gun, better armor,
not hugely improved either way) could take on T-34s at even odds (of
course the total numbers weren't even then...)  Upgraded Mk-IVs
(better armor, infinitely better gun) on an open field could take on
T-34s at long odds and still expect to win.

The vast majority of the Russian tank forces at this time were lightly
armored (but fast) BT-5s and -7s, and T-60s and -70s.  Mk-IIIs went
through them with no serious problems, despite their much geater
numbers.  KV-1s were a serious problem (heavy armor), but too slow and
too rare to make a significant difference strategically.

The logistic situation killed the Germans infinitely more than
anything else.  Change nothing else but improve the Russian rail
network and Germany wins by Christmas 1941.

It just goes to show that war plans predicated on the enemy
surrendering rather than being destroyed are *always* doomed to
failure...

I would largely agree with that, with reservations. The T-34 started the
reverse of the German Army, the German Army would have petered out anyway. I
have been Googling this group, a book by Tooze causes great reactions.  I
read it and found it revealing indeed, especially on the German invasion of
the USSR.

It commited 100%. There was no reserves.
Tooze, Page 452:
"the Germans had already conscripted virtually all their prime manpower. By
contrast, the Red Army could call up millions of reservists."

It was not.
Tooze - Page 431:
"the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941
were precisely the growing shortage of grain and the need to knock Britain
out of the war before it could pose a serious air threat."

"Meanwhile, the rest of the German military-industrialised complex began to
gird itself for the aerial confrontation with Britain and America."

The US was to make 50,000 planes a year with UK production on top and much
of these planes in the hands of the UK.  Germany did not have a cat in hells
chance of matching this level of production, with UK & US being new modern
designs as well, against a now increasingly outdated Luftwaffe.  They
thought they could crush the USSR in months and turn to the UK before the
planes came on line in mid 1942.

In June 1941, German industry was geared to producing more planes not land
army equipment in preparation for the coming air war with the UK. They wound
down army production.

Page 454:
"The existing Russian rail infrastructure, even if it had been captured
intact, was insufficient to support the German army.  As a rule of thumb,
the German logistical experts liked to assign at least one high capacity
railway line to each army sized unit.  But for the 10 armies that invaded
the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht was able to assign only three main railway
lines, one for each army group."

Further up the page he writes:
"the retreating Red Army became extremely proficient at evacuating rolling
stock and sabotaging bridges, tracks and other railway installations."

This means the German Army was not going to be supplied properly even if the
rail system was taken intact, and very poorly in real shooting war, to
compound matters

On the same page:
"Critical stores would be reserved above all for the main strike force of 33
tank and motorised infantry divisions.  If the battle extended much beyond
the first months of the attack, the fighting power of the rest of the German
army would dwindle rapidly."

"Fundamentally the Wehrmacht was a "poor army".  The fast striking motorised
element of the Germans army in 1941 consisted of only 33 divisions of 130.
Three-quarters of the German army continued to rely on more traditional
means of traction: foot and horse.  The German army in 1941 invaded the
Soviet Union with somewhere between 600,000 and 740,000 horses.  The horses
were not for riding.  They were for moving guns, ammunition and supplies."

"The vast majority of Germany's soldiers marched into Russia, as they had in
France, on foot."

"But to imagine a fully motorised Wehrmacht, poised for an attack on the
Soviet Union is a fantasy of the Cold War, not a realistic vision of the
possibilities of 1941. To be more specific, it is an American fantasy. The
Anglo-American invasion force of 1944 was the only military force in WW2 to
fully conform to the modern model of a motorised army."

Page 455:
"the chronic shortage of fuel and rubber"

"the fuel shortage of 1941 was so expected to be so severe that the
Wehrmacht was seriously considering demotorisation as a way of reducing its
dependency on scarce oil."

"Everything therefore depended on the assumption that the Red Army would
crack under the impact of the first decisive blow."

Page 456:
"a new Soviet industrial base to the east of the Urals, which had the
capacity to sustain a population of at least 40 million people."

"Soviet industrial capacity was clearly very substantial."

"Franz Halder recorded Hitler's ruminations about the Soviets' immense stock
of tanks and aircraft."

Reading further Tooze gives the misgivings of the German generals of the
invasion. All were negative.

Page 457:
"Halder noted in his diary: Barbarossa: purpose not clear, We do not hurt
the English. Our economic base is not significantly improved."

At the top of page 459 Tooze emphasises that Hitler misinterpreted Backe's
comments about the Ukraine grain. A region that had little surplus and had a
substantial population increase from WW1.

Page 459:
"On 22 January 1941 Thomas had informed his boss, Keitel, that he was
planning to submit a report urging caution with regard to the
military-economic benefits of the invasion. Now he reversed directions. As
it became clear that Hitler was justifying Barbarossa first and foremost as
a campaign of economic conquest, Thomas began systematically working towards
the Fuehrer."

Thomas was head of the OKW economic planning staff. He modified his reports
from negative to positive, presenting the Ukraine as an economic
breadbasket. Thomas was an insider and it is assumed he had heard of the
misinterpreted Backe's comments to Hitler.

Page 459:
"The OKW now claimed that in the first thrust the Wehrmacht would be able to
seize control of at least 70% of the Soviet Union's industrial potential."

Page 460:
"As late as the Spring of 1941, the Foreign Ministry was still opposing the
coming war, preferring to continue the alliance with the Soviet Union
against the British Empire."

"If the shock of the initial assault does not destroy Stalin's regime, it
was evident in February 1941 that the Third Reich would find itself facing a
strategic disaster."

Page 452:
"the Germans had already conscripted virtually all their prime manpower. By
contrast, the Red Army could call up millions of reservists."

Why did Germany invade the USSR in a rushed ill-conceived plan?  Madmen!

Since today marked the 68th Anniversary of Nazi Germany's attack on
the then Soviet Union (SU) it might be interesting to review info re.
this huge surprise attack especially since it changed the nature of
WW2 and started the Eastern war where Germany committed 65% - 75% of
its armed forces. The attack was launched for ideological reasons -
crush a Socialist ideology state and gain lebensraum where the Slavic
people became virtual serfs under Nazi occupation.

The major significance of Operation Barbarossa was:

1  This was the largest Theater operation in WW2 & history - almost 3
million men (some historians claim 4.5 million)  in the German & its
allied armies were in the invasion along a 1800 mile front reaching
from the Baltic Sea almost to the black Sea.

2 Largest till then armored forces involved (mobile on German side)
mostly static on SU

3  Largest Luftwaffe operation and huge Soviet Air force airples
destroyed but mostly on the ground

4 First major defeat for the Wehrmacht in WW2 -  its attack being
checked on the approaches to Moscow, then pushed back by a SU counter-
offensive

5 After Barbarossa Wehrmacht forced to transition from Blitzkreig to a
war of attrition loosing its edge.